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Abstract 
 
The relationship between bank performance measures, namely financial and nonfinancial, and  
financial strength ratings (FSRs) has created an interesting area of research for many years. 
This thesis examines econometric qualities including explanatory, discriminatory and 
predictive powers. The main aims of this thesis are as follows: (1) to identify the main bank 
performance measures associated with high-FSRs versus low-FSRs; (2) to determine the bank 
performance measures that can discriminate banks associated with high-FSRs versus low-
FSRs; and (3) to compare the predictive capabilities of conventional techniques versus 
machine-learning techniques in predicting banks’ FSR group memberships in the Middle 
East. 
 
The analysis is performed  in three stages: (1) the analysis identifies the association between 
banks’ FSRs and performance measures by applying a multinomial logit technique; (2) the 
analysis uses the outcome of the first stage as an input to discriminate high-FSRs from low-
FSRs using discriminant analysis; and (3) machine-learning techniques (i.e., CHAID, CART 
and multilayer perceptron neural networks) and conventional techniques (i.e., discriminant 
analysis and logistic regression) are used to predict banks’ FSR group memberships. Various 
performance evaluation criteria (i.e., average correct classification rate, misclassification cost 
and gains charts) are used to evaluate the predictive capabilities of various modeling 
techniques. The data set covers the Middle Eastern countries’ commercial banks from 2001 to 
2009.  
 
Results from the first stage indicate that high-FSR banks in the Middle East are well 
capitalised, and profitability is associated with the highest relative explanatory power. Second 
stage results show that three financial variables (i.e., loan loss provision to total loans ratio, 
asset utilisation ratio and equity to net loans ratio) contribute greatly to the model’s 
discriminatory power. On the other hand, results for nonfinancial variables reveal that bank 
size and sovereign rating are the most important to the model’s discriminatory power. The 
results indicate that financial variables outperform nonfinancial variables in terms of overall 
discriminatory power. Finally, in the last stage, results show that the predictive capability of 
CHAID outperforms other machine-learning techniques (i.e., CART and multilayer 
perceptron neural networks). Regarding conventional techniques, the predictive capability of 
discriminant analysis is superior to logistic regression. In terms of comparing various 
predictive techniques, results of the performance evaluation criteria reveal that machine-
learning techniques outperform conventional techniques in predicting banks’ FSR group 
memberships. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the Study 
The relationships between bank performance measures (i.e., financial and nonfinancial) and 
banks’ Financial Strength Ratings (FSRs) provide insights into the significance of bank 
activities. The reason is that bank rating is conducted by external rating agencies (RAs) that 
use usually opaque and unpublished methods to assign a rating based on banks’ financial and 
nonfinancial measures. Singleton and Surkan (1991) stated that most practitioners and 
academe face problems with RAs such as Standard and Poor’s (S&Ps) and Moody’s 
concerning the dearth of specific public knowledge on how rating classification decisions are 
made. A lack of consensus is observed regarding the ability of RAs to assign correct bank 
ratings (Altman and Rijken, 2004; Altman and Saunders, 1997; Amato and Furfine, 2004; 
Chen, 2012). In addition, RAs face difficulties in developing an accurate credit rating system 
for banks because of the opacity of and leverage across financial institutions. This is 
supported by the fact the three major RAs (i.e., Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch) 
disagree more strongly when issuing bank ratings than when issuing corporate and country 
ratings (Cantor and Packer, 1994; Hammer et al., 2012; Moon and Stotsky, 1993; Morgan, 
2002).  
It is worth noting that the three major private rating agencies were liable for the housing 
bubble and consequently financial crash of 2007-08 (Bussani, 2010; Diomande et al., 2009). 
Along with the Asian financial crisis, the two above-mentioned crises have highlighted 
massive problems in the banking systems and that correct ratings of banks’ FSRs tends to be 
more important than ever. The reform of the rating industry became crucial especially after 
2007-2008 financial crisis and the European sovereign-debt crisis. This is a result of the fact 
that most RAs failed to foresee default events and the downgrades of corporations, sovereign 
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governments and banks (Laere et al., 2012; Sy, 2009). Thus, the need to develop an accurate 
internal bank rating model to overwhelm the whims of RAs is crucial.  
In terms of bankruptcy, a major difference exists between bank and non-bank firms. The 
bankruptcy of a large non-banking firm has relatively lesser impact on the whole economy 
than the collapse of a bank. Bank failure results in a systemic crisis that negatively affects the 
economy at large (e.g., Latin America, Asia and the US housing bubble crisis). This is mainly 
because bank failures inversely affect investors’ confidence in the financial system and 
decrease credit supply, which in turn results in economic recession. Additionally, the banking 
business depends to a great extent on public confidence, which helps banks to attract financial 
resources (i.e., deposits) and invest those resources in profitable opportunities.  
In the present economy, bank ratings have become essential especially after the recent 
financial turmoil. Bank ratings are ordinal measures that send signals to market participants 
about the banks’ current and future financial positions as well as the bank’s default 
probability. Bank FSRs are considered an important indicator for investors, depositors, 
debtors and regulators in assessing the bank’s financial strength (Pasiouras et al., 2007). In 
emerging economies, banks’ financial strength plays a vital role because of relative 
deficiencies in the financial markets; opaque banking sectors; and inadequate regulatory, 
institutional and legal environments (Godlewski, 2007). In addition, a strong bank FSR 
assists banks to access capital markets in better conditions and positively affects bank 
operations and performance. De Ceuster and Masschelein (2003) supported the notion that 
‘the credit ratings of banks provide important bits of information and hence directly serve as 
an instrument of market discipline’ (p.757). In this case, public confidence is expected to 
improve if the financial and nonfinancial measures associated with high FSRs are disclosed. 
This is one of the main objectives of this thesis.   
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1.2 Bank financial strength ratings and bank capital structure 
The relevant literature on bank FSRs includes an intermediary factor that is bank capital 
structure (CS), namely, equity as a proportion of total assets. The reason for the involvement 
of bank CS is that it affects bank FSRs given that the adjustment of capital structure is largely 
controlled by universal bank supervisory regulations (e.g., Basel I, II and III). Estrella (2000) 
investigated the importance of capital ratios in predicting US bank failures and found a strong 
association between capital ratios and S&P debt ratings. Shen et al. (2012) provided further 
support for this view and suggested that RAs treat bank capital considerably differently from 
other financial ratios. The authors concluded that bank capital is a crucial determinant of bank 
rating, as it guards against bank default even in countries with low information asymmetry.   
Therefore, as the sources of bank capital are regulated, bank FSRs are implicitly regulated. 
This requires bank managers to design financial strategies that do not deviate from 
regulations and support banks obtaining high FSRs. The above-mentioned argument, among 
others, calls for the involvement of bank CS as one of the determinants of bank FSRs 
assigned by Capital Intelligence (CI). 
1.3 The main research summary 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify the influence of bank CS and bank financial and 
nonfinancial measures on bank FSRs assigned by CI in the Middle East region using 
multinomial logit (ML) technique. In addition, this thesis determines the main financial and 
nonfinancial measures that discriminate between high-FSR and low-FSR banks using 
discriminant analysis (DA) technique.  
This is followed by an evaluation of various statistical predictive techniques to predict banks’ 
FSR group memberships. This is done by applying both machine-learning techniques (e.g., 
chi-squared automatic interaction detector [CHAID], classification and regression trees 
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[CART] and multi-layer perceptron [MLP] neural networks), as well as conventional 
techniques (e.g., DA and logistic regression [LR]). This section provides a discussion of the 
research problem, research objectives, research questions and research contribution.   
1.3.1 Research problem 
The literature on the determinants and prediction of bank FSRs is extensive and well-
established for developed economies (Belloti et al., 2011a; Hammer et al., 2012; Öğüt et al., 
2012; Pasiouras et al., 2006; Poon et al., 1999; Poon and Firth, 2005) . In terms of bank FSRs, 
the Middle East region is not as well recognised in the literature as developed countries. This 
is mainly because of four main problems that have evolved over time. 
Firstly, Middle Eastern banks’ equity financing has been obtained mainly from governments. 
Secondly, because most Middle East banks are government banks, there has been less need to 
assess banks’ creditworthiness (Harington, 1997). Governments are using their banks to 
finance their economic activities to an extent that has caused a disconnection between bank 
FSR and bank CS. Thirdly, the market forces that monitor capital risk have been absent 
because the stock markets have been underdeveloped or even non-existent in many Middle 
East countries. Consequently, there has been less interest in bank FSRs (only 47.4% of 
commercial banks—64 out of 135—are rated)1. Fourthly, the opening and development of 
various stock markets in the region have encouraged many foreign banks to establish 
themselves there. This has stimulated the mostly unrated Middle Eastern banks to make their 
performance comparable to that of the rated foreign banks. 
 
                                                 
1
 According to Bank scope database as of 27 January 2011 
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1.3.2 Research objectives 
The objectives of this thesis are derived from the above-mentioned research problems. The 
objectives reflect the orientation of this thesis, which focuses on the mutual relationships 
between banks’ CS, financial and nonfinancial measures and bank FSRs. Accordingly, the 
objectives are outlined as follows: 
(1) Examine the impact of bank CS decisions on bank FSR. This possible impact has 
its deep roots in Bank for International Settlements (BIS) universal regulations 
known as Basel I, II, and III. These regulations have a universal objective, which 
is to protect bank capital using classified guidance for bank asset quality, capital 
adequacy, credit risk, liquidity and profitability. 
(2) Investigate the association between bank FSR and bank performance in terms of 
financial and nonfinancial measures. The objective is to determine the main 
financial and nonfinancial measures associated with high- and near-high FSRs 
versus low- and near-low FSRs of active commercial banks operating in the 
Middle East. 
(3) Examine how financial and nonfinancial measures affect high- versus low-FSR in 
the Middle East. The main objective is to determine the main financial and 
nonfinancial measures that can discriminate between banks associated with high- 
versus low-FSRs. Each RA has its own customised rating system, the details of 
which are not published. Practitioners as well as researchers can benefit from this 
thesis as it helps in the design and adjustment of bank financial strategies in the 
Middle East to achieve high FSRs. 
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(4) Examine the relative explanatory power of financial versus nonfinancial measures 
for bank FSRs in the Middle East.  
(5) Examine the usefulness of conventional as well as machine-learning statistical 
predictive techniques for predicting banks’ FSR group memberships in the Middle 
East.  
It is noteworthy that this thesis differs from other related studies in various terms as follows: 
 The researcher examines bank FSR assigned by CI, in contrast to other studies that 
have investigated bank individual ratings (FBR) and bank financial strength ratings 
(BFSR) assigned by Fitch and Moody’s, respectively.2 CI is more specialised in rating 
banks in the Middle East region than the other two rating agencies. According to Bank 
scope database as of 27 January 2011, the cut-off date in this research for the 
collection of data for subsequent analysis, CI assigns bank FSRs for 64 commercial 
banks in the Middle East whereas Fitch and Moody’s issue FBR3 and BFSR for only 
50 and 48 commercial banks in the same region, respectively.  
 The researcher is using a relatively comprehensive sample in terms of time coverage, 
number of banks and current bank FSRs. 
 To the best of researcher’s knowledge, no other studies have investigated which 
financial and nonfinancial measures are associated with high- and near-high FSR 
banks in the Middle East region.  
 The researcher is not aware of other studies in the Middle East region that have 
addressed the use of conventional and machine-learning techniques in predicting 
                                                 
2
 S&P has no publicly available equivalent to these ratings.   
3
 Fitch bank individual rating has been recently withdrawn in favour of the so-called Viability Rating, which 
express the same risk levels as Fitch bank individual rating but with greater granularity.  
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banks’ FSR group memberships. Thus, the aim is to close this gap in the Middle 
Eastern banking sector.  
1.3.3 Research questions 
According to the above-mentioned research objectives, this thesis examines the questions that 
follow: 
(1) Does bank CS matter in the determination of high- and near-high FSRs versus 
low- and near-low FSRs of commercial banks in the Middle East region? 
(2) Does bank asset quality matter to high- and near-high FSRs versus low- and near-
low FSRs of commercial banks in the Middle East region? 
(3) Does bank capital adequacy matter to high- and near-high FSRs versus low- and 
near-low FSRs of commercial banks in the Middle East region? 
(4) Does bank credit risk matter to high- and near-high FSRs versus low- and near-
low FSRs of commercial banks in the Middle East region? 
(5) Does bank liquidity matter to high- and near-high FSRs versus low- and near-low 
FSRs of commercial banks in the Middle East region? 
(6) Does bank profitability matter to high- and near-high FSRs versus low- and near-
low FSRs of commercial banks in the Middle East region? 
(7) Does country sovereign rating matter to high- and near-high FSRs versus low- and 
near-low FSRs of commercial banks in the Middle East region? 
(8) Does bank size matter to high- and near-high FSRs versus low- and near-low 
FSRs of commercial banks in the Middle East region? 
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(9) Does country effect matter to high- and near-high FSRs versus low- and near-low 
FSRs of commercial banks in the Middle East region? 
(10) Does time effect matter to high- and near-high FSRs versus low- and near-low    
FSRs of commercial banks in the Middle East region? 
(11) Are bank overall financial and nonfinancial measures significant to high- and 
near-high FSRs versus low- and near-low FSRs of commercial banks in the 
Middle East region? 
(12) Are financial or nonfinancial measures more significant to Middle Eastern banks’ 
FSRs? 
(13) How can bank financial and nonfinancial measures be used to differentiate 
between banks associated with high FSRs versus low FSRs? 
(14) How can bank financial and nonfinancial measures be used to predict banks’ FSR 
group memberships by employing different statistical predictive techniques?  
1.3.4 Research hypotheses 
The above-mentioned research questions were the basis for the development of the following 
hypotheses: 
HA1: A positive association exists between bank CS and the level of FSRs
 4
. 
HA2: A negative association exists between bank asset quality and the level of FSRs. 
HA3: A positive association exists between bank capital adequacy and the level of FSRs.  
                                                 
4
 Clearly, the null hypothesis (H01) expresses no relationship exists between bank CS and the level of FSRs and 
null hypotheses corresponding to the subsequent hypotheses can be derived similarly. 
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HA4: A negative association exists between bank credit risk and the level of FSRs. 
HA5: A positive association exists between bank liquidity and the level of FSRs. 
HA6: A positive association exists between bank profitability and the level of FSRs. 
HA7: A positive association exists between country sovereign ratings and the level of 
FSRs. 
HA8: A positive association exists between bank size and the level of FSRs. 
HA9: A positive association exists between country effect and the level of FSRs. 
HA10: A positive association exists between time effect and the level of FSRs
5
. 
HA11: All financial and nonfinancial measures are associated with higher explanatory 
power than individual bank categories. 
HA12: Financial measures are associated with higher explanatory power than nonfinancial 
measures. 
HA13: Financial measures are associated with higher discriminatory power than 
nonfinancial measures.  
HA14: In terms of banks’ FSR group memberships prediction, sophisticated machine-
learning techniques outperform conventional techniques. 
 
 
                                                 
5
 This hypothesis requires particular formulation as far as banks should be concerned with improving FSR 
through time (DeSerpa, 1971). 
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1.3.5 Contribution of this research to the existing literature 
The contribution of this thesis can be outlined as follows. 
(1) This thesis discusses the association between bank CS and bank FSR in the 
Middle East. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, recognisable current and 
relevant research on this topic has addressed the relationship between credit rating 
and capital structure using data mainly from US and other developed countries 
(Graham and Harvey, 2001; Kisgen, 2006; Shivdasani and Zenner, 2005). The 
findings of this thesis in the Middle East may deepen the understanding of the 
relationship between bank CS and bank FSRs in different regions. 
(2) The researcher examines financial as well as nonfinancial measures that may have 
an effect on bank FSR in the Middle East. The contribution is that both types of 
data address the extent to which public data provide reasonable and adequate 
explanatory power for bank FSR in the Middle East. This argument is based on 
inherent academic claims that a lack of consensus is observed regarding the basis 
upon which bank FSR is assigned by private RAs (Bussani, 2010; Diomande et 
al., 2009). Therefore, the method used in this thesis validates bank FSRs issued by 
RAs in the Middle East region. 
(3) The method adopted by RAs to produce bank FSRs does not reveal how financial 
and nonfinancial measures are used.
6
 The method offered in this thesis provides 
systematic and practical approach to the assignment of banks in the Middle East of 
                                                 
6
 In a personal communication (29 March 2010) between the researcher and Capital Intelligence, Capital 
Intelligence confirmed that the basis of assigning a certain FSR to a bank is neither revealed to the bank nor to 
the public. 
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high- and near-high FSRs versus banks with low- and near-low FSRs. This 
perspective is quite different from other relevant studies as it provides an answer 
to the following question: Why does a bank FSR matter? This thesis offers 
significant contribution to the bank rating literature for the Middle East from both 
a policy and an academic perspective in terms of formulating banking strategies 
that promote high- and near-high FSRs.  
(4) The contribution of this thesis also addresses the possible association between 
bank activities (asset quality, capital adequacy, credit risk, profitability and 
liquidity) and bank FSRs in the Middle East. The reason is that bank financial 
strategies are primarily formulated on an individual basis at different departments 
and then aggregated at the end of the financial period. It is necessary to show how 
each bank activity provides a contribution to the overall bank FSR. The researcher 
shows the relative contribution of each bank activity to the formulation of 
effective bank strategies by examining the individual role of each activity as well 
as the aggregate role in relation to different levels of bank FSR. 
(5) This thesis contributes to the current and relevant literature in that it examines all 
of the econometric qualities of the models commonly discussed in literature. 
These qualities include the explanatory, discriminatory and the predictive powers 
of the models. This thesis applies wide range of statistical techniques to predict 
banks’ FSR group memberships in the Middle East. These techniques include 
conventional methods (i.e., DA and LR) as well as machine-learning techniques, 
(i.e., CHAID, CART and MLP neural networks). The modelling of predictive 
banks’ FSR group memberships helps bank managers to understand the intrinsic 
process used by CI’s analysts. 
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1.4 The structure of the thesis 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. The first chapter introduces the thesis. The second 
chapter starts with a review of the rating definition, purpose and its relative importance to the 
economy and distinguishes between solicited and unsolicited ratings. Chapter two continues 
by explaining in detail the methodology of bank rating as practiced by RAs with a special 
focus on CI bank rating methodology. This is followed by a review of related studies that 
have investigated the determinants of bank ratings. This chapter concludes by introducing 
relevant knowledge about the performance of the financial sector, especially the banking 
sector, in the Middle East region as well as an overview of the main activities and rating scale 
definition for major RAs in the world. 
The third chapter discusses the research methods used in this thesis in terms of the data 
(classified into four quartiles according to FSR: high, near-high, low and near-low). The 
chapter also provides a detailed explanation of the financial and nonfinancial measures used 
in this thesis. This chapter concludes with a review of the various statistical methods that are 
employed in the analysis.  
Chapters four and five are the focus of this thesis. Chapter four presents the results of the 
multinomial logit (ML) for the five main bank performance categories (asset quality, capital 
adequacy, credit risk, liquidity and profitability) as well as the overall category that includes 
the above-mentioned five categories. In each category, the regression results are divided into 
two parts: the first regression model reports results without the inclusion of nonfinancial 
measures and the second regression model reports the results after the addition of 
nonfinancial measures to the regression model. 
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Chapter five reports a wide range of banks’ FSR group memberships predictive models’ 
classification rates, misclassification costs and gains charts results of various statistical 
predictive techniques (conventional and machine-learning) using the entire data set and two 
different subsamples. In addition, chapter five provides the results of the DA, including the 
main financial and nonfinancial measures that can be used to discriminate between banks 
with high- versus low-FSRs in the Middle East region. Chapter six concludes by pinpointing 
the main findings of this thesis and suggests some policy implications that may be useful for 
bank management and policymakers in the Middle East region. 
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CHAPTER 2: A REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature on bank FSR and is organised as follows. Section 2.2 starts 
by explaining the ratings definition, purpose and the RAs’ mechanism. This is followed by a 
review of the differences between solicited and unsolicited ratings. Section 2.3 discusses the 
methodology of bank rating as practiced by RAs with particular focus on CI’s bank rating 
methodology. Section 2.4 discusses the relationship between a bank’s rating and its capital 
structure. Section 2.5 reviews the relevant literature about bank rating and its determinants. 
Section 2.6 introduces relevant knowledge about the financial sector, especially the banking 
sector, in the Middle East region. Section 2.7 reviews the most common RAs in terms of the 
meaning of rating scales used by every rating agency. Finally, section 2.8 concludes this 
chapter.  
2.2 Rating definition and purpose 
This section introduces the definition of rating as per different RAs, discusses the purpose of 
the rating, highlights the mechanism adopted by RAs and finally distinguishes between 
solicited and unsolicited ratings.  
2.2.1 Rating definition 
John Moody issued the first publicly available railroad bond ratings to bond investors in 
1909. This was followed by Moody’s firm and Poor’s Publishing Company in 1916, the 
Standard Statistics company in 1922, and the Fitch Publishing company in 1924 (White, 
2010). According to Moody’s Investor’s Service (2012), rating is defined as ‘the purpose of 
Moody’s ratings is to provide investors with a simple system of gradation by which future 
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relative creditworthiness of securities may be gauged.’ (para.1). Similarly, Standard & Poor’s 
(2012a) defines rating as ‘…agency’s opinion about the ability and willingness of an issuer, 
such as a corporation or state or city government, to meet its financial obligations in full and 
on time.’ (para.1). Also, Fitch (2013) defines rating as  
‘. . .an opinion on the relative ability of an entity to meet financial commitments, such 
as interest, preferred dividends, repayment of principal, insurance claims or 
counterparty obligations. Credit ratings are used by investors as indications of the 
likelihood of receiving the money owed to them in accordance with the terms on 
which they invested.’(p.6)  
In addition, CI (2011) defines rating as ‘…the general creditworthiness of an entity 
(sovereign, bank or corporate) and the likelihood that it will meet its financial obligations in a 
timely manner.’ (para. 1)  
In the light of these definitions, rating is a multidimensional, forward-looking process that 
generates signals and indicators used to assess the creditworthiness of borrowers and to 
minimise default rates (Boot et al., 2006; Cantor and Packer, 1994). Financial intermediaries 
(banks and non-banking institutions) are key players in this area. RAs gather, analyse and 
process information to produce some rating indices. These indices guide investors in 
differentiating between good and bad borrowers.  
2.2.2 Rating purpose 
The rating process—whether sovereigns, banks or corporate—does not constitute a 
recommendation to purchase, sell or hold a particular security. It neither points out any 
investment opportunity that is suitable for a particular investor nor is it used as an audit or 
control of the company’s finances. RAs stress that their ratings constitute opinions (Fight, 
2001). However, sometimes the high fees of RAs may be justified in terms of facilitating easy 
access to capital markets, building international market reputation, lowering costs of 
borrowing and providing issuers with great financial flexibility.  
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From investors’ points of view, ratings reduce uncertainty, which in turn promotes market 
growth and enhances efficiency and liquidity. Boot et al. (2006) stated, ‘Rating agencies 
could be seen as information-processing agencies that may speed up the dissemination of 
information to financial markets’ (p. 84). It is obvious that RAs have, or must have, a 
significant role mitigating the agency problem, thus reducing the associated agency costs. 
That is, RAs reduce uncertainty to guide investors to select benchmark investments with 
manageable risks and limit agency costs
7
. For example, credit-rating restrictions can be 
written into the mandate for the management of large public fund, restricting investment in 
speculative grade securities. For this reason, most companies and international debt issuers 
ask for a rating from one of the nationally recognised statistical ratings organisations 
(NRSROs)
8
.  
From RAs’ points of view, high costs may be required to conduct dependable quantitative 
analysis (e.g., ratio analysis, cash flow analysis, macroeconomic variables, sovereign risk, 
and industry analysis) as well as accurate qualitative analysis (e.g., assessment of financial 
strength, management performance and corporate governance). Perhaps differences between 
agencies in this regard explain why few of them have gained international reputations. 
2.2.3 Rating agencies’ mechanism  
RAs are privately owned; operate without government mandate; are independent from the 
investment community and expert in the process of issuing ratings and debt instruments. The 
                                                 
7
 Agency theory is a concept that explains the relationship between principals, namely shareholders, and agents 
of the principals, namely company executives. The agency theory addresses two agency problems to deal with: 
(1) the conflict of interest between principal and agent (2) the difference of risk attitudes between principal and 
agent. Agency costs arise from agency problems that are borne by shareholders and represent a loss of 
shareholder wealth (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). 
8
 NRSRO include list of RAs that are authorized by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to 
issue ratings for certain regulatory purpose. The RAs designated as NRSROs are as follows: Standard & Poor’s 
Ratings Services, Moody’s Investors Services, Fitch Ratings, Kroll Bond Rating Agency, A.M. Best Company, 
Dominion Bond Rating Service, Ltd, Japan Credit Rating Agency, Ltd, Egan-Jones Rating Company, 
Morningstar, Inc., and HR Ratings. 
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world of rating consists of about 150 RAs operating worldwide. Moody’s Investor Service 
and Standard & Poor’s, which control about 80% of the market, dominate the industry 
worldwide. They have a designation from the NRSRO apart from their sustained creditability; 
they have revealed personnel and know-how advantages. CI is another example of a well-
known international agency that specialises in analysing banks in emerging markets. 
Development and history, shareholding structure, analyst recruitment policies and 
qualifications and the marketing of services and publications differ across agencies. 
It is noteworthy that a conflict of interest has automatically arisen in the rating industry as a 
result of the transition from charging investors to charging issuers. This is supported by the 
fact that 90% of Moody’s and Fitch’s revenues come from fees paid by the issuers (U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 2003). Thus, certified RAs have more interest in 
helping issuers benefit from a favoured regulatory treatment rather than providing valuable 
and accurate information to investors. Weber and Darbellay (2008) argued that certified RAs 
may favour issuers at the expense of investors to benefit from a favoured regulatory 
approach. In this regard, the accessible information for investors may be inaccurate. In the 
same context, it has been argued that certified RAs no longer care about their reputation 
relative to the generation of valuable information to investors as a consequence of the ratings-
dependent regulation. This normally articulates the failure of RAs in announcing an issuer’s 
downgrade and in issuing inflated ratings. Therefore, it is perceived that RAs are not in a 
position to anticipate financial crisis. 
The global financial system experienced a severe financial crisis in 2007-2008. Consequently, 
this led to the bankruptcy of many banks in the United States and Europe; of those that did 
not fail, many banks were either taken over or rescued by their governments. In spite of the 
fact that the 2007-2008 financial crisis originated from the subprime lending of the housing 
market, its effect extends across various segments of the credit market. The 2007-2008 
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financial crisis’ impact on major commercial banks is supported by the fact that Citigroup, 
one of the largest commercial banks, between the second quarter of 2007 and October 2008, 
shrank from $255 bn to $82 bn
 
( Liu and Mello, 2008). The financial crisis and the European 
sovereign-debt crisis assist practitioners and researchers to pinpoint the main problems that 
face RAs, such as conflict of interest, failure to rate derivatives, lack of accountability, 
barriers to entry in the rating industry (lack of competition) and vague and questionable rating 
methods (Bolton et al., 2012; Laere et al., 2012; Sy, 2009; White, 2010). 
2.2.4 Solicited vs. unsolicited 
As mentioned earlier, the working and functioning environment of RAs have drawn 
considerable public attention for several reasons: (1) RAs failed to predict the 1997 Asian 
crisis and many other corporate scandals such as Enron (2001), WorldCom, Inc. (2002) and 
Lehman Brothers (2008) as well as the 2007-2008 financial crises and European sovereign-
debt rating; (2) RAs play a vital role in the regulatory mechanism of financial markets; and 
(3) doubts concerning the transparency and reliability of the rating process, especially the 
practice of unsolicited rating. Unsolicited rating is the rating conducted by RAs without a 
formal permission from the issuer.  
The first issue of unsolicited ratings was made by Moody’s in 1909. Public information 
rating and shadow ratings are softer terms used by RAs (S&P and Fitch, respectively) for 
unsolicited ratings. Moody’s has a policy of not distinguishing between solicited and 
unsolicited ratings and thus initiated a statement that accompanies the assignment of 
unsolicited ratings: ‘This rating was initiated by Moody’s. The issuer did not participate in 
the assignment processes’. CI also assigns ratings on an unsolicited basis based on public 
information; these ratings are formatted in lowercase letters (i.e., bbb+ or a-).   
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According to Baker and Mansi (2002), unsolicited ratings result in a conflict among issuers, 
investors, RAs and regulators alike. Such conflict stems from the fact that unsolicited ratings 
tend to be lower than solicited ratings (Poon, 2003; Van-Roy, 2006). It has been argued that 
some banks consider Moody’s practice of assigning unsolicited ratings as blackmail 
(Harington, 1997). Among others, Moon and Stotsky (1993), Cantor and Packer (1997) and 
Pottier and Sommer (1999) stressed that controlling for self-selection bias, rating 
determinants and their importance as well as rating scales differ significantly across RAs. For 
unsolicited ratings, the reason for this perceived downward bias is either to persuade issuers 
to pay for higher solicited ratings or the absence of formal, in-depth meetings between RAs 
and the issuer’s management. These meetings provide RAs with inside (i.e., private) 
information about the entity being rated that may not have been disclosed in its published 
annual reports (Golin, 2001). In line with this, Baker and Mansi (2002) stated that unsolicited 
ratings are less accurate than solicited ones because of the absence of inside information. 
Thus, private information plays a crucial role in determining accurate ratings to be assigned 
by RAs.  
On the other hand, RAs defend unsolicited ratings as being of great importance to investors 
and market participants who request ratings for institutions that are unwilling to participate in 
the rating process or pay the rating fees. Moreover, RAs have argued that unsolicited ratings 
increase competition among RAs and that unsolicited ratings prevent firms from so-called 
rating-shopping. Rating-shopping occurs when firms shop among different agencies for the 
highest rating and hold back lower conclusions.  
Byoun and Shin (2002) used 221 unsolicited new ratings and 85 unsolicited rating changes as 
well as 27 solicited new ratings and 81 solicited rating changes in non-U.S. corporations (i.e., 
in 16 countries) between 1996 and 2002. The main objective of this research is to examine 
the effect of solicited and unsolicited ratings on stock prices. The authors concluded that low-
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grade and downgraded unsolicited ratings are much more profound to market’s reactions than 
high-grade and upgraded ones. The empirical results also revealed significant negative market 
reactions associated with new low grades and downgrade announcements of unsolicited 
ratings. On the other hand, for solicited ratings, the research concluded that negative market 
reactions only accompany downgraded ratings. This indicates that solicited ratings are used 
by good firms to signal good performance indices to the market, unlike poor performance 
firms that choose not to signal. Consequently, unsolicited ratings signal negative information 
about a firm’s performance in the market.      
It is worth mentioning that many studies (Poon, 2003; Poon and Firth, 2004)
9
 have discussed 
the major differences in treatments between solicited and unsolicited corporate/ bank ratings. 
The two studies used a standard sample selection model that accounted for self-selection into 
solicited status. The results demonstrate that unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than solicited 
ones after controlling for differences in key financial characteristics, sovereign risk and 
sample selection. In addition, firms that ask for ratings have stronger financial profiles in 
terms of liquidity, profitability, leverage and financial flexibility than issuers that do not ask 
for ratings. Moreover, firms operating in countries with an investment-grade sovereign rating 
have higher ratings than in countries with a speculative-grade sovereign rating. This means 
that sovereign ratings positively affect ratings.  
                                                 
9
 Poon (2003a) using pooled time-series cross-sectional data on 265 insurance companies in 15 developing 
countries rated by S&P during 1998-2000. The dependent variable was LTR issued by S&P. The independent 
variables were five dummy variables that refer to the solicited rating, Japanese issuers and sovereign ratings 
(three levels). This is in addition to four financial variables (EBIT interest coverage and return on assets as 
proxies for firm profitability, total debt to capital as a proxy for firm capital structure and short-term debt to total 
debt as a proxy for firm financial flexibility). Ordered-probit model was used. The author concluded that rating 
agencies have differently weighted the same financial indicators in issuing ratings to Japanese and non-Japanese 
issuers. In addition, the results indicated that capital structure and financial flexibility (profitability) are 
negatively (positively) statistically significant for LTRs. Profitability and sovereign credit risk were the two 
major factors used to determine the LTRs. In the same context, Poon and Firth (2004) considered Fitch’s ratings 
of 951 banks in 82 countries.   
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Along with this, Butler and Cornaggia (2012)
10
 examined the role of agency-firm 
relationships in the rating process. They used cross-sectional regression to examine whether 
or not a favourable rating assigned to issuers is the result of their paying high rating fees. The 
authors concluded that there is no obvious conflict of interest between RAs and issuers. That 
is, solicitation of a rating encourages RAs to rely more on so-called soft information and 
place less weight on hard information.
11
  
Similarly, Gan (2004)
12
 examined whether or not RAs (in particular, S&P and Moody’s) use 
consistent standards in solicited and unsolicited ratings. The author addressed this question by 
looking initially at the ex ante analysis, which states whether unsolicited issues are indeed 
given lower ratings than solicited issues, with the same observable issuer characteristics. This 
was followed by looking at the ex post analysis, which states whether unsolicited ratings 
perform better than solicited ones after the issuance of the rating while controlling for issuers’ 
characteristics.  
The author pointed out that both RAs issue significantly lower ratings to unsolicited issues. 
The main message of this study was that the performance of solicited and unsolicited issues is 
significantly the same. Perhaps, on the one hand, this is inconsistent with the so-called 
punishment hypothesis, in which RAs rate unsolicited issuers lower than they deserve so as to 
force future payments. On the other hand, this approach seems consistent with the private-
information hypothesis, in which RAs issue lower ratings for unsolicited issues because of 
self-selection based on private information. Consequently, the author concluded that, holding 
                                                 
10
 Butler and Cornaggia (2012) used a sample of 360 issued bonds by 153 firms during 1997 for which the firm 
hired at least one RA. The paper used high fees paid to RAs by issuers as a proxy for solicited rating and those 
with medium or low rating fees as a proxy for unsolicited rating. Authors used ‘hard’ information terminology 
for public information and ‘soft’ information terminology for private information that come directly from issuer.  
11
 Authors have excluded bonds with zero rating fees from their sample, which may have created a selection 
problem in their sample.  
12
 The author used a sample of 1,410 bond issues by 303 firm rated by both S&P and Moody’s during 1994 to 
1998. In line with Bulter and Cornaggia (2012), the author used rating fees reported in the registration statement 
to distinguish between solicited and unsolicited issues. 
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public information constant, firms with more favourable private information self-select into 
the soliciting group. 
In addition, Van-Roy (2006) examined the possibility of whether or not Fitch treats solicited 
and unsolicited bank ratings differently. The self-selection hypothesis and public-disclosure 
hypothesis are the two main hypotheses examined in this study. The former hypothesis states 
that better banks may self-select to be rated and that poor quality banks may not request to be 
rated. The latter hypothesis states that the significance of private information to rating 
agencies is minimised if banks with unsolicited ratings reveal extensive public information 
that compensate for the absence of private information. 
The empirical results of Van-Roy (2006) reveal that the ratios of loan loss provision to net 
interest revenue and the ratio of net loans to total assets (disclosure index and return on 
assets) have a significantly negative (positive) impact on individual bank ratings. 
Interestingly, the author found that financial and nonfinancial characteristics are not the main 
reason for the difference in treatment between solicited and unsolicited ratings. However, 
unsolicited ratings tend to be lower as they are based mainly on public information. Thus, the 
results reject the self-selection hypothesis and are consistent with those of the public-
disclosure hypothesis. This means that banks that publish extensive public information do not 
receive lower unsolicited ratings. However, the relevance of these results to other regions is 
questionable as the research data are extracted from banks located in Asia only.   
In the same context, Poon et al. (2009) used time-series cross sectional data from 460 
commercial banks in 72 countries, excluding United States, that had solicited and unsolicited 
long-term credit ratings in local currency issued by S & P from 1998 to 2003. Controlling for 
the effects of diverse financial profiles and self-selection bias, the main objective of the study 
was to identify and examine how and why solicited and unsolicited ratings may differ.  
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In line with Van-Roy (2006), the results of Poon et al. (2009) showed that unsolicited bank 
ratings are lower than solicited ones. This result can be understood in the light of differences 
in financial profiles and solicitation status across solicited and unsolicited bank ratings. 
Following this, it has been proposed that among other factors, country sovereign risk, bank 
profitability and bank size impose crucial influences on bank ratings. The empirical results 
revealed that return on assets (the ratio of loan loss reserve to gross loan) is positively 
(negatively) significant for Standard & Poor’s long-term rating. Thus, large and profitable 
banks with relatively low non-performing loans to gross loans located in countries with high 
sovereign ratings tend to have higher Standard & Poor’s long-term ratings than small and less 
profitable banks located in countries with low sovereign ratings. Poon et al. concluded that 
the solicitations do matter to bank ratings and that the impact of solicitation on bank rating is 
much more significant than that caused by differences in financial profile.  
2.3 The methodology of bank rating 
There is a strong relationship between sound and stable financial systems and the goal of 
sustainable macroeconomic and structural policies in the Middle East region. The sound 
financial systems result in wise allocation of resources and thus are considered a prerequisite 
for economic stability. On the other hand, macroeconomic volatility results in a negative 
impact on financial stability. In the Middle East region, financial stability and soundness are 
strongly affected by the soundness of the banking system, mainly because of the absence of 
capital markets’ role in resource allocation. This role highlights the significant importance of 
bank FSR as an indicator of the soundness and stability of the banking system (Laruccia and 
Revoltella, 2000).  
Banks are special and their unique and opaque characteristics, functions, operations, 
regulations, asset-structure, involved risk, and state protection laws necessitate special rating 
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methodologies. Morgan (2002) noted that the two major bond RAs (i.e., Moody’s and S&P) 
have more split ratings for banks than for corporations, which suggests that bank opacity 
hinders RAs’ ability to quantify banks’ risks and thus to issue a correct rating is difficult.13 
This risk stems from the nature of bank assets, especially loans and trading assets, for which 
uncertainty is hard to observe, as well as banks’ high leverage, through which agency 
problems may be introduced.  
In general, bank rating methodology can be framed by RAs into a set of questions to assess 
bank’s stability. RAs want to know more details about banks’ loan portfolios, in terms of 
economic sector, country risk, and currency; the breakdown between secured and unsecured 
lending; the rules and regulation imposed by the bank on loans to individual borrowers and 
the procedures for setting such rules and regulations; how banks assess and define doubtful 
and/or non-performing credits; disclosure of off-balance-sheet items and the amount of loan 
loss provision allocated by the bank. RAs are interested in knowing a breakdown of trading 
and investment securities portfolios as well as portfolios managed by the bank in terms of 
type of instruments (equity or fixed interest), the issuer, currency and maturity.  
It is also should be noted that RAs review bank interest rates and currency sensitivity. In 
addition, rating analysts check whether or not the inner or hidden reserves can be officially 
recognised and qualify as adequate capital. This is followed by calculating the bank’s capital 
weighted risk ratio as per the Basel G10 agreement. It is noteworthy that RAs must pay close 
attention to the makeup of the capital and examine both tier 1 and tier 2 capital
.
 Moreover, 
RAs focus on the nature and characteristics of the bank’s revenue stream and expenses. In 
addition, information about the ownership structure, contingent liability against the bank and 
                                                 
13
 Split ratings indicate that banks or firms receive different ratings from two or more RAs. The main objective 
of Morgan (2002) was to identify the main differences between the two RAs (Moody’s and S&P) in determining 
bank rating assignments using ordered logit regression.    
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reports on the bank by the national supervisory authority’s and independent auditors are 
information needed by RAs to assess the creditworthiness of banks.  
2.3.1 CAMEL approach 
CAMEL (i.e., capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings and liquidity) is an 
analytical approach suggested by Moody’s to assess a bank’s overall safety, stability and 
soundness.
14
 As mentioned earlier, individual bank ratings are published by Moody’s, Fitch 
and CI, which issue BFSRs, FBRs and FSRs respectively. However, S&P has no publicly 
available equivalent to these individual bank ratings. 
2.3.1.1 Capital adequacy  
Bank equity capital, the first element, provides a buffer against unexpected losses and thus 
assists banks to survive, thereby overcoming the risk of insolvency. That is, a bank’s equity 
capital acts as the last resort or defence against failure because any losses suffered by a bank 
are potentially written off against capital. In the case of unavoidable bankruptcy, Bras and 
Andrews (2003) stated that bank equity capital protects depositors, creditors and investors 
against expected losses that should be borne by them. It is worth mentioning that the size of a 
bank’s equity capital and its capital adequacy (i.e., the proportion of the bank’s capital 
relative to its risk) are considered by RAs to be the most important factors in the analysis of 
bank creditworthiness. Rawcliffe and Andrews (2003) pointed out that bigger banks (in terms 
of absolute size of equity) are more likely to be significant to their domestic economies as the 
probability of receiving external support exists strongly, if needed, and thus decreases the risk 
that the bank will default. Many studies in the literature have stated that high capital strength 
ratios result in better bank ratings (Laruccia and Revoltella, 2000; Pasiouras et al., 2006, 
                                                 
14
 In 1997, a sixth component, a bank’s sensitivity to market risk was added to the CAMEL model; hence, the 
acronym was changed to CAMELS. The main objective of this measure is to test the impact of changing market 
conditions on bank profitability and the value of its assets and liabilities. 
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2007; Poon et al., 2009; Poon and Firth, 2005; Van-Roy, 2006).This implies that well-
capitalised banks tend to acquire higher bank FSRs. 
2.3.1.2 Asset quality 
Asset quality (e.g., diversification, loan growth, adjusted returns, credit policy and 
provisions)
15
 is the second crucial element of CAMEL. Asset quality refers basically to the 
quality of the bank’s earning assets, which is composed mainly of the bank’s loan portfolio 
(credit risk) and securities portfolio (market risks) as well as off-balance-sheet items (e.g., 
guarantees, letters of credit and derivative instruments). The importance of bank asset quality 
examination to RAs stems from the fact that a bank with poor asset quality is associated 
negatively with its profitability by reducing the spread between interest income and provision 
costs; thus a bank’s net profits erodes over time.  
Accordingly, a bank with poor asset quality is closer to insolvency and thus will be associated 
with low FSRs. Poon et al. (1999) found that the most important factors used to classify 
Moody’s bank ratings are loan provision information and bank risk, respectively. Laruccia 
and Revoltella (2000), Poon and Firth (2005), Pasiouras et al. (2006), Van-Roy (2006), Poon 
et al. (2009) and Laere et al. (2012) found that banks with better asset quality (in terms of 
loan portfolio) have better probability of acquiring a high bank rating. 
2.3.1.3 Earnings 
Along with the above two elements, profitability (return on equity [ROE] and return on assets 
[ROA], stability of income streams, trend and track of profits, dividends payout potential) is 
the third element used in the assessment of banks current financial performance and growth 
prospects. Profitability is an important area for RAs to analyse as bank income ultimately 
                                                 
15
 In spite of the increasing sophistication of banks and growing market risk, the principal risk for most banks 
remains credit risk, which is reflected in the analysis of asset quality (e.g., loan portfolio including type, size, 
maturity, currency, geographical distribution and economic sector).    
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affects its survival and existence. Profitability is a quantitative measure of management’s 
ability to utilise assets efficiently to create value for shareholders and maintain and improve 
capital soundness. In the same context, in the analysis of profitability, it is important to 
determine the extent of diversification (types and sources) of earning streams. Poon et al. 
(1999), Laruccia and Revoltella (2000), Poon and Firth (2005), Pasiouras et al. (2006), Van-
Roy (2006), Pasiouras et al. (2007) , Poon et al. (2009) and Laere et al. (2012) concluded that 
profitable banks tend to obtain high bank ratings, and insolvent banks seem to have problems 
generating adequate profits (Wheelock and Wilson, 2000). 
2.3.1.4 Management quality  
The fourth element is management quality (e.g., experience, reputation and technical skills, 
honesty and integrity, eagerness to keep well regulated environment, strategic planning and 
the ability to keep effective internal and external communication), which is a subjective 
element in bank analysis. Management quality is the ability of managers to generate the 
maximum revenue from available earning assets and to control bank costs. Therefore, 
management efficiency in generating revenues and managing expenses is another factor that 
assists RAs to understand the creditworthiness of a bank and thus to assign the appropriate 
bank rating (Pasiouras et al., 2006). 
2.3.1.5 Liquidity 
The fifth component is liquidity (stability of customer base, whether loans and funding are 
well matched and overall liquidity position), which is an important evaluation element for 
both good banks and stressed ones. Banks are highly concerned with liquidity risk; that is, the 
chance that bank will not be able to meet its current financial obligations (e.g., those of 
depositors) because of insufficient current assets such as cash and quickly marketable 
securities, especially during economic recession (Golin, 2001). Laruccia and Revoltella 
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(2000) found that banks with low net loans to assets ratio (good liquidity position) tend to 
obtain better BFSRs assigned by Moody’s. Poon and Firth (2005) and Pasiouras et al. (2006) 
concluded that banks with high loans to total asset ratio (poor liquidity position) acquire low 
FBRs.  
2.3.2 Capital Intelligence bank rating methodology 
The CI rating process is summarised in Figure 2-1. CI adopted a more specialised approach to 
the assessment of bank stability (Capital Intelligence, 2012). This approach considers 
operating environment, ownership and governance, franchise value, management and 
strategies, risk profile and financial profile as major determinants of bank’s stability.  
Figure2.1: CI’s rating process  
 
Source: Capital Intelligence (2012) 
A bank’s operating environment includes the evaluation of the country’s economic structure; 
political stability; country’s legal system; the developments in the money, capital and real 
estate markets; and government policies changes that might impact the banking industry. CI 
examines the role of the stability of the bank’s ownership structure and the eagerness of 
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owners to support the bank in hard times. In line with this, the bank’s position in the domestic 
banking sector also is examined by CI in terms of market share of assets and various business 
sectors. This is considered as an essential indicator of bank earnings performance, both 
current and future.  
This is followed by CI’s judgement about the organisational structure of the bank, 
management’s degree of independence from the bank’s owners and the management 
qualification needed to plan and react to changes in the environment. CI evaluates bank’s risk 
profile, which comprises market, operational and legal risks. Market risk is related directly to 
unpredicted fluctuations in market prices (interest rates, exchange rates, equity prices and 
prices of final goods) and is closely associated with asset and liability management. 
Operational risk may arise as a result of inadequate or failed internal and/or external 
processes and systems. In line with these concerns, various sources of conflict between 
market participants may lead to legal risk.  
CI concludes its process by assessing the bank’s financial profile, which includes asset 
quality, capital, liquidity and profitability. Finally, CI assesses these factors and issues bank 
FSRs according to a score based on these assessments. In this thesis, one objective is to assess 
the contribution of bank’s financial and nonfinancial profile in the assignment of high- and 
near-high FSRs to formulate financial strategies for bank managers who seek high FSRs. 
Another aim is to identify the relative importance of financial and nonfinancial variables for 
CI analysts in the assignment of high FSRs and thus assist bank mangers in designing the 
relevant financial policies that promote banks’ high FSRs.   
2.4 Bank rating and bank capital structure  
In the process of financial intermediation, banks face severe competition, which forces them 
to incur various types of financial and nonfinancial risks. It is known that the growth of any 
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business is linked with greater risk, as higher risk must be compensated with higher return. 
This ultimately forces entities to trade-off between risk and return. Risk arises from expected 
and unexpected events. In the case of expected losses, banks can overcome risk by 
appropriate pricing methods. The unexpected loss is created mainly by the bank itself and it 
must be covered by the mandatory capital.  
Accordingly, the importance of bank CS and the need for an adequate capital is recognised. 
Because the capital allocation process is based on risk sensitivity, bank regulators seek to 
prevent or reduce the probability of bank failure. The goal is to enhance banks’ stability, 
safety, soundness and prevent system disaster that eventually provide safeguard to bank 
depositors. It seems that ideal bank CS is of great concern for any bank because of the new 
international standards (i.e., Basel II), the severe competition between banks because of 
technological improvements and to boost bank financial strength to meet eventualities that 
may pose adverse financial impact. In this context, efficient bank ratings protect financial 
firms against unexpected losses and failure. It is obvious that efficient bank ratings are crucial 
in environments characterised by asymmetric information such as the Middle East region. 
Mishkin (2012) states that asymmetric information occurs when one party (principal) has 
inadequate information about the other party (agent) involved in a transaction that eventually 
may lead to inaccurate decisions. In the banking industry, the lack of, and in many other 
cases, the incomplete information about borrowers’ creditworthiness provides an example of 
the existence of information asymmetry in the Middle East (Best and Zhang, 1993). 
 The literature shows that asymmetric information result in various kinds of moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems. It is noteworthy that adverse selection problem arises before 
entering into a financial transaction, while moral hazard problem does exist after the financial 
transaction has occurred (McCaskie, 1999). As far as the banking industry is concerned, these 
two problems may result in a failure in banks’ credit system, a loss of depositors’ confidence 
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in the financial reserves systems and consequently a negative influence on bank FSR. On the 
macroeconomic perspective, these two problems may end up with a systemic banking crises 
causing a collapse in the financial system and thereby creating an economic crises such as 
1997 Asian financial crises and 2008 global financial crises (Akerlof, 1970; Bester, 1985; 
Berndt and Gupta, 2009; Freimer and Gordon, 1965; Harris, 1974; Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992; Stein, 1998; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).   
The moral hazard problem is exemplified in the Middle East banks as far as they do not 
consider the full consequences and responsibility of their actions, and therefore have a 
tendency to act more risky than they would have otherwise. This source of risk is mainly due 
to the fact that the majority of Middle Eastern banks are government-owned. Therefore, 
banks’ operations and decisions are protected intensely by the government. In addition, 
adverse selection problem occurs due to the fact that banks in the Middle East region may 
issue loans to customers without remunerate the associated credit risk appropriately. That is, 
customers’ creditworthiness is not fully operationalized due to the banks’ lack of complete 
information about customers.   To overcome this issue, the operation of banks in unsecured 
markets urges banks to maintain a sufficiently high FSR. 
In the banking industry, economic capital
16
 is defined as the amount of equity needed by a 
bank to cover, with a chosen confidence level, unexpected losses in its portfolio over a given 
time. Such a confidence level explains the bank’s solvency standard (defined as one minus 
the probability of default for a representative bank). This implies that economic capital can be 
effectively linked to a rating category that historically displays the same solvency standard. 
Jackson et al. (2002) confirmed that a bank with an A rating is characterised by a 99.96% 
                                                 
16 Economic capital is defined as the risk capital used by the bank to cover the three basic risks (market, credit 
and operational). In other words, economic capital is the amount of money needed for survival in the worst case 
scenario. Economic capital differs from regulatory capital in that the latter is the obligatory capital required by 
regulators to be maintained, whereas economic capital is the best estimate of the required capital that banks use 
internally to manage their own risk. 
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solvency standard; equally, a bank that seeks an A rating must reserve economic capital using 
the 99.96% confidence level. Jokivuolle and Peura (2006) pointed out that banks that seek the 
minimum rating target hold a capital buffer in excess of the minimum amount of economic 
capital.  
Gordy and Howells (2006) emphasised that a bank that aims to have an adequate capital for 
an AA rating today might also want to have a 95% probability of remaining investment grade 
at the horizon. This constraint creates a buffer for economic capital. Jokivuolle and Peura 
(2006) also assumed that external RAs determine bank ratings based on a comparison 
between the bank's actual capital and its economic capital. That is, the bank's actual capital 
must exceed its economic capital within a confidence level implied by the minimum rating 
target (such as 99.96% over a one-year period for an A rating) to achieve the minimum rating 
target. Accordingly, an increase in confidence level will result in an increase in economic 
capital. This implies that to achieve a better bank rating requires an increase in the bank's 
capital. 
2.4.1 Principal-agent relationship 
Before proceeding further, it seems helpful to shed light on what is known in the literature as 
the principal-agent relationship. In this regard, the principal is the regulator and agents are 
the financial institutions. The regulator is supposed to monitor domestic financial institutions 
to safeguard the interests of depositors, among others. Capital adequacy as a buffer against 
losses and failure is among the main tools with which to monitor a bank’s solvency position 
and bankruptcy avoidance (Murinde and Yaseen, 2004).
17
  
                                                 
17
 It should be noted that the stage of business cycle and the bank’s financial situation determine how banks will 
respond to capital ratio pressures. During booms, banks issue new equity capital, and they cut bank loans during 
downturns. The reduction in lending, when banks are capital constrained, directly affects the real economy. This 
is mainly because the reduction in bank lending may not be fully offset by increases in lending from other 
financial intermediaries or markets. The credit crunch is the output that results from substitution of high-risk 
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Specific characteristics of banks explain why the theory of optimal CS for banks is somewhat 
different from that of nonfinancial firms. Simply, governments interfere in bank capital 
structure in two ways: (1) the government may provide under-priced guarantees (e.g., explicit 
deposit insurance and implicit guarantees of deposits and other liabilities), and (2) regulators 
play a crucial role in increasing costs associated with capital levels considered insufficient by 
the regulators. In this context, the role of bank deposits in affecting bank financial decisions , 
especially  CS, should be considered in line with the ability of banks to minimise the cost of 
financial intermediation and the effects of moral hazard and adverse selection (Osterberg, 
1990).  
In line with this, high leverage and illiquid assets financed by short-term liabilities are among 
the major characteristics of banking-industry-specific risk. This may explain why financial 
institutions have much higher leverage than nonfinancial corporations. Along with this, 
highlighting the differences between developed and less developed financial systems is 
perceived as a radical issue. In less developed systems, policymakers must carefully consider 
consequences of information asymmetry and banking regulations (Vives, 2006).Obviously, 
the consequences of financial failure are vital in terms of serious social costs, the 
contamination of other financial institutions, and ultimately, the economic system as a whole. 
This puts pressure on every country to develop and implement strict policies to assure the 
safety and soundness of its banks.  
                                                                                                                                                        
assets, such as commercial loans, into less risky assets, such as government securities, that will end up with a 
significant decline in the credit supply to borrowers. Consequently, reduction of bank loans will lead to a 
substantial decline in the investment demand and a real growth slowdown. This apparently delays firms’ 
investment plans and may lead to reduction in numbers of workers to cut costs. It is essential to explain that the 
cause of bank capital constraints may be a substantial increase in provisions and write-offs, a general decline in 
bank loan demands, and/or banks’ concern about deterioration of their credit quality. In addition, banks with less 
capital will be more aggressive in pricing loans, forcing other banks either to reduce loan prices or to lose 
market share. 
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The main theme of the standards of BIS, which was established in 1974 by the G10 countries 
and Switzerland, is that investment in high-risk assets forces banks to increase their capital. 
BIS aimed mainly to improve soundness and stability of the international banking system in 
response to the gradual increase of risk after the globalisation and deregulation of financial 
systems in a large number of countries, especially the developing countries. Many studies 
have shown that stiffer capital regulation—risk-based CS—is a necessary component of 
explanations of the decline in loan growth, which eventually results in a credit crunch (Berger 
and Udell, 1994; Brinkmann and Horvitz, 1995; Furfine 2000; Furlong, 1992; Haubrich and 
Wachtel, 1993; Jacques and Nigro, 1997; Lown and Peristiani, 1996; Naceur and Kandil, 
2007; Rime, 2001; Wagster, 1999; Wall and Peterson, 1987).  The following section focuses 
on banking regulations. A number of important questions can be raised in this regard. 
Whether or not regulation of the banking industry promotes competitiveness, efficiency and 
stability of the financial system is among these questions. 
2.4.2 Basel I and II 
In 1988, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) started to set up rules and 
regulations intended to enrich the stability and soundness of the international banking system. 
This concluded with the development of a new framework, which known as Basel I.
18
 Basel I 
requires banks to have a Tier 1 ratio of at least 4% and a total capital ratio of at least 8% (with 
Tier 2 not exceeding 50%). Because it can be expensive to issue new capital, this scheme 
leads to a preference for less risky assets (Naceur and Kandil, 2007).In general, risky assets 
(e.g., commercial loans and consumer instalment loans) require the maintenance of total 
                                                 
18
 A bank’s capital was defined as comprising two tiers: Tier 1 (or core) capital includes the book value of 
common stock, non-cumulative preferred stock, share premiums, retained profit, general and legal reserves; and 
Tier 2, (or supplementary) capital includes revaluation of assets, undisclosed reserves, general provision and 
reserves, hybrid instruments (i.e., cumulative preferred stock), long-term subordinate debt and investment 
fluctuation. 
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equity capital equal at 8% of the asset’s book value. On the other hand, riskless assets (e.g., 
cash and government debt) incur no capital requirements.
19
 
Critiques of Basel I were raised against the equal risk-weighting given to all credit regardless 
the high or low quality of the credit; which consequently led to incoherence between banks’ 
capital levels and their credit quality. In addition, Basel I ignored the maturity structure of 
credit exposure for capital charges
20
 and failed to take advantage of the availability of certain 
credit risk-mitigation techniques such as cash margins, collateral security, and so on. Also, 
Basel I did not recognise the portfolio diversification effect on credit risk; however, this was 
captured later by market risk. Finally, Basel I did not impose capital charges for operational 
risk, which is considered as an important source of risk and may be, at times, more 
overwhelming than credit risk.   
On the contrary, it is worth mentioning that the introduction of Basel I for bank capital 
reignited interest in the effects of bank capital regulations (Dahl and Shrieves, 1990; Weber 
and Darbellay, 2008).The main conclusions of later studies were that regulatory minimum 
capital constraints are crucial to influence financing decisions made by a significant subset of 
banks. A positive relationship between bank capital and bank risk-taking has been confirmed 
by vast number of studies (e.g., Aggarwal and Jacques, 1998; Edtiz et al., 1998; Jacques and 
Nigro, 1997; Shrieves and Dahl, 1992).According to this regulatory hypothesis, banks are 
encouraged by regulators to increase their capital in accordance with the amount of risk 
taken.  
                                                 
19
 The risk baskets are divided into four parts: (1) 0% for cash, claims on central governments denominated and 
funded in national currency (sovereigns), claims on all Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) central governments and claims on central banks. (2)20% for claims on multilateral 
development banks and claims guaranteed by these banks, claims on banks incorporated in OECD and loans 
guaranteed by these banks, and claims on banks outside of OECD with maturity of up to one year. (3)50% for 
loans secured by mortgages on residential property. (4)100% for claims on corporate, claims on banks outside of 
OECD with maturity of more than one year, claims on central governments outside of the OECD and not 
denominated and funded in national currency, and all other assets.  
20
 The accord ignores the fact that there is greater risk of default accompanied by long-term exposure than the 
short-term exposure. 
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On the contrary, an opposite hypothesis suggests a negative relationship between capital and 
risk. This is known as the moral hazard hypothesis, which stems from the unintended 
consequences of regulatory actions. As discussed by Kahane (1977), Koehn and Santomero 
(1980) and Kim and Santomero (1988), banks could respond to regulatory pressures to 
increase their capital by increasing asset risk. The Basel Accord was updated in the early 
1990s, by adding a new element: market risk resulting from changing market conditions (e.g., 
share prices and interest rates). The proposed amendment required that the ratio of capital to 
credit risk and market risk should be greater than or equal to 8%.  
As a consequence of the aforementioned criticism of Basel I, the BCBS proposed a more risk-
sensitive approach in Basel II, which is based on three pillars of banking safety and 
soundness: minimum capital requirements, prudential supervision process, and market 
discipline.
21
 The new accord introduced two main approaches by which to calculate bank 
capital requirements. The first alternative, called the standardised approach, typifies a 
portfolio of bank loans by risk categories; that is, the risk weight assigned to each category is 
based on the counterparty risk assessment performed by international RAs. This approach has 
magnified the role of RAs in the development of bank CSs on a global scale. Apparently, 
RAs came to serve as regulatory tools in financial market prudential oversight.
22
 The second 
alternative, called the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach, depends entirely on banks’ 
internal rating systems for credit risk evaluation in which bank supervisors are the key players 
(Weber and Darbellay, 2008).  
                                                 
21
 For the prudential supervision process, banks’ internal assessment procedures are the full responsibility of 
national supervisors with additional authority and right to impose additional capital requirements. For the market 
discipline and disclosure portions of Basel II aim to increase transparency by using enhanced disclosure 
requirements for banks. Such transparency will improve the ability of market participants to evaluate effectively 
the bank’s risk profile. 
22
 Basel II has categories (0%, 20%, 50%, 100% and 150% for short-term government bonds, exposure to 
OECD banks, residential mortgages, unsecured commercial loans and borrowers with poor credit rating, 
respectively) depending on the credit rating of the borrower. Although a 100% risk weight means a full capital 
charge equal to 8% of the value, a 50% risk-weight requires a capital charge of 4% of that value.   
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In spite of the fact that the second approach is more expensive, advanced and yields a much 
higher regulatory capital level, it is obvious that both approaches are costly and complex.
23
 
Basel II added a new type of risk: operational risk, defined by Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2001) as ‘the risk of direct or indirect loss resulting from inadequate or failed 
internal processes, people and systems or from external events’24 (p. 2). Three methods are 
used to calculate operational risk capital charges: (1) the basic indicator approach in which 
banks must hold capital from operational risk equal to fixed percentage of gross income, (2) 
the standardised approach
25
 and (3) the internal measurement approach.
26
 
Accordingly, the basic capital requirements for banks (≥ 8%) can be expressed as the ratio of 
bank capital to credit, market and operation risks. Hence, supervisors in some emerging 
markets have applied much higher minimum capital levels than Basel’s 8%. For example, the 
minimum capital requirement in Argentina is 11.5% plus 1% for market risk exposure, and in 
Singapore, the minimum is 12% (Jackson et al., 2002). Raghavan (2004) also noted that Basel 
II was rejected by China, where the minimum capital requirement is determined mainly by 
the China Banking Regulatory Commission. In the early 2000s, regulators discussed the 
inclusion of other types of risk, such as liquidity risk, warehousing risk, reputational risk and 
concentration risk. In contrast to Basel I, Basel II has succeeded in precluding banks from 
taking excessive risk. This is justified as more capital requirement will be needed to hold 
                                                 
23
 The two approaches are computed by multiplying the following three parameters: estimates of the probability 
of default, loss given default and exposure at default. The difference between the two approaches is that banks 
that apply the advance approach will compute the three parameters internally and independently, which is not 
the case under the foundation approach. 
24
 This definition includes legal risk 
25
 Bank activities are divided into standardised business unit and business line. For each business line, an 
indicator measures the size and volume of bank activity in that area. The capital charge for operational risk is 
calculated by summing the product of the indicator for each business line to its capital factor, which is mainly 
set by supervisors. 
26
 For this approach, the overall capital charge is simply the product of gamma and expected loss. Expected loss 
is the product of exposure indicator, probability of loss event and the loss given that event. Gamma is a factor 
supplied by supervisors that for each business line/risk type combination.  
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risky positions. Consequently, banks will be more cautious about going into riskier 
businesses. Eventually, financial stability will be reached. 
On the other hand,Weber and Darbellay (2008) criticised Basel II, especially the standardised 
approach, out of concern that banks will concentrate more on obtaining high credit rating than 
on the quality of underlying assets. The authors added that conventional banking activities 
performed by banks to monitor their customer will diminish. This is mainly because banks 
are over-reliant on RAs to collect and gather information about borrowers, thereby enhancing 
financial instability, which was initially observed in the subprime crisis. In addition, 
measurement of bank capital requirements using credit rating also was criticised because of 
the ratings’ procyclical effects.27    
A study by the BCBS on the impact of Basel II on 365 banks in 43 countries showed that 
capital requirement and risk in banks with more retail activities were low (Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, 2003). This may encourage banks located in large G10 countries to 
increase investments in retail activities. In line with this finding, it seems that the introduction 
of Basel II hindered asset securitisation in large banks because of the substantial rise in 
capital requirements accompanied by the inclusion of more securitised assets in bank 
portfolios.
28
 Moreover, evidently, the degree of specialisation within the banking industry is 
positively and significantly related to the level of capital requirements. The introduction of 
IRB approaches creates more pressures on banks, especially the large ones. This is not the 
                                                 
27
 This was supported by the notion that RAs tend to upgrade borrowers’ credit ratings during economic booms 
and vice versa during financial crises. Such trends negatively impact banks’ financing during recession and 
decrease capital reserves during economic booms.  
28
 Traditionally, banks kept the originated loans on their balance sheets and monitored them for their entire 
durations; the securitisation process allows banks the possibility to offload credit risk from their balance sheets 
and transfer them to other investors.   
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case for small banks that will be forced to implement that less costly standardised approach, 
thus segmenting the banking industry into two tiers.
29
  
2.4.3 Bank CS and financial variables  
The endogenous relationships between banks’ CS and financial variables stem from the fact 
that all changes in bank income statements affect the equity position according to the 
balances of the accounting equation. Table 2.1 summarises the endogenous relationship 
between banks’ CS and financial variables.  
Table 2.1: Endogenous relationship between bank CS and financial variables 
Financial 
Category 
CS Endogenous Relationship Relevant Literature 
Asset quality The ratio loan loss provision to net interest 
revenue (LLPNIR) negatively affects bank CS 
because high loan loss provisions increase total 
operating expenses. This results in a decline in 
bank net income and thus bank net worth or 
equity capital (i.e., bank assets/liabilities) will 
decrease in value.  
The ratio of loan loss reserve to impaired loans 
(LLRIL) negatively affects bank CS because 
high loan loss reserves result in a decrease in the 
value of the bank loan portfolio and thus a 
decrease in the value of bank assets. This results 
in a decrease in bank net worth. 
The ratios of impaired loan to gross loans 
(ILGL), impaired loans to equity (ILE) and 
unreserved impaired loans to equity (UILE) 
negatively affect bank CS because high levels of  
impaired loans result in a decline in the value of 
bank assets. Accordingly, bank equity capital is 
negatively affected.  
The ratio of net charge-off to net income before 
loan loss provision (NCONIBLLP) negatively 
affects bank CS because high net charge-off 
leads to a decrease in bank net income and thus 
low equity capital. 
Ahmed et al., 1999; Angklomkliew et 
al., 2009; Balla and McKenna, 2009; 
Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008; 
Craigwell and Elliott, 2011; Fecht and 
Wagner, 2009; Floro, 2010; Ghosh, 
2007; Laeven and Majnoni, 2003  
Capital 
Adequacy 
Tier 1 ratio (TR) and total capital ratio (TCR) 
positively affect bank CS because both ratios 
contain the main elements of bank CS ratio. 
The ratios of equity/net loans (ENL), 
equity/liabilities (EL) and equity/deposit and 
Altman and Sounders, 2001; Ayuso et 
al., 2004; Cantor, 2001; Diamond and 
Rajan, 2000; Dince and Fortson, 1972; 
Fama, 1980; Gambacorta and 
Mistrulli, 2004; Gardener, 1981, 1990; 
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 It is worth noting that to overcome deficiencies in financial regulations revealed by the global financial crisis, 
the BCBS introduced on 16 Dec. 2010 a new global regulatory standard—Basel III—for bank capital adequacy 
and liquidity. Basel III strengthens bank capital requirements and introduces new regulatory requirements for 
bank liquidity and leverage. However, some estimates indicate that implementation of Basel III will decrease 
annual GDP by 5% to 15%. 
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short-term funding (EDSTF) positively affect 
bank CS because the main component of these 
ratios is bank equity capital. 
The ratios of capital funds to assets (CFTA), 
capital funds/net loans (CFNL), capital 
funds/deposit and short-term funding (CFDSTF) 
and capital funds/liabilities (CFL) positively 
affect bank CS. This is mainly because bank 
capital funds comprise bank equity capital, 
hybrid capital and subordinated debt.   
The ratio of subordinated debt/capital funds 
(SDCF) negatively affects bank CS because the 
percentage of subordinate debt in capital funds 
increases and bank equity capital decreases. 
Equity multiplier (EM) negatively affects CS as 
equity multiplier ratio is the inverse of bank CS 
ratio.    
Kahane, 1977; Lackman, 1986; 
Pringle, 1974; Santomero and Watson, 
1977; Sealey, 1983; Sharpe, 1978; 
Shehzad et al., 2010; Talmor, 1980.  
Credit Risk The ratio of Net Charge Off/Average Gross 
Loans (NCOAGL) negatively affects bank CS. 
This is mainly because high net charge-off leads 
to a decrease in bank net income and thus 
inversely affects its equity capital. 
The ratios of Loan Loss Provisions/Total Loans 
(LLPTL) and Loan Loss Provisions/Equity 
(LLPE) negatively affect bank CS as high loan 
loss provision means an increase in bank total 
expenses. This decreases bank net income which 
ultimately decreases its net worth (i.e., equity 
capital)  
The ratios of Loan Loss Reserve/Gross Loans 
(LLRGL) and Loan Loss Reserve/Total Equity 
(LLRE) negatively affect bank CS. This is 
mainly because high loan loss reserve reduces 
the value of bank assets and thus its net worth. 
Anandarajan et al., 2007; Bikker and 
Metzemakers, 2004; Eng and Nabar, 
2007; Fonseca and González, 2008; 
Graham and Humphrey, 1978; 
Greenidge and Grosvenor, 2010; 
Jiménez and Saurina, 2006; Sinkey 
and Greenawalt, 1991. 
Liquidity The interbank ratio (IBR) positively affects bank 
CS as whenever the bank is net placer (i.e., 
amounts due from other banks are greater than 
those due to other banks), which means that 
bank total assets exceed bank total liabilities and 
thus a higher net worth.  
The ratios of net loans/total assets (LR), net 
loans/deposit and short-term funding (NLDSTF) 
and net loans/total deposit and borrowing 
(NLTDB) positively affect bank CS. This is 
mainly because well-operated banks are able to 
sell more loans to increase profitability. This 
increases the amount of undivided profit, which 
leads to an increase in bank equity capital. 
The ratios of liquid assets/deposit and short-term 
funding (LADSTF) and liquid assets/total 
deposit and borrowing (LATDB) positively 
affect CS as banks with high volumes of liquid 
assets relative to their liabilities will have higher 
net worth and thus higher equity capital. 
 
Casey and Lannoo, 2005;Diamond 
and Rajan, 2001a, 2001b; Hatakeda, 
2000; Gatev and Strahan, 2006; 
Loutskina, 2011; Sawada, 2010;  
Wagner, 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Profitability The ratios of net interest margin (NIM), net 
interest income/average assets (NIIAA), other 
operating income/average assets (OIAA), 
recurring earning power (REP) and pretax 
Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009; 
Angbazo, 1997; Claeys and Vennet, 
2008; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 
1999; DeYoung and Rice, 2004; 
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operating income/average assets (PTOIAA) 
positively affect bank CS. This can be explained 
as banks with high profitability can retain some 
of their profits for future transactions. This 
results in an increase in undivided profit 
accounts and thus an increase in bank equity 
capital in general. 
The ratios of noninterest expense/average assets 
(NIEAA) and non-operating items and 
taxes/average assets (NOITAA) negatively 
affect bank CS as banks that pay higher interest 
and/or noninterest expenses negatively affect 
overall profitability. Accordingly, banks’ ability 
to retain profits for future use is hindered. This 
results in lower undivided profits and thus lower 
bank equity capital. 
Return on average assets (ROAA) and return on 
average equity (ROAE) positively affect bank 
CS. An efficient bank is able to generate the 
maximum amount of earnings from available 
assets and equity. This leads to higher 
profitability and thus higher bank net worth. 
Dividend pay-out (DPO) negatively affects bank 
CS. This is mainly because higher payout ratios 
results in lower undivided profit accounts. This 
ultimately inversely affects bank equity capital. 
The ratios of income net of distribution/average 
equity (INODAE) and non-operating income/net 
income (NOINI) positively affect bank CS in 
the essence that an increase in income, whether 
from operating or non-operating revenues, will 
eventually lead to an increase in undivided 
profits and thus bank equity capital. 
Cost-to-income ratio (CIR) negatively affects 
bank CS. In general, banks face a problem in 
controlling overhead or the cost of bank 
activities. This results in a dramatic decline in 
profitability, which eventually leads to a 
decrease in undivided profits and thus bank 
equity capital. 
The ratios of net profit margin (NPM), tax 
management efficiency (TME), asset utilisation 
(AU) and expense control efficiency (ECE) 
positively affect bank CS. This is mainly 
because well-operating banks efficiently manage 
their expense-control programs. In addition, 
they implement proficient service-pricing 
policies and minimise their tax exposure. This 
leads to higher profitability and thus more 
undivided profits accumulate. This results in an 
increase in bank equity capital. 
Operating efficiency ratio (OER) negatively 
affects bank CS. It is notable that a high 
operating efficiency ratio indicates an expense-
control problem or a decline in revenues. Thus, 
profitability and undivided profit accounts are 
negatively affected. This leads to a decrease in 
bank equity capital.   
DeYoung and Roland, 2001; Dietrich 
and Wanzenried, 2011;Fonseca and 
González, 2008; García-Herrero et al., 
2009; Ho and Saunders, 1981.  
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2.5 Bank ratings: Empirical findings 
The relevant literature includes few studies on bank ratings and bank financial characteristics. 
A pioneering study on this subject was performed by Poon et al. (1999) using data from 1997 
and a sample of 130 banks in different countries.
30
 The main objective of the study was to 
predict Moody’s BFSR31 using bank-specific financial data and including an aggregate 
measure (between 0 and 100) of the bank’s country’s economic, political and financial risk 
(i.e., country effect). The authors also examined whether the information provided by BFSR 
is the same as that contained in traditional debt ratings. The method used was an ordered 
logistic regression model.  
Their empirical results reveal that BFSR provides similar but not identical information to that 
contained in traditional debt ratings (both long- and short-debt ratings). Poon et al.’s (1999) 
results also show that the effect of country risk on BFSR is insignificant. This can be 
explained by the large similarity in banks’ financial disclosures across countries and the 
maintenance of minimum capital adequacy ratios required by the BIS. In addition, the study 
found that loan provision, risk and profitability are the most important determinants of BFSR, 
respectively. Finally, Poon et al. concluded that the inclusion of short- and long-term debt 
ratings enhances the predictive power of the models.   
Laruccia and Revoltella (2000) also predicted Moody’s BFSR using data from a sample of 
212 banks operating in developing and transitional economies (38 in East Europe, 106 in Asia 
                                                 
30
 The financial variables used in this study were from 1996. 
31
 It is worth noting that the basic difference between Moody’s BFSR and Moody’s long-term deposit rating is 
that the latter concerns the bank’s ability to repay foreign and/or domestic currency deposit obligations on time. 
That is, long-term bank deposits reflect the amount of country risk in which the bank is located. However, 
Moody’s BFSR represents Moody’s opinion of a bank’s intrinsic safety and soundness and thus excludes certain 
external credit-risk and credit-support elements that are covered by Moody’s long-term deposit rating. BFSR is 
an adequate measure of the probability that a bank will require external support from its owners, official 
institutions or from its business group. Accordingly, the BFSR provides an effective evaluation of the 
fundamental stability of each bank.  
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and 68 in South America). The main objective of their work was to identify the main 
determinants of overall banking system soundness and stability. Additionally, this paper 
focused on the construction of a microeconomic model to predict Moody’s BFSRs using 
different econometric techniques (e.g., linear regression, logistic regression and a neural 
network).  
The empirical results revealed that the neural network model explains 76.7% of the variance 
of the dependent variable, and the equivalent figure for the linear regression model explains 
73.5%. The logistic model explains only 71%. Laruccia and Revoltella’s (2000) results 
showed that the effect of country risk on BFSRs is highly significant in the models, which 
conflicts with the results reported by Poon et al. (1999). In addition, the findings conclude 
that all of the financial ratios had the expected sign for sensitivity. Banks with high BFSRs 
are associated with high equity-to-total asset ratios (i.e., well-capitalized banks), low cost –to- 
income ratios (i.e., highly profitable banks), low net loans-to-total assets ratios (i.e., highly 
liquid banks) and low loan loss reserve-to-gross loans ratios (i.e., better quality of loan 
portfolio).     
Poon and Firth (2005) conducted a study based on FBR in 2002 for a sample of 1,060 banks 
in 82 countries. The main objective of this paper was to distinguish the differences between 
shadow (unsolicited) and non-shadow (solicited) FBRs and whether the financial 
characteristics of banks with shadow ratings differed from those with non-shadow ratings. 
The method employed was Heckman’s two-step treatment estimation method. A piece of 
information derived from this study is that there is a significant difference in distribution 
between shadow and non-shadow FBRs. This difference stems from the fact that non-shadow 
FBRs are higher than shadow FBRs. 
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Poon and Firth (2005) suggested that this difference is based on many reasons: (1) banks with 
poor financial profiles will not seek ratings and thus will receive low shadow ratings; (2) the 
significant difference in levels of information used for shadow and non-shadow ratings 
matters; and (3) the nature of shadow rating, which is based entirely on public information, 
urges RAs to be more conservative in assigning shadow ratings. In addition, the study 
revealed that profitable and large banks operating in countries with high sovereign credit 
ratings are assigned high FBRs. On the contrary, low FBRs are assigned to banks with high 
loan loss reserve-to-gross loans ratios (i.e., poor asset quality) and high loans-to-total asset 
ratios (i.e., weak liquidity position). Finally, the results suggested that sovereign credit rating, 
bank size, profitability, asset quality, and liquidity are the most important determinates of 
FBRs. 
Pasiouras et al. (2006), using 2004 data for a sample of 857 banks from 71 countries, 
examined the impact of bank regulations, supervision, market structure, and bank 
characteristics on FBRs. The method used was the order logit model. The findings revealed 
that the impact of bank profitability, liquidity, size and diversification of business and 
franchise power (expense management and asset quality) on FBRs are positive (negative) and 
statistically significant in all model specifications. The positive sign associated with predictor 
estimates indicated that large, profitable and more liquid banks with more subsidiaries are 
assigned higher FBRs. The negative sign implies that banks with lower asset quality (in terms 
of loan portfolio) and high cost-to-income ratio results in lower FBRs.  
However, the impact of banks’ CS on FBRs is positive and statistically significant only when 
bank supervision and regulation framework variables are not included in the model. This 
indicates that well-capitalised banks are assigned higher FBRs. In addition, banks that are 
relatively more strictly controlled by institutional shareholders were found to obtain higher 
FBRs. 
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As for bank regulatory and supervisory variables, banks are assigned higher FBRs with 
higher deposit insurance power, liquidity and diversification guidelines, entry requirements, 
fraction of entries denied and economic freedom. High FBRs also are associated with banks 
in countries with lower capital requirements, official disciplinary power and no explicit 
deposit insurance scheme. In line with this, the results indicate that banks operating in 
restricted markets are assigned lower FBRs as greater restrictions on bank activities mitigate 
banking efficiency and development.  
Concerning market structure variables, Pasiouras et al.’s (2006) results showed a positive 
(negative) relationship between the share of assets in foreign-owned banks (degree of asset 
concentration and share of assets in government-owned banks) and FBRs. This is mainly 
because greater government ownership increases banking sector fragility and financial system 
inefficiency. A piece of information that can be derived from this study is that banks 
operating in developed countries are assigned higher FBRs than those in emerging markets if 
regulatory and supervisory variables are not included in the model. 
Godlewski (2007) also examined the coherence between bank default probabilities and 
Moody’s BFSR and FBRs by employing a simple scoring and mapping technique and 
identifying the main determinants of bank ratings using logistic regression model. This paper 
used two samples of 483 and 257 banks for Moody’s and Fitch respectively, located in 
emerging market economies (e.g., South-East Asia, South America and Central and Eastern 
Europe) during the period from 1998 to 2002.  
The empirical results revealed that profitable, more liquid and well-capitalised banks with 
high reserves to cover nonperforming loans tend to have a low bank default probability and 
thus obtain a high Moody’s BFSR. For the FBR sample, the empirical results of Godlewski 
(2007) revealed that banks with better capital adequacy, more total deposits-to-total assets 
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ratio and a better cover of nonperforming loans with reserves results in lower bank default 
probability and thus higher FBRs. Using a simple scoring model, the results showed 
coherence between these ratings and actual bank default rates, although mapping results 
indicates that ratings tend to aggregate bank’s default probability information into 
intermediate low category grade. 
Pasiouras et al. (2007) used a sample of 153 South and South-East Asian commercial banks 
for the year 2004 to examine the possibility of predicting FBRs for Asian banks using 
publicly available data by employing a multigroup hierarchical discrimination technique. The 
dependent variable was FBRs (five rating scales). The independent variables included 10 
financial and nonfinancial variables. Regarding financial variables, the empirical results 
revealed that banks with a high ratio of equity to customer deposit and borrowing (well-
capitalised banks) and a high return on equity and net interest margin (profitable banks) tend 
to obtain high FBRs. As for nonfinancial variables, the number of institutional shareholders, 
the number of subsidiaries and the Heritage banking and finance score are the most important 
nonfinancial variables for FBRs. 
A piece of information derived from this study is that regulatory restrictions on bank activity 
were found to have a negative and significant effect on FBRs, which is consistent with a 
recent study by Pasiouras et al. (2006). In line with this, the analysis also revealed that FBRs 
are significantly positively affected by the number of institutional shareholders and 
subsidiaries. Finally, the results highlighted that a multigroup hierarchical discrimination 
technique can predict FBRs with satisfactory classification accuracy (66.03%) in comparison 
to discriminant analysis (53.73%) and ordered logistic regression (47.55%). 
Belloti et al. (2011a), using a sample of 681 international banks rated by Fitch and operating 
in 90 countries during the period from 2000 to 2007, examined the impact of financial 
47 
 
variables and country risk on prediction of FBRs by using ordered choice estimation 
techniques and a support vector machine. The empirical results revealed that high FBRs are 
assigned to large, profitable and well-capitalised banks that operate in more stable/developed 
rich countries. In addition, highly liquid banks over the last two periods prior to the rating 
tend to obtain higher FBRs, and banks with high ratio of operating expense to total operating 
income tend to obtain lower FBRs. A piece of information derived from this study is that the 
inclusion of the country effect enhances the predictive performance of both the ordered 
choice model and the support vector machine and that the latter is substantially better than 
ordered choice models for in-sample predictive accuracy power. 
Öğüt et al. (2012), using a sample of 17 Turkish banks covering the period from 2003 to 
2009, predicted Moody’s BFSR using the most important, publicly available, financial and 
operational variables. In addition, the authors examined whether or not the financial strength 
ratings produced by proposed prediction models in this study are consistent with those issued 
by RAs. For prediction purposes, two popular data mining techniques (i.e., support vector 
machine and artificial neural networks) were used and their results compared with two 
popular conventional techniques (i.e., multiple discriminant analysis and ordered logistic 
regression). 
The empirical results of Öğüt et al. (2012) revealed that ordered logistic regression achieved 
the highest accuracy rate when using factor scores as input variables compared to other 
classifiers. On the other hand, the accuracy rates were the highest in multiple discriminant 
analysis and support vector machine when financial and operational variables were used as 
input variables. The results also indicated that the use of financial and operational variables, 
rather than using factor scores, as input variables improves the prediction accuracy rate. In 
addition, banks with high loan portfolios (loan-to-asset ratio and loan-to-deposit ratio), 
profitability (ROE), efficiency ratios (the ratio of net interest revenues [loss] to number of 
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branches, the ratio of net interest revenue [loss] to total assets and the ratio of net interest 
revenue [loss] to number of employees) tend to obtain high BFSRs. A piece of information 
derived from this study is that RAs assign low ratings to banks that invest more of their funds 
(especially deposits) in government debt securities rather than selling loans. This is mainly 
because investment in government debt securities results in low profitability and high market 
risk (i.e., interest rate risk). 
Hammer et al. (2012) constructed a reverse-engineering FBR model to evaluate the 
creditworthiness of 800 banks rated by Fitch and operating in 70 different countries as of 
December 2001. The main objective of the study was to predict FBRs accurately using a set 
of variables and to identify the main bank characteristics associated with high versus low 
FBRs. In addition, the authors developed a model to discriminate between high and low bank 
ratings in which the discriminant values are utilised to identify an accurate and predictive 
bank rating system. The methods employed in this study were multiple linear regressions, 
ordered logistic regression, support vector machine and logical analysis of data. 
The empirical results of Hammer et al. (2012) revealed that the logical analysis of data and 
ordered logistic regression are better than multiple linear regression and support vector 
machine in providing the most accurate results in reverse-engineered Fitch bank-rating 
system. The results also revealed that the classification accuracy associated with logistic 
analysis of data outperformed that of ordered logistic regression. Consequently, the logical 
analysis of data approach is suitable for reverse-engineering bank rating as it is an objective, 
transparent and generalisable approach. These features can help bank mangers to construct 
internal rating systems that act in accordance with the IBR requirements and are consistent 
with Basel II requirements. 
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Shen et al. (2012) examined the influence of information asymmetry on RAs in assigning 
S&P’s long-term credit ratings to banks operating in 86 countries from different regions 
during the period from 2002 to 2008 using similar financial ratios. This study divides the 
sample countries into high income or industrial countries with low information asymmetry 
and middle income or emerging countries with high information asymmetry. The method 
applied in this study was an ordered probit model. 
The empirical results of Shen et al. (2012) revealed that banks with high capital, liquidity and 
profitability tend to obtain high ratings. Banks also tend to receive high ratings when they 
have high efficiency and high asset quality measures. The results also showed that large 
banks located in countries with high sovereign credit ratings tend to receive high bank credit 
ratings. The authors concluded that RAs assign greater weight to banks’ financial ratios in 
high income or industrial countries because of low information asymmetry, better 
institutional environmental quality and high quality financial statements. However, the weight 
of banks’ financial ratios was minimal in middle-income countries because of lack of 
transparency, high information asymmetry and low quality financial statements. A piece of 
information derived from this study is that enhancements in bank ratings are associated with 
countries that have low information asymmetry. 
The relevant literature discussed above demonstrates a significant association between bank 
ratings and financial/nonfinancial characteristics across different regions using different RAs’ 
bank ratings. However, this dimension has not been studied extensively for the Middle East 
region and the relationships between bank financial/nonfinancial variables and FSRs issued 
by CI have not been examined at all for the Middle East. This emphasises the importance of 
the current thesis in addressing this research gap. Appendix A summarises the relevant 
studies in the literature. 
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2.6 Financial sector in the Middle East region 
In the last few decades, repressive policies have been adopted by various countries in the 
Middle East region (excluding Gulf countries) to stay in control of the money supply. These 
policies also serve some social goals, such as protection of financial institutions against usury 
practice by keeping the interest rates lower than the market rates to support the government 
debt at a lower cost. Such policies have forced banks to increase their reserve requirements, 
raise their credit ceilings and use selective credit allocation. This resulted in the development 
of a non-competitive and segmented financial sector. This forced Middle Eastern countries to 
adopt a financial reform agenda with the goal being to select better investment opportunities 
to improve productivity, mobilise savings, improve corporate governance and allow the 
trading, hedging, and diversification of risk (Naceur and Omran 2011). In the 2000s, some 
countries in the region, especially the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, have begun 
to concentrate their efforts, using privatisation, enhancements of bank regulations and market 
orientation, with the goal of producing a well-developed, profitable and efficient banking 
sector.  
In the late 1990s, the Middle East region was considered a bank-based economy, with banks 
controlling most financial activities. This forced many countries to adopt comprehensive 
banking sector reforms. Before this, most of the banking sectors in the Middle East were 
highly regulated and controlled mainly by governments. The prudential rules and regulations 
imposed by the governments were initiated mainly to mitigate the economic downturns 
associated with financial crises and to reduce adverse budgetary consequences for 
governments. In other words, the main purpose of such severe rules was to enhance the 
ability of bank management to make wise investment decisions (Murinde and Yaseen, 2004).  
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In line with the recommendations of the BCBS, the central banks recommended that banks 
raise their minimum capital requirement to 8%. In the same context, many countries in the 
region formulated bank laws that focus mainly on the transparency and disclosure of their 
central banks’ activities. Central banks’ most important activities can be summarised as 
follows: (1) issuing banknotes, (2) maintaining price stability, (3) managing gold and foreign 
exchange reserves, (4) preparing monetary, credit and banking policies, (5) supervising policy 
implementation, (6) supervising the national payment system, (7) recording and following up 
external debt (public and private), and (8) making recommendations to the government 
regarding loans and credit facilities.  
GCC banks tend to be family-owned with a moderate amount of state ownership and 
participation. Accordingly, prudential guidelines were enacted by the GCC to regulate the 
launch of new banks in these countries and to reduce the probability of the failure of the 
banking sector. The guidelines cover such aspects as capital, capital reserves, a minimum age 
of 10 years for a bank, licensing, monitoring licensed foreign banks, bank closures, and a 
minimum capital retention requirement, among others (Jabsheh, 2002). The Middle East is 
described in the literature as having bureaucratic and political problems, underdeveloped 
financial markets, accrued opacity within the banking industry, a massive volume of 
nonperforming loans, and an inadequate regulatory, institutional and legal environment 
(Godlewski, 2005).  
Therefore, it can be concluded that the rating of banks is a significant issue in the region. 
FSRs assigned by CI are used as an indicator of bank performance and strength. Thus, it 
would be of great benefit to economists and policymakers to determine the main quantitative 
factors that affect the rating assignment process and in particular the main financial and 
nonfinancial variables that produce high- and near-high FSRs and thus a better and more 
developed banking sector in the region. It has already been noted that RAs do not publish 
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their rating methodologies, and thus it is unclear to the public why some banks are assigned a 
AAA rating and others a CCC rating. This thesis contributes to the attempt to remove this gap 
between practitioners and the public. 
2.6.1 Banking industry in developing versus developed economies 
In developing economies, the banking industry has different features than that in developed 
ones. This is mainly because the implications of either IRB or standardised approaches result 
in higher capital requirements in developing compared to developed economies. The reason is 
clear: the credit quality and credit ratings assigned to corporate borrowers in developing 
economies are considerably lower than those of developed economies. In addition, 
developing economies face difficulties in implementing IRB approaches because the new 
standards have not been adjusted for the environment in these economies. Thus, the 
standardised approach could be more suitable in this case, though it will not be effective 
because of the small number of RAs specialised in issuing ratings for corporate borrowers in 
this region.  
In addition, Rojas-Suarez (2001) identified that the main problem facing developing markets 
is inefficient capital regulation rules that result from a lack of data, inadequate accounting 
standards and rules, bad reporting systems and inefficient financial markets. The author 
concluded that financial ratios are more relevant in industrialised countries than in developing 
markets for credit-rating explanation. The message of this discussion is that Basel II will 
increase capital charges in developing markets. This highlights the significant importance of 
bank FSRs in these markets as financial institution creditworthiness is a crucial prerequisite 
for financial system stability (Shen et al., 2012). It is possible that banks operating in 
developed markets may reduce lending to banks in developing markets with tight 
requirements (Griffith-Jones and Spratt, 2001). Nevertheless, lending decisions by banks in 
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developed markets may be based more on economic capital rather than on regulatory capital  
(Jackson et al., 2002). In line with this, the market discipline exerted by RAs is an essential 
element in the interbank swap market where banks strive to maintain a cushion of capital 
above the regulatory capital requirement. 
2.6.2 Banking sector in the Middle East region 
The banking sector in the member countries of GCC witnessed remarkable developments 
during the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. This was mainly a result of the outstanding 
boost in income per capita and saving capacity in these countries as a result of the oil boom. 
Financial deepening also has increased substantially in these countries. The acceleration of 
economic activity and banking development in line with progressive reform efforts are the 
main drivers in this regard. However, it should be noted that banks in the region face many 
common challenges that might hinder their ability to operate effectively and grow within a 
more competitive environment. 
One of these challenges stems from overdependence on oil and the dominance of the public 
sector, which results in banks operating in over-banked, limited and often recessionary 
domestic markets. In addition, the investment opportunities are concentrated in specific 
sectors (e.g., real estate, trade and stock market activities). This in turn directs and limits bank 
lending to consumer loans, construction and trade finance. Moreover, banks in the GCC 
region are overprotected from foreign competition and deposits are entirely guaranteed by the 
government. This is unhealthy. It creates a fragile, inefficient banking sector. 
GCC governments, within the progressive reform and liberalisation efforts and attempts 
around the world, have been forced to liberalise many financial services, including banking. 
The entry of foreign banks into the region with competitive pressures on domestic banks is 
among the main features of such a new era. The World Trade Organization and other 
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international organisations are imposing pressures on GCC banks to adopt international 
standards for capital adequacy, risk management and accounting practices. Moreover, the 
government role as a lender of last resort for troubled banks in the region starts to lessen, 
creating additional competitive pressures across banks (Limam, 2001). Finally, the 
emergence of large investment companies represents another challenge faced by GCC banks.  
For non-oil countries in the Middle East region, the structure of the banking sector can be 
illustrated as follows: The Egyptian government owns around 67% of the country’s total 
banking assets, meaning that Egypt has the highest percentage owned by the state (Naceur 
and Omran, 2011). Jordan and Lebanon, meanwhile, have no banks owned by the 
government.  
2.7 Rating agencies 
This section provides an overview of major RAs, including Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, 
Fitch and CI. For each RA, an historical background is given and different rating products 
with different maturities are illustrated. This section concludes with a comparison between 
long/short ratings scales across different RAs.    
2.7.1 Standard & Poor’s  
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) has been a leading agency since 1860 that provides analytical and 
research services across a range of publicly issued debt obligations. Independence, 
objectivity, creditability and disclosure are its core principles. S&P’s credit rating and 
symbols are divided into issue-specific credit ratings and issuer credit ratings.  
S&P’s issue-specific credit ratings express an opinion about the creditworthiness of an 
obligor with respect to a specific financial obligation, a specific class of financial obligation 
or a specific financial program (e.g., bank loan or a debt issue). Such an opinion is based on 
three main considerations: the chances of obligor payment to meet its financial commitments 
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in accordance with obligation terms, the nature of and provisions of the obligation and 
protection afforded by the obligation in the event of default or bankruptcy. S&P’s issuer 
credit ratings express an opinion about the obligor’s capacity and willingness to meet specific 
financial commitments at their due times. The word specific does not refer to any particular 
financial obligation, given that the nature and provisions of an obligation, its standing in 
bankruptcy or liquidation, statutory preferences or the legality and enforceability of the 
obligation are not considered issue-specific credit ratings (Standard and Poor's Ratings 
Services, 2013).  
S&P’s credit analysts study both quantitative and qualitative aspects to determine corporate 
credit ratings. The overall company rating derives from both the overall, qualitative business-
risk rating (i.e., industry characteristics, competitive position and management are the main 
determinants) and the overall quantitative financial-risk rating (i.e., financial policy, 
profitability, financial flexibility, CS and cash flow protection are the key factors). The 
issuance of bank rating is based on evaluation of the bank’s overall financial and business 
risks employing the so-called bank rating analysis methodology profile. The overall bank 
rating is derived after an examination of the five business risk factors (i.e., economic risk, 
industry risk, market position, diversification and management and strategy) and the six 
financial risk factors (i.e., credit risk, earning, liquidity and funding, market risk, 
capitalisation and financial flexibility) that affect overall bank performance.      
To gather, analyse and process information about current and anticipated events and 
circumstances, S&P uses two rating scales within two time frames: the long-run (i.e., more 
than one year) and the short-run (i.e., one year or less). The long-run credit ratings result from 
an assessment scale that includes two scores: investment score (i.e., the safest level of 
financial securities with low default rates: AAA, AA, A and BBB) and speculative score (i.e., 
the riskier securities with relatively high default rates: BB, B, CCC, C, SD and D). It is worth 
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mentioning that the S&P rating agency adds a plus (+) or a minus (-) to ratings AA to CCC to 
indicate the strength and weakness within a rating for every issuer. The short-run ratings are 
denoted by the symbols A-1+, A-1, A-2, A-3, B and C. The investment score is applicable 
only to A categories. The remaining categories are considered to be speculative scores.  
S&P developed the so-called CreditWatch listing to monitor a list of issuers whose ratings 
may change when an event or deviation from an expected trend occurs or is expected. 
CreditWatch designation may be positive, meaning improved rating, or negative, meaning 
that the rating has deteriorated. Finally, S&P unsolicited ratings are based on an analysis of 
publicly available information sources such as a company’s published annual report 
(Standard and Poor's Ratings Services, 2012b).  
2.7.2 Moody’s  
Moody’s is currently a freestanding agency that is highly specialised in credit rating. 
Moody’s rating depends on a combination of both quantitative and qualitative criteria rather 
than purely quantifiable and objective criteria. Peer group analysis is an analytical technique 
used by Moody’s to assess issuers’ access to markets. This technique helps to identify the 
precise differences in the peer group or industry sector, which in turn enables the 
accumulation of knowledge and identification of possible discrepancies in the evaluation. 
As with S&P, Moody’s uses two rating scales within two time frames: the long-run (for 
specific issue and for issuer) and the short-run. Moody’s long-term issuer ratings reflect 
opinions about the issuer’s ability to satisfy senior, unsecured financial obligations 
denominated in foreign or/and domestic currency. The long-run ratings reveal both the 
default probability of an issuer and the amount of loss that may result from a default. Similar 
to S&P, Moody’s rating scale includes two scores: (1) the investment score (Aaa, Aa, A and 
Baa represent the top four categories, with Aaa being the highest score). The highest 
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investment score is assigned to well-insured issuers, even if they face severe economic 
conditions; and (2) a speculative score, which ranges from Ba (moderate threshold between 
good and bad credits) to C (bottom score reflecting very bad credit with poor investment 
prospects). It is worth mentioning that Moody's rating agency appends numerical modifiers 1, 
2, or 3 to each generic rating classification from Aa through Caa. The modifier 1 indicates 
that the obligation ranks at the higher end of its generic rating category; the modifier 2 
indicates a mid-range ranking; and the modifier 3 indicates a ranking in the lower end of the 
generic rating category (Moody's Investors Service, 2013). 
Moody’s short-run ratings deal with securities that mature in less than one year. In this 
context, Moody’s classifies issuers as those who may not be able to meet their entire short-
term obligations (NP: not prime) and those for whom the possibility of meeting their 
obligations is high (P: prime). Within P, there are sub classifications (P-1: highest degree of 
investor protection; P-2: moderate protection; P-3: lowest protection).  
Moody’s BFSR was inaugurated in 1995 and is available on a solicited and unsolicited basis 
for banks from 50 countries. BFSRs are a common way to judge bank safety and soundness, 
and they correspond to Moody’s opinion on a bank’s internal financial strength (i.e., the 
probability that a bank will require assistance from third parties such as owners, industry 
groups or government institutions such as the central bank).  
Before assignment of BFSRs, Moody’s analyses five quantitative and qualitative factors: 
franchise value, risk positioning, regulatory environment, operating environment and 
financial fundamental . According to Moody’s, franchise value measures the ability of banks 
to survive in a given geographical market or business niche. This measure includes a bank’s 
market share and sustainability, geographical diversification, earning stability and 
diversification and ability to overcome events that can destroy a bank’s franchise value. The 
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second factor, risk positioning, defines a bank’s risk behaviour and its risk-management 
approach. This factor accounts for corporate governance, controls, financial reporting 
transparency, credit risk concentration and liquidity management. The third and fourth factors 
(i.e., regulatory and operating environment) are general factors concerned mainly with the 
environment in which the bank operates. The fifth factor encompasses financial fundamentals 
such as profitability, liquidity, capital adequacy, efficiency and asset quality.  
The rating scale ranges from A banks (exceptional intrinsic financial strength, strong 
financial fundamentals and attractive stable operating environment) and E banks (weak 
financial fundamentals, unattractive operating environment and a severe need for periodic 
outside support). Between these two ends, B, C and D banks exist on the scale. A plus (+) 
modifier is appended to ratings below the A category and a minus (-) modifier is appended to 
ratings above the E category to distinguish those banks that fall in intermediate categories. 
Moody’s also has developed rating outlooks and a rating review/watch list as periodic 
judgements of good (poor) performers in terms of the above-mentioned scales( Moody's 
Investors Service, 2013) .  
2.7.3 Fitch  
Fitch is a leading global rating agency and is regarded by some people as a main competitor 
of the US duopoly of Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s. Fitch supplies the word’s credit 
market with independent and prospective credit opinions, research and data (e.g., Bankscope 
database). Leadership, responsiveness, transparency and perspective are the core principles of 
Fitch’s rating system. Fitch has been mainly developed by strategic mergers and acquisitions, 
which may explain the rapid growth of Fitch during the past decades. 
Fitch ratings activities are spread globally to cover sovereign, financial, bank, insurance, 
municipal and other public finance entities and the securities or other obligations they issue. 
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A merger between Fitch and Thomson Bank Watch in December 2000 strengthened Fitch’s 
position in the business of bank ratings. With more than 1,000 international bank ratings, 
Fitch is considered to be the leading bank credit rating agency in terms of coverage with its 
main concentration in the emerging markets (e.g., Asia, Africa and Middle East, Central and 
Eastern Europe and Latin America). Fitch’s market share for bank ratings in emerging 
markets is almost twice that of S&P’s and Moody’s.  
Fitch ratings are classified into international and national. Simply, international credit ratings 
access the capacity to meet foreign currency or local currency commitments; whereas 
national credit ratings are assessments of credit quality relative to the rating of the best credit 
risk in a country. In line with this, Fitch covers four major kinds of credit rating: long-term 
credit rating, short-term credit rating, FBR, and bank support rating. As with the other rating 
agencies, long-term credit rating and short-term credit rating have the same meanings, which 
are interpreted as an opinion about the ability of an entity to meet financial obligations 
(interest, preferred dividends or repayment of principle) on a timely basis.
32
 Consequently, 
Fitch’s long-term credit rating scale includes two scores. In line with S&P’s ratings, the first 
is the investment score (AAA, AA, A and BBB represent the top four categories, with AAA 
being the highest score). The second is speculative score (i.e., the riskier securities with 
relatively high default rates; BB, B, CCC, CC, C, RD and D). To denote relative status within 
major rating categories, the plus (+) or minus (-) modifiers are attached to ratings from AA to 
B. The short-term credit rating scores are denoted by the symbols F-1+, F-1, F-2, F-3, B and 
C. The investment score is applicable only to F categories. The remaining categories are 
considered to be speculative scores.  
                                                 
32
 Short-term rating has a time horizon of not more than 12 months for most obligations. 
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FBRs, recently known as bank viability ratings, are used mainly to assess banks’ quality and 
strength without any external support. The FBR represents Fitch’s opinion about the 
possibility that a bank may face significant difficulties that would necessitate immediate 
support. The main factors that determine these ratings include profitability and balance sheet 
integrity (including capitalisation), franchise, management, operating environment, size (in 
terms of equity capital), diversification (in terms of involvement in a variety of activities in 
different economic and geographic sectors) and prospects. FBR scores range from A denoting 
for a very strong bank to E, which indicates a bank with very serious problems that require 
external support. Between these two ends, A/B, B, B/C, C, C/D, D and D/E ratings exist on 
the scale (Fitch Ratings, 2013).  
Bank support ratings comprise five rating categories and represent Fitch’s opinion about the 
potential tendency of a supporter (either the governmental authorities or institutional owners) 
to support a bank in distress periods. Assignment of such ratings is based on four broad 
categories of criteria: guarantees and commitments, percentage control, nature of the owner 
and importance of the bank to the owning institution. Support rating scores vary from 1, 
which denotes a high probability of external support. This is backed by two main reasons: (1) 
supporter’s high propensity to support the bank and (2) the supporter is itself very highly 
rated. The other extreme of scoring is represented by 5, for which the expected external 
support for the bank is in great doubt. Finally, it is worth mentioning that Fitch developed the 
Rating Watch and Rating Outlook as equivalent lists developed by RAs discussed previously. 
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2.7.4 Capital Intelligence (CI) 
CI is one of the most specialised rating agencies
33
 in the Middle East region. CI has provided 
ratings services since 1985. Strong professionalism in providing valuable information to 
banks' creditors about banks’ financial strength distinguishes CI from other RAs. Also, CI 
enjoys a good reputation in the qualitative and quantitative analysis of banks (i.e., mainly 
profitability and capital adequacy). The independence, objectivity and analytical consistency 
have enabled CI to expand the scope of its rating services to include corporate credit, bonds 
and other financial obligations. The rating process for CI starts with an examination of the 
traits of a country’s banking system by evaluating the regulatory and supervisory regime as 
well as the accounting and auditing practices of the relevant market. In this regard, it should 
be highlighted that CI uses a comprehensive list of evaluation ratios and factors (country-, 
market-, institutional- and bank-level) (Capital Intelligence, 2012).  
CI ratings are classified as international or national. According to Capital Intelligence (2011), 
international credit ratings are classified into issuer credit ratings (which measure the 
creditworthiness of an entity, sovereigns, financial institutions and corporate entities, and its 
ability to meet its financial obligation in a timely manner) and issue-specific credit ratings (an 
opinion about the willingness of an a financial institution or a corporation to satisfy its 
financial obligations with respect to a specific bond or other debt instrument). CI uses two 
rating scales within two (long-term and short-term) time frames. The issuer credit ratings are 
categorised into foreign and local currency ratings, which assess the willingness and ability of 
an entity to satisfy financial obligations denominated in foreign (local) currency, controlling 
for economic, financial, country risks and external support. In the case of foreign currency 
                                                 
33
 CI’s geographical coverage includes the Middle East, the wider Mediterranean region, Central and Eastern 
Europe, South Africa, South East Asia, the Far East and North and South Africa. 
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credit ratings, restrictions imposed by governments on foreign exchange are taken into 
account.  
CI has developed two additional ratings for financial institutions: (1) an FSR, which assesses 
the bank’s intrinsic financial strength, soundness and risk profile, controlling for many factors 
related to the operating environment; and (2) support ratings, which emphasise the probability 
that banks would receive support from third parties in case of difficulties. The rating scale 
applied to the FSR is the same as for foreign and local currency ratings. The rating scale 
applied to support ratings ranges from 1 (a bank that has a high probability of receiving 
financial assistance in the event of difficulties because of the extremely strong ability and 
willingness of potential supports to provide sufficient and timely support) to 5 (the likelihood 
of support is low). Tables 2.2 and 2.3 summarise the major rating categories for S&P, 
Moody's, Fitch and CI.  
Table 2.2: Long-term ratings/scales for the four rating agencies 
S&P Moody’s Fitch CI   
Investment Score  
 
AAA
 
AA
 
A
 
BBB
 
 
Aaa
 
Aa 
A
 
Baa 
 
AAA
 
AA
 
A
 
BBB 
 
AAA 
AA 
A 
BBB 
  
Speculative Score 
 
BB 
B 
CCC 
CC 
C 
 
Ba 
B 
Caa 
Ca 
 
BB 
B 
CCC 
CC 
C 
 
BB 
B 
C 
  
Default 
 
SD, D  
 
C 
 
RD, D  
 
RS,SD,D 
  
Source: Developed by the researcher 
Table 2.2 summarises and compares the long-term ratings/scales issued by the four rating 
agencies. AAA is the highest credit rating assigned by S&P. This rating refers to the highest 
level of financial creditworthiness and strong commitments. The AA rating is slightly below 
the AAA rating. The A rating refers to strong but unsustainable financial creditworthiness. 
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The position of the obligor in this case may be easily affected by adverse shocks and 
significant changes in economic conditions. The obligors in higher rated categories may have 
more capacity to adjust their positions in response to adverse shocks. BBB refers to a 
reasonable capacity to meet financial commitments.  
BB refers to a low level of creditworthiness associated with different sources of uncertainties. 
B is below BB and refers to weak financial commitments. CCC comes after B and denotes a 
high degree of vulnerability and fragile financial position. CC means that the obligor is in 
financial stress with the possibility of bankruptcy. A C rating points to bankruptcy, although 
debt service payments continue. The SD (selective default) rating is assigned when S&P 
considers that the issuer has selectively defaulted on a specific issuer or class of obligations 
when they are due. D is among the worst ratings and is assigned when the obligor fails to 
meet all or substantially all of its obligations. Ratings ranging from AA to CCC are adapted 
by the addition of a plus or minus sign to show relative standing within the major categories 
(Standard and Poor's Ratings Services, 2013). 
Moody’s Aaa rating refers to entities with strong positions that may enable them to offer 
exceptional financial security. Aa is below Aaa and implies a possibility of long-run risk. An 
A rating refers to good financial security, though the possibility of long-run risk is greater 
than for those rated as Aa. Baa lags behind A such that the issuers may offer adequate 
financial security with weak or unreliable protective elements.  
Ba refers to so-called risky issuers with weak commitments. Below Ba, the B rating refers to 
riskier issuers, poor financial security and questionable credibility. Generally speaking, the 
Caa rating is designed to refer to issuers who have strong incentives to evade/default on their 
obligations. Ca refers to issuers with on-going default on their obligations. The element of 
trust could be missing from Ca rated issuers. C is the lowest-rating and is used for issuers 
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who are characterised by long-run default and very weak possibilities of recovery. Ratings 
ranging from Aa to Caa are adapted by the addition of the modifiers 1, 2 and 3 to show 
relative standing within the major categories (Moody's Investors Service, 2013).  
Fitch’s AAA rating indicates the highest credit quality with the lowest risk. This is usually 
assigned to entities with extended strong financial positions and credibility. AA is slightly 
below AAA. Although an A rating represents high credit quality, it may refer to a higher 
degree of risk and vulnerability than AAA and AA ratings. The B class of ratings indicates an 
increased degree of expected risk. Below the BBB and BB ratings, a B rating refers to 
significant credit risk with a limited safety margin and questionable long-run commitments. 
The C class of ratings refers to possibilities of default, with CCC as the highest (default is 
expected) and C as the lowest (default is imminent). The RD (restricted default) rating means 
that the issuer has selectively defaulted on a specific issue but will continue to meet its 
payment obligations in a timely manner. Finally, the D rating is designed to include entities 
that have defaulted on all of their financial obligations. Ratings ranging from AA to B are 
adapted by the addition of a plus (+) or minus (-) sign to show relative standing within the 
major categories (Fitch Ratings, 2012). 
Finally, CI’s A class of ratings is very similar to that of the preceding ratings. The same 
applies to the B class, in which, for example, BBB represents the high credit quality, BB 
represents speculative qualities associated with some vulnerability and the B rating refers to 
significant credit risk and uncertainty. Below the B class, a C rating refers to sizeable risk and 
strong default possibilities. Like S&P’s, the SD (selective default) rating is assigned when CI 
considers that the issuer has failed to service one or more financial obligations when it came 
due but believes the issuer will be able to satisfy other financial commitments in a timely 
manner. The RS (regulatory supervision) rating is issued specifically for financial institutions 
and means that the issuer is under the regulatory supervision of the authorities because of its 
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poor financial condition. Finally, the lowest rating, D, represents defaulted cases. The same 
applies to FSRs, in which, for example, the A class of ratings represents CI’s opinion about 
banks with strong financial positions and that the operating environment is attractive and 
stable. Ratings ranging from AA to C are adapted by the addition of a plus (+) or minus (-) 
sign to show relative standing within the major categories (Capital Intelligence, 2011). 
 
Table 2.3: Short-term ratings/scales for the four rating agencies 
S&P               Moody’s Fitch CI 
Investment Score 
 
  A-1+ 
A-1 
A-2 
A-3
 
 
P-1 
 
P-2 
P-3 
 
 F-1+ 
F-1 
F-2 
F-3 
 
A1 
A2 
A3 
Speculative Score 
 
B 
C 
 
NP 
 
B 
C 
 
B 
C 
Default 
 
SD/D 
 
NP 
 
RD/D 
 
RS/ SD/ D 
Source: Developed by the researcher 
For the short-term ratings shown in Table 2.3, for S&P, A-1 means that an obligor has a 
strong capacity to meet its financial commitments; certain obligors are designated with a plus 
sign (+), which indicates that the obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitments is 
extremely strong. A-2 means that an obligor has satisfactory capacity to meet its financial 
commitments. However, it is somewhat susceptible to the adverse effects of changes in 
circumstances and economic conditions than obligors in the highest rating category. A-3 
means that an obligor has adequate capacity to meet its financial commitments. However, 
adverse economic conditions and changing circumstances are more likely to lead to a 
weakened capacity of the obligor to meet its financial commitments.  
A B rating means that the obligor is regarded as vulnerable and has significant speculative 
characteristics. The obligor currently has the capacity to meet its financial commitments; 
however, it faces major on-going uncertainties that could lead to the obligor’s inadequate 
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capacity to meet its financial commitments. A C rating means that the obligor is currently 
vulnerable to non-payment and is dependent upon favourable business, financial and 
economic conditions for it to meet its financial commitments. The SD (selective default) 
indicates that am obligor has defaulted in one or more of its financial commitments.  A D 
rating means that the obligor is in payment default (Standard and Poor's Ratings Services, 
2012b). 
Moody’s P-1 rating means that issuers have superior ability to repay senior short-term debt 
obligations. P-1 repayment ability will often be evidenced by many of the following 
characteristics: leading market position in well-established industries, high rates of return on 
funds employed, conservative capitalisation structure with moderate reliance on debt and 
ample asset protection, broad margins in earnings coverage of fixed financial charges and 
high internal cash generation and well-established access to a range of financial markets and 
assured sources of alternate liquidity.  
A P-2 rating means that issuers have a strong ability to repay senior short-term debt 
obligations. This is normally evidenced by many of the characteristics cited above but to a 
lesser degree. Earnings trends and coverage ratios, although sound, may be more subject to 
variation. P-3 means that issuers have an acceptable ability to repay senior short-term 
obligations. The effect of industry characteristics and market compositions may be more 
pronounced. Variability in earnings and profitability may result in changes in the level of debt 
protection measures and may require relatively high financial leverage. NP means that the 
issuers do not fall within any of the prime rating categories (Moody's Investors Service, 
2013).  
For Fitch rating, F1 denotes the highest credit quality and the strongest capacity for timely 
payment of financial commitments. An added plus sign (+) is ued to denote any exceptionally 
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strong credit feature. F2 denotes good credit quality and a satisfactory capacity for timely 
payment of financial commitments, but the margin of safety is not as great as in the case of 
the higher ratings. F3 denotes fair credit quality in which the capacity for timely payment of 
financial commitments is adequate; however, near-term adverse changes could result in a 
reduction to a noninvestment grade.  
A B rating represents a speculative stage. This rating denotes minimal capacity for timely 
payment of financial commitments, plus vulnerability to near-term adverse changes in 
financial and economic conditions. A C rating means a high default risk in which default is a 
real possibility. Capacity for meeting financial commitments relies solely on a sustained, 
favourable business and economic environment. The RD (restricted default) rating denotes 
that an entity has defaulted on one of its financial obligations, although it continues to meet 
other financial commitments. A D rating indicates an entity or sovereign that has defaulted on 
all of its short-term financial obligations (Fitch ratings, 2012). 
Similar to agencies discussed previously, CI’s A1 means superior credit quality and 
represents the highest capacity for timely repayment of short-term financial commitments 
such that unexpected adversities are extremely unlikely to pose a threat. A2 represents a very 
strong capacity for timely repayment of short-term financial commitments but that the issuer 
may be affected slightly by unexpected difficulties. A3 represents a strong capacity for timely 
repayment of short-term financial commitments that may be affected by unexpected 
difficulties.  
A B rating represents an adequate capacity for timely repayment of short-term financial 
commitments that could be seriously affected by unexpected difficulties. A C rating 
represents an inadequate capacity for timely repayment of short-term financial commitments 
if unexpected difficulties are encountered in the short term. RS (regulatory supervision; this 
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rating is assigned to financial institutions only) indicates that the obligor is under the 
regulatory supervision of the authorities because of its weak financial condition. The 
likelihood of default is extremely high without continued external support. SD means 
selective default, in which the obligor has failed to service one or more financial obligations 
but CI believes that the default will be restricted in scope and that the obligor will continue to 
pay other financial obligations at their due time. A D rating represents a weak position in 
which the obligor has defaulted on all, or almost all, of its financial commitments (Capital 
Intelligence, 2011). 
2.8  Conclusion  
A critical review of the literature leads to the conclusion that banks are special and their 
unique and opaque characteristics, functions, operations, regulations, asset structures, 
involved risk and state protection laws necessitate special rating methodologies. The 
determinants and prediction of bank ratings are extensive and well established for developed 
economies compared to developing economies, including the Middle East region. Thus, one 
objective of this thesis is to determine the main quantitative factors that affect the rating 
assignment process and, in particular, the main financial and nonfinancial variables that 
produce high- and near-high FSRs that lead to better and more developed banking sectors in 
the Middle East region.  
Additionally, a model to discriminate between high and low FSRs through which the 
discriminant values are utilised to identify an accurate and predictive bank rating system is 
developed. In terms of estimation techniques, and to the best of the researcher’s knowledge to 
date, the researcher is not aware of other studies relative to the Middle East that address the 
use of conventional and machine-learning techniques for predicting bank FSR group 
memberships. The following chapter presents the research methods used in this study.  
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CHAPTER 3 : METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes data and techniques used in this thesis. The first section discusses the 
data collection procedure and explains the dependent variable (i.e., bank FSRs) as well as the 
main independent and control variables used in this study. The second section describes the 
main statistical techniques employed. The researcher applied the ML technique to identify the 
main financial and nonfinancial variables associated with high- and near-high FSRs versus 
low- and near-low FSRs in the Middle East region. This is to satisfy one of the main 
objectives of this thesis.  
Another objective is fulfilled by using two conventional techniques, namely DA and LR, and 
three machine-learning techniques (CHAID, CART and MLP neural networks) to 
discriminate and predict bank FSR group membership for banks located in the Middle East 
region. The procedure for the selection of such predictive models and the usage of different 
evaluation criteria are explained thoroughly in subsections that follow.  
It is worth mentioning here that this thesis reflects the philosophy of a positivistic approach 
that adopts the philosophical stance of the natural scientist. Positivism usually starts with 
testable hypotheses (as mentioned earlier) extracted mainly either from speculative theories 
or gaps in the empirical literature. This approach depends entirely on application of different 
statistical techniques to a large set of quantitative data to test designated hypotheses, the 
results of which may bridge the gap found in the literature.  
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3.2 Data and research methods 
This section addresses (1) data collection, (2) dependent variable and rating categories, 
(3) independent variables and expected signs with bank FSR, and (4) control variables. 
3.2.1 Data collection 
The overall sample consists of 135 active commercial banks in the Middle East region. The 
researcher focuses only on commercial banks to avoid comparison problems between various 
types of banks and to provide homogeneity in the comparison between countries. Banks are 
from 10 countries in the Middle East region
34
, as shown in Table 3-1, and the data are from 
2001 to 2009.  
The data were obtained from Bank scope database of Bureau van Dijk.
35
 Bank scope contains 
financial statements and data on more than 11,000 public and private banks worldwide. The 
rationale behind the use of the Bank scope database is that it presents banks’ financial 
information using a separate data template for each country thus allowing for differences in 
reporting and accounting conventions. In addition, the Bank scope database converts data into 
a global format, resulting in standard financial ratios that can be compared across banks and 
countries (Pasiouras et al., 2006). The number of commercial banks rated by CI in the Middle 
East region is only 64 banks and the remaining 71 banks have not been rated.  
The researcher divided the data set into three samples. The first sample includes the entire 
data set (351 observations). The researcher has removed bank observations with missing data 
from the entire data set to enhance explanatory, discriminatory and predictive models’ 
quality. The second sample includes subsample1 (67% training sample; 235 observations and 
                                                 
34
Israel, Palestinian Territory, Iraq and Syrian Arab Republic are excluded from the sample because they do not 
have commercial banks rated by CI. Iran is also excluded from the sample as all Iranian banks are Islamic 
according to Bank scope database classification.   
35
 Note that the top three RAs (Moody’s, S&P’s and Fitch) as well as CI and the Economic Intelligence Unit 
issue rating reports for Bank scope.  
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33% testing sample; 116 observations). The researcher has selected randomly both training 
and testing subsample1 using PASW® Modeler 14 software. The third sample includes  
subsample2 (2001-2006 training sample; 235 observations and 2007-2009 testing sample; 116 
observations). The entire data set was used as a test set to examine the overall predictive 
capability of the proposed classification models because of the benefits of a large data set. 
The researcher developed subsample1 and subsample2 as a simple validation technique that 
tests the predictive effectiveness of the fitted model. 
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for banks, by country and whether rated by CI, based on bank 
size (in total assets) 
Country 
# Active Commercial 
Banks 
# Banks with 
CI’s FSR 
% of Banks 
Rated by CI 
Mean Size 
(Total 
Assets) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(Total Assets)  
Bahrain 10 4 40 9.422 0.819 
Egypt 24 6 25 8.809 0.855 
Jordan 11 7 63.6 7.433 1.296 
Kuwait 6 6 100 9.231 0.598 
Lebanon 38 6 15.7 8.688 0.708 
Oman  6 5 83.3 7.810 0.708 
Qatar  8 4 50 8.547 1.146 
Saudi Arabia 9 9 100 9.672 0.815 
United Arab 
Emirates
36
 
18 15 83.3 8.248 1.316 
Yemen 5 2 40 5.832 0.554 
Total 135 64 47.4 8.521 1.308 
Source: Developed by the researcher 
 
Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics for each country based on bank size (i.e., the natural log 
of total assets in US dollars). It is clear that banks in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait are 
larger in size than those in other countries. Meanwhile, Yemen’s banks are smaller than those 
of other countries. Furthermore, banks in Egypt, Lebanon, Qatar and United Arab Emirates 
have a similar average size, as do banks in Jordan and Oman.  
                                                 
36
 Although the number of rated banks in the UAE seems different from other countries in the Middle East, this 
does not necessarily conclude a different banking regulatory environment. The common understanding in the 
related literature is that the GCC share common banking regulations. Nevertheless, the researcher further 
examines the country effect using dummy variables in the analysis.  
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3.2.2 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is bank FSR, which indicates CI vision of the bank’s intrinsic 
financial strength, soundness and risk profile (the researcher examines the country risk profile 
using the sovereign rating as an efficient proxy that is well-known in the related literature). 
Bank FSRs are a categorical variable and an ordered relationship exists between them. 
However, econometric models employed in this thesis accept only numeric variables. For this 
reason, the rating scale is coded by assigning numerical values for each bank FSR score. The 
lowest rating (i.e., D) is assigned 1 and other ratings are increased by 1 when bank FSR 
improves by one grade.   
This method is common in other relevant studies (Belloti et al., 2011a; Hammer et al., 2012; 
Öğüt et al., 2012; Pasiouras et al., 2006; Poon et al., 1999; Poon and Firth, 2005; Poon et al., 
2009; Shen et al., 2012). The researcher found no banks in the Middle East with assigned 
ratings as high as AAA, AA+ and AA nor as low as B-, C+, C, C- and D during the period 
from 2001 to 2009. Using a simple weighted average, Table 3.2 shows the numerical ratings 
and the rating categories examined in this thesis. 
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Table 3.2: A synopsis of CI bank FSRs, numerical ratings and rating categories 
CI’s Bank FSR Numerical Categories 
AAA 20 
high FSR 
AA+ 19 
AA 18 
AA- 17 
A+ 16 
A 15 
A- 14 
near-high FSR 
BBB+ 13 
BBB 12 near-low FSR 
BBB- 11 
low FSR 
BB+ 10 
BB 9 
BB- 8 
B+ 7 
B 6 
B- 5 
C+ 4 
C 3 
C- 2 
D 1 
Source: Developed by the researcher. 
Note. The ratings range from AAA (highest rating) to D (lowest rating). For ratings AA to C, CI adds a plus (+) 
or a minus (−) to represent the strength and weakness in a grade of rating for every bank. 
In the first analytical stage, four quartiles were categorised into two groups to determine the 
main financial and nonfinancial variables associated with low- and near-low-FSR banks 
versus high- and near-high-FSR banks. In the second and third analytical stage, the first and 
fourth quartiles (corresponding to low FSRs and high-FSR banks) are only used to 
discriminate and predict bank FSR group membership. Bank FSR group membership is 
explained by two values, namely, high- FSR = 1 and low- FSR= 0.   
3.2.3 Independent variables 
This thesis examines the association between bank CS, financial and nonfinancial variables 
and bank FSR and discriminates and predicts bank FSR group membership using financial 
and nonfinancial variables. It is worth mentioning that Öğüt et al.’s (2012) empirical findings 
revealed that the accuracy rates of prediction classifiers are higher with the use of variables 
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rather than factor scores. For that reason, the researcher used financial and nonfinancial 
variables rather than factor scores as input variables.  
The equity ratio is a well-known proxy for bank CS. The literature provides evidence that this 
ratio avoids distortions in the measurement of capital structure, since this ratio measures the 
amount of protection afforded to the bank by the equity they invested in it (Poon and Firth, 
2005). In addition, the researcher further argues that the use of equity ratios avoids a possible  
contradiction that may arise due to differences between short-term and long –term debt in the 
banking industry. The effects of bank CS on FSR also are influenced by other aspects or 
categories of bank performance. It is believed that bank asset quality, liquidity, profitability, 
credit risk and capital adequacy, as determined by CI
37
, have an effect on bank FSR. 
Consequently, the main independent variables are bank CS and various financial variables of 
each of the above five categories of bank performance. The researcher studied the impact of 
each category on bank FSR as each category examines an independent bank activity. Each of 
the five categories includes various measures that are used to discriminate and predict bank 
FSR group membership. A detailed description of each measure is given in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: List of bank financial variables examined
38
 
Factors 
(Predictors of 
Bank 
Performance) 
Variables 
(Ratio/Proxy) 
 
Expected 
Relationship 
to Bank FSRs 
 
Definition 
Asset quality Loan loss provision/Net 
interest revenue 
(LLPNIR)  
 
Negative The ratio of loan loss provision to net interest 
revenue denotes the relationship between 
provisions in profit and loss accounts and 
interest income over the same period. The 
estimated amount of provision reflects the 
expected amount of loans becoming non-
performing, thus high provisions mean a higher 
percentage of nonperforming ratio, which 
indicates poor asset quality. Ideally, this ratio 
should be as low as possible. In a well-run bank, 
if the lending book is higher in risk, this is 
reflected by higher interest margins. If the ratio 
                                                 
37
This is based on the CI classification.  
38
 All definitions within the categories of asset quality, capital, operations and liquidity were obtained from the 
Bank scope database and CI website. 
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deteriorates, this means that risk is not being 
properly remunerated by the margins. 
Loan loss 
reserve/Impaired loans 
(LLRIL) 
Positive The ratio of loan loss reserve to impaired loans 
or non-performing loans. Obviously, banks with 
high LLRILs are considered more conservative 
and thus investors will feel more comfortable 
about its asset quality. 
Impaired loans/Gross 
loans (ILGL) 
Negative The ratio of impaired loans to gross loans (loans 
+ loan loss reserve). This ratio measures the 
proportion of total loans that are doubtful. In the 
2000s, banks began to develop and implement 
advanced strategies and techniques to lower this 
ratio as much as possible to enhance their asset 
quality. 
Net charge off/Net 
income before loan loss 
provision (NCONIBLLP) 
Negative The ratio of net charge-off (amount written off 
from loan loss reserves less recoveries from 
loans) to net income before loan loss provisions 
is measured similarly to charge-offs but against 
income generated in the year. Intrinsically, bank 
asset quality improves when this ratio 
deteriorates, other things being equal. 
Impaired loans/Equity 
(ILE)  
Negative The ratio of impaired loans to equity. 
Unreserved impaired 
loans/Equity (UILE) 
Negative The ratio of unreserved impaired loans to equity. 
Capital 
Adequacy 
Tier 1 ratio (TR) 
 
Positive A comparison between a bank’s core equity 
capital and its total risk-weighted assets mainly 
composed of Tier 1 capital (common stock and 
disclosed reserves or retained earnings plus 
sometimes perpetual non-cumulative preference 
shares) as a percentage of risk-weighted assets 
measured under Basel rules. This ratio is used 
mainly by regulators to grade bank capital 
adequacy as one of the following rankings: well-
capitalised, adequately capitalised, 
undercapitalised, significantly undercapitalised, 
and critically undercapitalised. This ratio should 
be at least 4%; otherwise bank is considered to 
be undercapitalised.  
Total capital ratio (TCR) Positive The ratio of total capital (Tier 1 + Tier 2) to risk-
weighted asset. The total capital ratio of a bank 
must be at least 8%. This indicates that 8% of 
the bank’s risk-weighted assets must be covered 
by permanent or near permanent capital.    
Equity/Total assets (CS) 
 
Positive This ratio is used as a proxy for the bank’s CS. 
This ratio measures the ability of the bank to 
withstand losses. A declining trend may signal 
increased risk exposure and possibly a capital 
adequacy problem. 
Equity/Net loans (ENL) Positive This measures the equity cushion available to 
absorb losses on the bank’s loan book. 
Equity/Liabilities (EL) 
 
Positive This leverage ratio is another way to consider 
equity funding of the balance sheet and thus 
capital adequacy. 
Equity/Deposit and short-
term funding (EDSF)  
Positive This ratio measures the amount of permanent 
funding relative to short-term, potentially 
volatile funding. The higher this ratio is, the 
better from the bank’s risk perspective. 
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Capital funds
39
/Total 
Assets (CFTA) 
Positive The ratio of capital funds to total assets. The 
capital funds include bank’s equity plus hybrid 
capital plus subordinated debt. 
Capital funds/Net loans 
(CFNL) 
Positive The ratio of capital funds to net loans. 
Capital funds/Deposit and 
short-term funding 
(CFDSF)  
Positive The ratio of capital funds to deposits and short-
term funding. 
Capital funds/Liabilities 
(CFL) 
Positive The ratio of capital funds to total liabilities. 
Subordinated debt/Capital 
funds (SDCF) 
Negative The ratio of subordinate debt to capital funds. 
This ratio indicates what percentage of total 
capital funds is provided in the form of 
subordinated debt. 
 Equity multiplier (EM) Negative The ratio of total assets to total equity. This ratio 
measures how many times a dollar of equity is 
leveraged. A higher EM indicates higher 
financial leverage, which means the bank relies 
more on debt to finance its assets. 
Profitability Net interest margin (NIM) 
 
Positive This ratio is net interest income (interest revenue 
minus interest expense) expressed as a 
percentage of earning assets (loans plus other 
earning assets excluding fixed assets). The 
higher this ratio, the cheaper the funding or the 
higher the margin the bank generates. Higher 
margins and profitability are desirable as long as 
the asset quality is maintained. 
Net interest 
income/average assets 
(NIIAA)  
Positive This ratio measures the degree of bank 
efficiency in generating net interest income with 
available bank assets. 
 
Other operating 
income/Average assets 
(OIAA) 
 
Positive This ratio indicates to what extent fees and other 
income make up the bank’s earnings. As long as 
this is not volatile trading income, it can be seen 
as a form of income with lower risk. The higher 
this figure is, the better. 
Non-interest 
expense/average assets 
(NIEAA)  
Negative This ratio gives a measure of the cost side 
(overhead plus loan loss provisions) of the bank 
performance relative to assets invested. The 
lower this figure is, the better. 
Pretax operating 
income/Average assets 
(PTOIAA)  
Positive This ratio is a measure of the operating 
performance of the bank before tax and unusual 
items (profits before tax plus other). It is a good 
measure of profitability that is unaffected by 
non-trading activities. 
Non-0perating items and 
taxes/Average assets 
(NOITAA) 
Negative This ratio measures costs and tax as a percentage 
of assets invested. The lower this figure is, the 
better. 
Return on average  assets 
(ROAA)  
Positive The ratio of net income to average total assets. 
This ratio is perhaps the most important ratio in 
comparing the efficiency and operational 
                                                 
39
 This form of debt instrument has been substituted for equity and is a hybrid in the sense that it incorporates 
both debt and equity features and often includes specific option elements. The main objective of such 
instruments is to maximise the benefits of both debt and equity holders. Hybrid capital includes a variety of 
instruments, such as preference shares, that are not pure equity but have traditionally been deemed close enough 
to it to count toward a bank’s Tier 1 capital ratio.    
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performance of banks. This is mainly because it 
considers returns generated from assets financed 
by the bank. 
Return on average equity 
(ROAE)  
Positive ROE is a measure of the return on shareholder 
funds (earnings performance). The higher this 
figure is, the better. However, care must be 
taken to avoid putting too much weight on this 
ratio as it may be at the expense of an over-
leveraged bank.   
Dividend pay-out (DPO) 
 
Positive This ratio measures the amount of after-tax 
profits paid to shareholders. In general, the 
higher the DPO, the better is bank profitability, 
but not at the cost of restricting reinvestment in 
the bank and its ability to grow its business. 
Income net of 
distribution/Average 
equity (INODAE) 
Positive This ratio is effectively the return on equity after 
deduction of dividends paid from returns. It 
shows by what percentage the equity has 
increased from internally generated funds. The 
higher this figure is, the better. 
Non-operating 
income/Net income 
(NOINI) 
Positive This ratio denotes the percentage of total net 
income that is made up of unusual items. This 
ratio is a proxy that measures bank revenue 
diversification.  
Cost-to-income ratio 
(CIR) 
 
Negative The ratio of overhead to the sum of net interest 
revenue and other operating income. This is 
currently one of the most focused-on ratios as it 
is used as a proxy measurement of management 
ability to control expenses. That is, it measures 
management quality and overhead or costs of 
running the bank, the major element of which is 
staff salaries and benefits, rent expenses, 
equipment expenses and other administrative 
expenses, stated as a percentage of income 
generated before provisions. Thus, higher values 
of this ratio indicate less efficient management. 
Note that this ratio improves automatically if 
lending margins in a particular country are very 
high. Also, this figure can be distorted by high 
net income from associates or volatile trading 
income. 
Recurring earning power 
(REP)  
 
Positive The ratio of pre-provision income to average 
total assets. This ratio is a measure of after-tax 
profits, including provisions for bad debts, as a 
percentage of average total assets. This measures 
ROA performance without deducting provisions. 
Net profit margin (NPM) Positive The ratio of net income to interest income plus 
non-interest income. This ratio reflects the 
effectiveness of bank expense-control programs 
and service pricing. 
Asset utilisation (AU) Positive The ratio of interest income plus non-interest 
income to total assets. This ratio measures how 
banks implement efficient management policies 
for bank portfolio decisions, especially the mix 
and yield of assets. 
Tax management 
efficiency (TME) 
Positive The ratio of net income to pretax operating 
income. This ratio reflects bank usage of 
security gains or losses and other tax-
management tools (such as buying tax-exempt 
bonds) to minimise its tax exposure. 
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Expense control 
efficiency (ECE) 
Positive The ratio of pretax operating income to interest 
income plus non-interest income. ECE measures 
bank effectiveness in controlling operating 
expenses. 
Operating efficiency ratio 
(OER) 
Negative The ratio of interest expense plus non-interest 
expense plus provisions for loan losses plus 
taxes to interest income plus non-interest income 
plus securities gains (or losses). 
Credit risk  Net charge-off/Average 
gross loans (NCOAGL)  
 
 
Negative This ratio represents the net charge-off (i.e., the 
amount written off from loan loss reserves less 
recoveries) measured as a percentage of gross 
loans. This ratio indicates what percentage of 
today’s loans is written off the book. The lower 
this figure is, the better, as long as the write-off 
policy is consistent across comparable banks. 
Loan loss provisions/Total 
loans (LLPTL) 
Negative The ratio of provisions for loan losses to total 
loans. The higher this ratio is, the poorer the 
quality of loan portfolio. 
Loan loss 
provisions/equity (LLPE) 
Negative The ratio of provisions for loan losses to total 
equity. 
Loan loss reserve/Gross 
loans (LLRGL)  
 
Negative The ratio of loan loss reserve to gross loans 
(loans plus loan loss reserves) indicates how 
much of the total loan portfolio is provided for 
but not charged off. Given a similar charge-off 
policy, the higher the ratio, the poorer the quality 
of the loan portfolio. 
Loan loss reserve/Total 
equity (LLRE) 
Negative The ratio of reserve for loan losses to total 
equity. 
Liquidity Interbank ratio  
(IBR) 
Positive This is money lent to other banks (due from 
other banks) divided by money borrowed from 
other banks (due to other banks). If this ratio is 
greater than 1, then it indicates the bank is a net 
placer rather than a borrower of funds in the 
market place and therefore more liquid. 
Net loans/Total assets 
(LR)  
 
Negative This liquidity ratio indicates what percentage of 
bank assets is tied up in loans. The higher this 
ratio, the less liquid the bank is and hence the 
lower the bank FSR issued. LR is also known as 
loan ratio.  
 
Net loans/Deposit and 
short-term funding 
(NLDSTF) 
Negative This ratio is another measure of bank liquidity. 
Apparently, a high figure denotes lower 
liquidity. 
Net loans/Total deposit 
and borrowing  
(NLTDB) 
Negative This ratio is similar to NLDSTF except that 
NLTDB’s denominator only includes deposits 
and borrowings with the exception of capital 
instruments (i.e., total deposits and borrowings = 
customer and short-term funding plus other 
funding minus hybrid capital and subordinated 
debt). 
Liquid assets
40
/Deposit 
and short-term funding 
(LADSTF)  
 
Positive This is a deposit run-off ratio. It focuses mainly 
on the percentage of customers and short-term 
funds that must be met if they are withdrawn 
suddenly. The higher this percentage, the more 
liquid is the bank and the less vulnerable to a run 
                                                 
40
 Liquid assets are short-term assets that can be easily converted into cash, such as cash itself and deposits with 
the central bank, treasury bills, other government securities and interbank deposits. 
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on the bank.  
Liquid assets/Total 
deposit and borrowing 
(LATDB)  
Positive This ratio is similar to LADSTF but LATDB 
shows the amount of liquid assets as a 
proportion of total deposits and borrowing  
     Source: Developed by the researcher 
 
 
3.2.4 Control variables 
The methodology examines other factors that may have an effect on bank FSR. Bank 
financial performance variables are controlled for the following four variables: 
(1) Country as a dummy variable to control for country variations; 
(2) The size effect as a dummy variable (Ln Assets). Size is classified into three size 
levels: large, medium and small
41
; 
(3) Time effect as a dummy variable to control for the effect of time; and 
(4) CI’s national long-term credit rating (i.e., country sovereign ratings [SR]) reflects 
country-specific effects that result from differences in regulation and supervision 
rules implemented by each country. SR indicates the probability of government 
default on its obligation (Laere et al., 2012). Consequently, SR captures important 
macroeconomic and institutional characteristics of countries in which banks are 
located (Poon et al., 2009). The following factors are expressed in SR: exchange 
rates, inflation, regulatory environment, taxation, infrastructure availability, labor 
market condition and the size, structure, and growth of the economy.   
It is noteworthy that SR is issued based on certain economic and political risks 
such as fiscal policy and budgetary flexibility, income and economic structure, 
stability of political institutions, monetary policy and inflation pressures and 
public and private sector debt burdens. The SR scale comprises 20 categories 
                                                 
41
Size reflects qualitative factors, such as geographic and product diversification. 
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(from nrAAA to nrD). The categorical ratings are converted into a numerical 
scale, with the largest numerical value (20) assigned to the countries with highest 
ratings (nrAAA). This numerical conversion was used by Hammer et al. (2012) 
and Ferri et al. (1999). 
Some research has highlighted the importance of country-specific effects as a 
determinant of bank rating. For example, Caporale et al. (2011), using financial 
variables of EU countries’ bank ratings, found that country-specific indicators are 
vital determinants of bank rating. The researchers found that banks located in so-
called new EU countries have lower bank ratings than banks located in old EU 
countries because of country-specific effects. Belloti et al. (2011b) presented 
similar evidence by applying ordered choice estimation techniques and a support 
vector machine to identify the impact of financial variables and country risk on the 
prediction of FBRs. The authors found that the inclusion of the country effect 
enhanced the predictive performance of both econometric predictive techniques. 
In addition, banks located in more stable, developed and rich countries tend to 
obtain high ratings.  
Similarly, Shen et al. (2012), using S&P’s long-term credit rating for rated banks 
in 86 countries, found that banks located in countries with high sovereign credit 
ratings tend to receive high bank credit ratings. Godlewski (2006), using a sample 
of emerging market economies, found that good institutional environment quality 
positively affects the national reputation and thus enhances the reputation of 
banks. Thus, the inclusion of SR is expected to improve the explanatory power as 
well as the predictive capabilities of the models tested in this thesis.  
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3.3 Statistical estimation models  
This section provides a discussion of different models, statistical techniques and three 
evaluation criteria used in this thesis to evaluate the predictive capabilities of the proposed 
predictive techniques. 
3.3.1 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity implies that two or more variables are very closely linearly related, which 
makes it difficult to determine reliable estimates of their individual regression coefficients 
(Field, 2010). In other words, two independent variables convey the same information. In 
addition, multicollinearity has negative impact on model results. This is mainly because it is 
difficult to separate the influential relationship between supposedly independent variables. 
That is, correlated variables contribute redundant information to the regression model. This 
leads to unstable coefficients that result in coefficient signs that do not match expectations.  
This thesis addresses the issue of multicollinearity by examining the variance inflation factor 
(VIF) scores. The regression analysis is conducted a number of times to trace the variables 
associated with VIF scores > 5. The VIF is estimated as follows (Studenmund, 2000, p. 257): 
 
 2i
i
R1
1
βˆVIF

  (1) 
The decision rule states that if the VIF coefficient for any independent variable is equal to 
one, this implies that collinearity has no significant effect on the relationship between 
independent variables. However, when variables associated with the VIF coefficient are 
greater than five, the independent variable is excluded from the regression equation. The 
decision to drop a variable has a goal of reducing multicollinearity as much as possible, thus 
improving the significance of other variables that are not substantially correlated with each 
other (Berenson et al., 2005). In addition, a pair-wise correlation matrix among independent 
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variables is estimated to test whether independent variables are correlated and thus validate 
VIF results.  
3.3.2 Multinomial logit (ML) model 
The nature of the dependent variable mainly necessitates the use of ML technique, which is a 
generalisation of the logistic regression. This is mainly because the dependent variable (i.e., 
bank FSRs) is polytomous, that is, its values are more than two categories (Sentas and 
Angelis, 2006).  A similar related technique (i.e., an ordered logistic regression ‘logit’) has 
been used in a number of empirical studies (Eisenbeis, 1978; Poon et al., 1999; Pasiouras et 
al., 2006; Pasiouras et al., 2007; Öğüt et al., 2012; Hammer et al., 2012). In this case, the data 
are called individual specific.  
The problem of the ordered methods is that variables may influence credit ratings differently 
across different rating categories. The multinomial or unordered logit model allows the 
importance of variables to vary across ratings (Matthies, 2013). In addition, the ordered 
models assume a constant influence of variables across all rating categories. Ederington 
(1985) states that unordered logit achieves the best fit for in-sample estimation and ordered 
logit performs best for out-of sample prediction. 
Altman and Rijken (2006) state that the ordered probit panel regression assumes a point-in-
time perspective instead of the through-the-cycle approach that is employed by rating 
agencies. This is problematic if the probit method is used to forecast rating changes (Amato 
and Furfine, 2004). Distinguin et al. (2013) find that the operational aspects of multinomial 
logistic allow for possible asymmetric effects, therefore, they use it for predicting bank 
ratings. 
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The estimation description of ML model is as follows (Greene, 2000, p. 859): 
  Jj
e
e
jY
J
k
ik
ij
1,2,...,for  
1
Prob
1
'
'





Χ
Χ


 (2) 
Where 
Y represents the dependent variable, i.e., bank FSRs, which takes integer values from 1 to J. j 
denotes the number of bank FSRs rating categories ranging from 1 (D) to 20 (AAA), e  is the 
base of natural logarithm (2.71828),  j represents the regression coefficient corresponding to 
outcome j, 
i
x  are explanatory variables describing observation i (i.e., financial and 
nonfinancial variables). The estimated equations provide a set of probabilities for the J+1 
choices for a decision maker with characteristics
i
x . The estimation of the ML model is 
straightforward. Newton’s method provides a ready solution. The log-likelihood can be 
derived by defining, for each individual (or each bank FSR), 1
ij
d if alternative j is chosen 
by individual i, and 0 if not, for the J-1 possible outcomes. Then for each observations i, one 
and only one of the
ij
d 's is 1. It is worth noting that if the data are in the form of ratios, then 
the appropriate log-likelihood and derivatives are obtained just by making
iji pnij
d   
The log likelihood is a generalisation of that for the binomial or logit model: 
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The derivatives have the characteristically simple form: 
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Where 
ijd  represents the log likelihood (the probability of occurrence for each bank FSR). The 
independent variables are bank equity ratio (proxy for bank CS) in addition to the financial 
variables of bank performance that include asset quality, capital adequacy, credit risk, 
liquidity and profitability. Non-financial variables are also included to assess country, bank 
size, time and country sovereign ratings impact on bank FSR simultaneously with bank CS 
and financial variables. These are used as the factors in the estimation procedures. Figure 3-1 
illustrates the ML model. 
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Figure 3.1: Flow chart diagram of the ML model  
Bankscope 
database
Financial data of commercial banks in 
the Middle East 
Data preparation
Implementation of Multinomial Regression 
technique
Determination of financial and non-
financial profile of high- and near-high- 
bank FSR versus low- and near-low- bank 
FSR.
Description of roadmaps for commercial 
banks in the Middle East region
 
3.3.3 The process of choosing statistical predictive techniques 
One of the main thrusts of the current thesis is to predict banks’ FSR group memberships and 
choose the most accurate predictive statistical techniques to enhance the predictive capability 
of banks’ FSR group memberships for commercial banks located in the Middle East region. 
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Using PASW® Modeler 14
42
, the researcher applied the auto classifier node as an initial step 
to create automatically and compare a number of statistical predictive techniques. 
In a relatively simple stream, auto classifier node generates and ranks a set of candidate 
predictive statistical techniques and chooses the ones that perform the best. The auto classifier 
node specifies the number of statistical models to be created, along with the criteria used to 
compare statistical techniques. This thesis used the overall accuracy percentage to rank the 
predictive statistical techniques. The overall accuracy percentage identifies the percentage of 
observations that are correctly predicted by the statistical technique relative to the total 
number of observations (SPSS, Inc., 2010). 
Accordingly, the auto classifier ranks at the top two decision-tree techniques: CHAID with 
96.30% overall accuracy and CART with 95.44% overall accuracy. This is followed by MLP 
neural networks with 94.02% overall accuracy. The two conventional multivariate statistical 
techniques (i.e., DA, with 93.16% overall accuracy, and LR, with 73.5%) are ranked as the 
lowest predictive statistical techniques. Thus, it can be concluded that the machine-learning 
techniques (i.e., CHAID, CART and MLP neural networks) are superior to the conventional 
techniques (i.e., DA and LR) for predicting bank FSR group membership in the specific 
environment chosen (i.e., the Middle East region).  
Moreover, the auto classifier node generates an evaluation chart that offers a visual way to 
assess and compare the performance of each predictive statistical technique. As shown in 
Figure 3.2, the five predictive statistical techniques are plotted to highlight the differences 
between each of them in terms of overall accuracy percentage.  
 
                                                 
42
 PASW® Modeler 14 is the SPSS enterprise-strength data mining workbench that helps the author building 
predictive models quickly and intuitively without programming 
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Figure 3.2: An evaluation chart for the five predictive statistical techniques 
 
3.3.3.1 Evaluation criteria 
The present study used three evaluation criteria: average correct classification (ACC) rate 
criterion, estimated misclassification cost (EMC) criterion and gains charts. The ACC rate 
criterion is significant in evaluating the classification capability of the proposed statistical 
predictive techniques. The EMC criterion is used to evaluate the overall statistical technique 
effectiveness and to find the minimum EMC for the proposed statistical predictive 
techniques. Finally, gains charts are a useful way to visualise the quality of the predictive 
model. 
3.3.3.1.1 Average correct classification criterion 
As shown in Table 3.4, the initiative of ACC rate evolved from a matrix titled ‘A Confusion 
Matrix’, ‘Classification Matrix’ or ‘Accuracy Matrix’ ( Abdou, 2009b; Altman, 1968; Yang 
et al., 2004).  
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Table 3.4: Classification matrix 
 Predicted observations 
Actual observations              h       l 
H              Hh       Hl                            TH 
L              Lh        Ll                             TL 
             Th       Tl                    TN 
Note. H = actual high FSR; h = predicted high FSR; L= actual low FSR; l = predicted low 
FSR; Hh = actual high FSR/predicted high FSR ; Hl = actual high FSR/predicted low FSR; 
Lh = actual low FSR/predicted high FSR; Ll = actual low FSR/predicted low FSR; TH = 
total actual high-FSR observations; TL = total actual low-FSR observations; Th = total 
predicted high-FSR observations; Tl = total predicted low-FSR observations; and TN = 
total number of observations in the dataset.  
 
Table 3.4 shows that a number of useful rates can be calculated from this matrix. The first 
rate is the ACC rate, given by (Hh + Ll)/TN. The second rate is a complementary value of the 
ACC rate; that is, total error rate represented by (Hl + Lh)/TN. The third rate is subdivided 
into two sub-rates known as the correctly classified high-FSR rate (Hh/TH) and the correctly 
classified low-FSR rate (Ll/TL). Finally, the fourth rate also is subdivided into two sub-rates 
called Type I error rate (Hl/TH) and Type II error rate (Lh /TL).   
In this thesis, the ACC rate is considered to be an important criterion to be used, especially 
for banks in the Middle East, because it highlights the accuracy of prediction. In addition, the 
ACC rate ignores various misclassification costs for actual low FSR/predicted high FSR and 
the actual high FSR/predicted low FSR. The ACC rate measures the proportion of the 
correctly classified cases (high FSR and low FSR) in the Middle East bank dataset. 
3.3.3.1.2   Estimated misclassification cost criterion 
The second evaluation criterion is the EMC criterion, which is computed by the equation that 
follows (Abdou, 2009b; West, 2000): 
EMC= C(I) × (Hl/TH) × (TH/TN) + C(II) × (Lh/TL) × (TL/TN) (4) 
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where C(I) is the misclassification cost associated with a Type I error; (Hl/TH) is the 
probability of a Type I error expressed as a ratio of number of high FSRs predicted as low 
FSRs (Hl) to total high FSRs (TH); (TH/TN) is the prior probability of high FSRs, 
specifically, the ratio of total high FSRs (TH) to the total number of observations (TN); C(II) 
is the misclassification cost associated with a type II error; (Lh/TL) is the probability of Type 
II error, expressed as a ratio of low FSRs predicted as high FSRs (Lh) to total low FSRs (TL); 
and (TL/TN) is the prior probability of a low FSR, that is, the ratio of total low FSRs (TL) to 
the total number of observations (TN).  
It is worth mentioning that there is a significant difference between the costs associated with 
Type I and Type II errors. Generally, the misclassification cost associated with Type II error 
is much higher than that associated with Type I error (Abdou 2009b; Lee and Chen, 2005). 
Hans Hofmann, who contributed the German credit-scoring data, recommended that the ratio 
of misclassification costs associated with Type I and Type II errors be set to 1:5 (West, 2000). 
In this thesis, the importance is not only on this relative cost ratio at 1:5, but also that it 
provides a sensitivity analysis using higher cost ratio at 1:12. This is mainly because it is 
expected that the higher cost ratio might be more appropriate, especially for an environment 
with high political risk such as countries in the Middle East region. 
3.3.3.1.3  Gains chart 
The gains chart plots the values in the gain (%) column from the gains table. Gains are 
defined as the proportion of hits in each increment relative to the total number of hits in the 
tree using equation (5):  
(hits in increment / total number of hits) x 100% (5) 
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The diagonal line plots the expected response in the testing subsamples if the models are not 
used. The curved line indicates how much the model can be improved by including only those 
that rank in the higher percentiles based on gain. The steeper the curve, the higher the gain 
(SPSS, Inc., 2010). 
3.3.4 CHAID 
CHAID is a data analysis method used to examine the association between a dependent 
variable and a large series of independent variables (Koyuncugil and Ozgulbas, 2012). 
CHAID is used to predict and detect interactions between variables (Bijak and Thomas, 
2012). The CHAID method is a statistical technique for segmentation and is considered a 
tree-structured classification method (Kass, 1980). The CHAID algorithm is an enhancement 
of the automatic interaction detection method designed for a categorised dependent variable 
(Magidson and Vermunt, 2005). The main objective of CHAID is to split the data into 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive subsets that best describe the dependent variable (Kass, 
1980).  
CHAID examines all values of a potential independent variable using the significance of a 
statistical test as a criterion. Using stepwise procedures, values that are statistically 
homogeneous are merged with respect to the dependent variable and all other values that are 
heterogeneous are maintained. Subsequently, the first branch in the decision tree is developed 
by selecting the best independent variable. This iterative process concludes with child node 
that groups all homogenous values of the selected independent variable. This process is 
repeated until the tree is fully grown and no more nodes can be split.  
The measurement level of the dependent variable determines the statistical test. That is, the F 
test is used for a continuous dependent variable and the chi-squared test is used for a 
categorical dependent variable to determine the best next split at each step (SPSS, Inc., 2010). 
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In this thesis, the Pearson chi-squared test is used because it fits the nature of data. The chi-
squared statistics are calculated using the observed cell frequencies and the expected cell 
frequencies, and the p-value is based on the calculated statistics. 
The Pearson chi-squared statistic is calculated as per SPSS, Inc. (2010, p. 77): 
    ∑ ∑
      ̂    
 
 ̂  
 
   
 
    (6) 
where      ∑                   is the observed cell frequency and  ̂   is the expected 
cell frequency for cell             from the independence model. The corresponding p-
value is calculated as        
     , where   
  follows a chi-square distribution with d = 
(J – 1)(I – 1) degrees of freedom. 
The Bonferroni correction method
43 
is used to adjust the test significance level for numerous 
tests completed at the same time (Dunn, 1961; Hawkins and Kass, 1982). The adjusted p-
value is computed by multiplying the p-value by a Bonferroni multiplier. The Bonferroni 
multiplier manages the overall p-value across multiple statistical tests. Suppose that an 
independent variable originally has I categories and after the merging step, this number is 
reduced to r categories. The Bonferroni multiplier B is the number of possible ways that I 
categories can be merged into r categories. For  r = I, B = 1, for 2 ≤ r < I (SPSS, Inc., 
2010,p.79). 
   ∑      
      
        
           (7) 
The CHAID method has certain advantages as a means of identifying logical patterns in 
complicated datasets. First, the CHAID method produces more than two categories at any 
particular level in the tree as it is not a binary tree method. This iterated process produces a 
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 It is named after Italian mathematician Carlo Emilio Bonferroni for the use of Bonferroni inequality. 
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wider tree than that provided by binary growing methods. Second, the CHAID method can 
work for all levels of measurements for the dependent variable and independent variables 
(e.g., nominal, ordinal or interval). Finally, the missing values in the independent variables 
are treated as a floating category so that partial data can be used whenever possible within the 
tree
44
.  
In the literature of finance, the CHAID algorithm has been used for development of early 
warning system models for financial risk detection in several research studies (Koyuncugil 
and Ozgulbas,  2007, 2012). In addition, the CHAID algorithm has been used to develop 
credit scoring models by which to assess the credit risk of bank customers (Bijak and 
Thomas, 2012; Thomas et al., 2002; Yap et al., 2011). To the best of this researcher’s 
knowledge, this is the first research that has used the CHAID algorithm to predict banks’ FSR 
group memberships for commercial banks in the Middle East region. 
3.3.5 CART 
The CART method is a nonparametric statistical procedure and a binary decision tree-based 
algorithm popularised by Breiman et al. (1984). As the name suggests, the CART algorithm 
is a single procedure that can be used to solve both regression and classification problems 
using a set of if-then rules (Razi and Athappilly, 2005). CART is a classification tool used to 
classify an object (i.e., data groups and/or firms) into two or more populations. CART is a 
very flexible, reliable, transparent and comprehensible decision-tree tool that automatically 
separates complex databases to isolate significant patterns and relationships (Chandra et al., 
2009; Ravi et al., 2008).  
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 The floating category mean that independent variable with missing data will be either separated out on its own 
or grouped with categories near one end of the ordinal part of the scale. 
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The CART method outlined in Breiman et al. (1984) is divided into three stages: 
(1) construction of the maximum tree (tree-growing process), (2) selection of the right-sized 
tree (pruning process), and (3) classification of the new data using the constructed tree. 
The first stage involves the tree-growing process in which CART uses a recursive partitioning 
technique to partition data into two homogeneous subsets. Those two subsets are then split 
again using a splitting criterion that generates the greatest improvement in predictive 
accuracy. Depending on the type of dependent variable, several criteria are available to 
reduce the impurity in splitting for classification. Gini or towing is used with a categorical 
dependent variable and least-squared deviations are used with a continuous dependent 
variable (SPSS, Inc., 2010). In this thesis, the Gini index is used because it fits the nature of 
the data and is the most broadly used rule. The splitting process is repeated until the 
homogeneity criterion is attained or until some other stopping criterion is fulfilled.  
The Gini index uses the following impurity function g(t) at a node t in CART tree  as follows 
(SPSS, Inc., 2010, p.63):   
     ∑    ∣      ∣             (8) 
where   and   are categories of the dependent variable, and 
   ∣    
       
    
 
   ∣    
          
   
 
     ∑      
 
 
where      is the prior probability value for category          is the number of records in 
category   of node  , and    is the number of records of category   in the root node. It should 
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be noted that Gini index is used to enhance splitting during tree growth, thus only those 
records in node   and the root node with valid values for the split predictor are used to 
compute        and    , respectively.  
After a fully grown tree is identified, the second stage, called the pruning process, is 
implemented to improve the generalisation and to avoid over-fitting. The pruning process 
investigates the entire decision tree and then eliminates the bottom-level splits that do not add 
significantly to the accuracy of the tree. The main objective of the pruning process is to 
generate a right-sized tree in which the misclassification risk is smaller than that of the largest 
possible tree. This is achieved by employing two pruning algorithms: optimisation by number 
of points in each node and cross-validation.  
The former algorithm implies that the splitting is stopped when the number of observations in 
the node is less than predefined required minimum. The latter algorithm is based on an 
optimal proportion between the misclassification error and the complexity of the tree. Thus, 
the cross-validation process focuses on minimising both the misclassification risk and the 
complexity of the tree to obtain the optimal tree. This task is accomplished using the minimal 
cost-complexity function (SPSS, Inc., 2010, p.67): 
            | ̃| (9) 
 
     is the misclassification risk of tree  , and | ̃| is the number of terminal nodes for tree  . 
The term   represents the complexity cost per terminal node for the tree.  
The third stage is to classify the new data after the construction of a right-sized tree with the 
lowest cross-validated rate. The outcome of this stage is that each new observation is 
assigned to a class or response value. Each new observation will fit with one of the terminal 
nodes of the tree through a set of questions in the tree.     
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The main advantage of the CART method can be summarised as follows. First, the CART 
algorithm is a nonparametric technique and thus does not require specification of any 
functional form. Accordingly, CART is not affected by the outliers. This feature is important 
especially for financial data in which outliers exist as a result of financial crises or defaults. 
Also, CART considers unequal misclassification costs in the tree-growing process and 
specifies the prior probability distribution in a classification problem. Finally, the CART 
algorithm handles noisy and incomplete data and provides easy-to-use decision trees that 
reveal variable interactions in the data set.  
In the literature of finance, the CART algorithm has been applied to solve problems such as 
firm bankruptcy prediction (Brezigar-Masten and Masten, 2012; Chandra et al., 2009; Chen, 
2011; Li et al., 2010). In the field of banking, the CART algorithm has been used to develop 
credit scoring models by which to assess the credit risk of bank customers (Chen et al., 2009; 
Kao et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2006). In addition, the CART algorithm has been used to develop 
early warning models by which to assess the soundness of individual banks (Loannidis et al., 
2010) and to predict bank performance (Ravi et al., 2008). To the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge, this is the first study to use the CART algorithm to predict banks’ FSR group 
memberships for commercial banks in the Middle East region. 
3.3.6 Neural networks 
Neural networks are an information processing technology that mimics the processing 
characteristics of the human brain. The study of neural networks was first proposed by 
McCulloch and Pitts (1943), who explained the threshold neuron as a model that simulates 
the working principle of the human brain. This mean that the learning ability of human beings 
is transferred to a computer environment in which neural networks are able to learn from 
examples (Akkoc, 2012).  
96 
 
Neural networks are nonparametric models and computational tools employed to examine 
data and develop models to identify significant patterns or structures in the data, which is 
known as training data. Once the neural network is familiar with the training data and learns 
its patterns, the neural network is employed for new data (i.e., testing data) and thus achieves 
a variety of outcomes. The neural network possesses certain strengths not found in other 
statistical techniques, such as no prior assumption is required, tolerance of noisy or random 
inputs, self-organisation and learning, generalisation from specific examples and discovery of 
complex relationships among inputs (Udo, 1992, 1993). These abilities create a machine that 
possesses a reasoning process similar to that of the human brain.  
Widrow et al. (1994) argued that most neural network applications fall into three main 
categories: (1) pattern classification, (2) prediction and financial analysis and (3) control and 
optimisation. Because of the overlap between pattern classification and predictive application, 
Widrow et al. introduced a modified categorisation that separates application by methods. 
This resulted in three categories: (1) classification, (2) time series and (3) optimisation.  
The classification problems entail either binary decisions or multiple-class identification in 
which observations are divided into categories based on specified characteristics. In time-
series problems, neural networks develop a forecasting model using the historical data set to 
predict future data points. Finally, the optimisation problems require application of neural 
networks to solve very difficult problems known as non-polynomial complete problems (e.g., 
job-scheduling in manufacturing). In sum, neural networks can be employed to: (1) learn to 
predict future events depending on pattern observed in the historical training data, (2) learn to 
classify unobserved data into determined groups according to characteristics defined earlier in 
the training data, and (3) learn to cluster the training data into natural groups according to 
comparable characteristics in the training data (Smith and Gupta, 2002). 
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Neural networks are used successfully across a wide range of problem domains, in areas such 
as finance, medicine, engineering, geology and physics. In the field of finance, neural 
networks are employed to deal with uncertainty by recognising data patterns and using these 
patterns to predict future events. Medsker et al. (1993) stated that neural networks are used in 
different financial analysis tasks such as credit authorisation screening, mortgage risk 
assessment and financial and economic forecasting. Moreover, neural networks have been 
adapted to improve significantly the potential of corporate finance applications such as 
financial simulation, prediction of investor behaviour, investment evaluation, credit approval, 
pricing of initial public offerings and determination of optimal capital structure (Hsieh, 1993).    
In addition, neural networks have been successfully trained to predict bank failure 
(Boyacioglu et al., 2009; Chauhan et al., 2009; Kumar and Ravi, 2007; Loannidis et al. 2010; 
Markham and Ragsdale, 1995; Ravi and Pramodh, 2008; Salchenberger et al., 1992; Tam, 
1991; Tam and Kiang, 1990, 1992; Zhao et al., 2009;) as well as firm bankruptcy (Brockett et 
al,. 1994; Chandra et al., 2009; Chen et al., 1995; Falavigna, 2012; Fletcher and Goss, 1993; 
Hsiao and Whang, 2009; Kim and Kang, 2010; Lee et al., 2005; Tsukuda and Baba, 1994; 
Udo, 1993; Wilson and Sharda, 1994; Zhang et al., 1999). In line with this, Huang et al. 
(2004) employed a back-propagation neural network to evaluate the creditworthiness of US 
and Taiwanese banks, and Öğüt et al. (2012) employed neural networks to predict BFSRs 
issued by Moody’s for Turkish banks during the period from 2003 to 2009.  
3.3.6.1 Neural network fundamentals 
Neural networks were inspired by the biological sciences as they represent an extremely 
simplified model of the brain. Neurons are the cells found in the human brain and nervous 
system. Each neuron is a specialised cell that can propagate an electrochemical signal. These 
signals or information are carried to a neuron through a branching input structure called 
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dendrites. On the other hand, electrochemical signals are transmitted from neurons via a 
branching output structure known as axons. Synapses are the gaps or junctions between the 
connections used by neurons to communicate with each other (Picton, 2000).  
Neurons fire electrochemical signals along the axon. This signal is transferred via synapses to 
the dendrites of other neurons. According to the incoming electrochemical signals, synapses 
release the neurotransmitters that excite or inhibit their associated neuron activity. Thus, a 
neuron retains all of the activating signals and disregards all of the inhibiting signals from all 
of its synapses. Neurons fire to their axon only if the difference is higher than its threshold of 
activation. Consequently, a neuron may send/receive an electrochemical signal to/from other 
neurons. This means that neural networks are composed of a number of processing elements, 
each of which has a number of inputs that combine to produce a single output (Abdou et al., 
2008).  
3.3.6.2 The structure of neural networks 
The basic element of a neural network is artificial neurons that are linked together to form 
either a single layer or multiple layers. The type of neural network determines the basic 
neuron elements employed. A neuron is a simple virtual device that receives a number of 
inputs either as raw data inputs or outputs from the preceding neuron. Each neuron sums all 
inputs and performs a (usually nonlinear) transfer function to generate an output. The output 
value is either a final model prediction or is used as one of the inputs to other neurons (SPSS, 
Inc., 2010).  
The structure of a neural network is composed of many neurons connected in a systematic 
way. The most common neural network structure consists of three basic layers: (1) an input 
layer that represents a layer for input neurons where external information (independent 
variables in statistics) is received; (2) one or more hidden layers that perform the internal 
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processing on information received from input layer and (3) the output layer, which 
represents a layer for output neurons where information is transmitted outside of the neural 
network (dependent variable in statistics).  
These layers are fully interconnected with each other. That is, each neuron in the input layer 
is connected to every neuron in the hidden layer and each neuron in the hidden layer is 
connected to every neuron in output layer. Each connection has its associated weight, which 
verifies the power of one neuron over another. Each weight may have either a positive or a 
negative value attached to it. Positive weights indicate reinforcement and negative weights 
are associated with inhibition (Irwin et al., 1995). As shown in Figure 3.3, predictions are 
generated by the information flow from the input layer via the processing layer (i.e., hidden 
layer) to the output layer. 
Figure 3.3: Basic neuron model 
 X1  
 X 2      hj                          oj=g(hj) 
          
X i 
 
Source: Based onIrwin et al. (1995), p. 3; Brockett et al. (1994); and Udo (1993), modified by the author 
Figure 3.3 shows a neural network structure with inputs (X1,X2,….Xi) connected to neuron j 
with weights (W1j,W2j…..Wij) on each connection. After multiplying each input signal by its 
associated weight, the neuron adds all of the received input signals. This results in an output 
(hj) that passes through a transfer (activation) function, g(hj), which is normally non-linear, to 
conclude with the final output Oj. 
W1j 
W2j 
Wij 
∑        ∑ (
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3.3.6.3 Multilayer perceptron 
PASW® Modeler 14 offers two different types of neural networks: MLP and radial basis 
function. In this thesis, MLP is employed because of the categorical nature of the dependent 
variable. MLP is one of the most frequently used neural network models. It is applied in 
approximately 95% of the reported neural network business application studies, mainly for 
prediction, classification and modelling (Wong et al., 1997). MLP is utilised to solve 
problems that concern learning the relationships between a set of inputs and a known output.      
MLP is a feed-forward neural network with up to two hidden layers. MLP is a supervised 
learning network that permits weights to be learned from experience, based on empirical 
observations of the object of interest (Rumelhart et al., 1986; Salchenberger et al., 1992). 
That is, any non-linear function can be approximated by adjusting or training the supervised 
network based on the given input-output pairs. An MLP network is a function of one or more 
independent variables that minimises the prediction error of the dependent variable. The 
training of an MLP involves the minimisation of an error function based on the generalised 
delta rule using a back-propagation algorithm (SPSS, Inc., 2010). Back propagation is the 
most popular example of a neural network training algorithm used to calculate the gradient of 
the network; that is, to calculate the first derivatives of the error function with respect to each 
network weight (Fausett, 1994; Lee et al., 2005; Patterson, 1996).  
The calculation of neural network weights is known as the training process. In the training 
process, the input data feed forward via the network to generate a prediction from the output 
layer. The network compares the predicted output to the actual output and calculates the error. 
In an attempt to improve the overall predictive accuracy, the difference between the actual 
output and the predicted output is propagated backward (i.e., as an error function) via the 
101 
 
network to adjust and update the connection weights. This process is repeated until either the 
error function is sufficiently close to zero or the default number of iterations is reached.   
Figure 3.4 shows an example of MLP feed-forward architecture. The architecture consists of 
three main layers: (1) the input layer, which consists of neurons of all input variables (Xi); 
(2) the last layer, which is the output layer, which is one neuron (Y) and (3) the interior 
layer(s), called the middle or hidden layer(s), which have three neurons in this architecture 
(Hj).The flow of data is from left to right, with input (Xi) passed via the network through 
connecting weights to the hidden layers of neurons and subsequently to the output layer. 
 
Figure 3.4: MLP feed-forward architecture (one hidden layer) 
              Input layer  Hidden layer  Output layer 
 X1 Wij 
 Wj 
 X2   Y 
  
X3  
 
Xi 
 
Source: Modified by the author from Erbas and Stefanou (2009), Fletcher and Goss (1993),Lee et al. 
(2005), Limsombunchai et al. (2005), Sermpinis et al. (2012), Smith and Gupta (2000) and Udo 
(1993) . 
 
Accordingly, the following equation explains the MLP feed-forward function for one hidden 
layer:   
Y= 𝐹 [∑    𝐹 
 
   (∑    
 
     )] (10) 
where Y = the output of the network, 𝐹 = the logistic (sigmoid) transfer function,     
 
     
, for the output layer,   = the connection weights from hidden layer (node j) to output 
H1 
H2 
Hj 
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layer, 𝐹 = the logistic transfer function for the hidden layer,     = the connection weights 
from input layer (node i) to hidden layer (node j) and    = the input variable for node i 
(Brown and Mues, 2012; Erbas and Stefanou, 2009; Limsombunchai et al., 2005; 
Salchenberger et al., 1992).  
3.3.7 Discriminant function 
It is sometimes useful to determine functions of the variables X 1 , X 2 , …,X p  that in some 
sense separate the m groups. The simplest approach involves the use of a linear combination 
of the X variables for this purpose in such a way that Z reflects group differences as much as 
possible (Eldomiaty et al., 2011): 
Z = a 1 X 1  + a 2 X 2 +…+a p X p  (11) 
Groups can be well separated using Z if the mean value changes considerably from group to 
group, with the values within a group being fairly constant. One way to choose the 
discriminant coefficients a 1 , a 2 ,…, a p  in the index is to maximise the F ratio for a one-way 
analysis of variance. Hence a suitable function for separating the groups can be defined as the 
linear combination for which the F ratio is as large as possible.  
When this approach is used, it turns out that it may be possible to determine several linear 
combinations by which to separate groups. In general, the number available is the smaller of 
p and m-1. This is one of the advantages of the linear DA. That is, the reduction of the 
analysis space dimensionality (i.e., from the number of different independent variables X to 
m-1 dimension[s]). In this stage, the researcher is concerned only with two groups: banks 
with high FSRs versus those with low FSRs, so the resulting Z function is only one function 
(i.e., one-dimension analysis). 
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When discriminant coefficients are applied to the actual ratio, a basis exists for classification 
into one of the mutually exclusive groups. In this regard, the DA technique has the advantage 
of considering an entire profile of characteristics common to the relevant observations (i.e., 
banks with high FSRs) as well as the interaction of these characteristics. The linear DA also 
has the advantage that it yields a model with a relatively small number of selected 
measurements, which has the potential to convey a great deal of information (Altman, 1968; 
Altman and Sametz, 1977).  
3.3.7.1 Discriminant analysis (Z-score model) 
The DA was initially introduced by Fisher (1936) as a classification technique. The DA is the 
most common technique used to develop Z-score models. The DA addresses the problem of 
the quality of separation into two or more groups of observations (i.e., individuals, 
companies, banks), given measurements for these observations on several variables (Hair et 
al., 2005; Manly, 2004). Therefore, the DA is a statistical technique used to identify and 
weigh the significant measures that accurately classify original observations into their 
identified groups. The DA is used primarily to classify and/or make predictions in problems 
in which the dependent variable appears in qualitative form (e.g., high- or low-risk stocks, 
bankrupt or non-bankrupt, high versus low FSRs). Accordingly, the qualitative form is to be 
classified into two different groups. 
In the field of business,Altman (1968), Altman and Sametz (1977) and Altman and Fleur 
(1984) initiated the DA by building a z-score model that uses public accounting information 
to discriminate between bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms. There are many Z models in the 
DA, most of which were derived for the evaluation of company solvency and the assessment 
of financial distress across different industries and in different countries. 
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In the literature of finance (Altman, 1973; Blum, 1974; Boyacioglu et al., 2009; Canbas et al., 
2005; Deakin, 1972; Doğanay et al., 2006; Edmister, 1972; Li et al., 2010; Pettway and 
Sinkey, 1980; Santomero and Vinso, 1977; Sinkey, 1975; Taffler, 1978, 1982, 1983, 1984;  
Wilcox, 1971) applies many forms of DA to predict corporate and bank failure and to assess 
financial distress. In addition, DA has been employed by Abdou et al. (2008), Abdou (2009a), 
Akkoc (2012), Bardos (1998), Desai et al. (1996), Lee et al. (2002, 2006), Lee and Chen 
(2005), Martell and Fitts (1981), Min and Lee (2008), Mylonakis and Diacogiannis (2010), 
Overstreet et al. (1992) and Reichert et al. (1983) to build credit scoring models. In the field 
of banking, Öğüt et al. (2012) used DA to predict BFSRs issued by Moody’s.  
3.3.7.2 Discriminant, content and construct validity 
The effectiveness of DA and the resulting discriminant models require a test for discriminant 
validity, content and construct validity (Podsakoff and Oragan, 1986). In this case, the 
classification as well as the use of bank financial and nonfinancial variables provides 
distinctive dimensionality, which means that the issue of discriminant validity is well settled.  
Regarding the issues of content and construct validity, the characteristics of bank financial 
variables are drawn from relevant literature that adequately provides multidimensional 
perspectives (e.g., asset quality, capital adequacy, credit risk, liquidity and profitability 
categories). In addition, these financial variables provide adequate coverage of the important 
contents and therefore a good basis for content validity (Nunnally, 1994). Because many 
related studies have conducted empirical examinations of bank financial and nonfinancial 
variables in the literature of the banking industry, these variables provide an adequate 
evidence of construct validity (Dince and Fortson, 1972;Sinkey, 1975). 
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3.3.8 Logistic regression 
LR is a well-established multivariate statistical technique used to predict binomial or 
multinomial outcomes. The initial model formulation of LR was designed for binary 
classification problems (Crama et al., 1988). LR is used to examine the relationship between 
binary or ordinal response probability and one or more independent variables. That is, LR is 
used when the dependent variable is a dichotomy (two categories) and the independents are of 
any type (Cox and Snell, 1989; Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000).  
LR is a progression of the ordinary multivariate linear regression. The main difference 
between logistic and linear regression is that the dependent variable is binary or dichotomous. 
Consequently, the chosen parametric models and the assumptions attributed to each technique 
are different. Once these differences are accounted for, the methods used in an LR analysis 
pursue the same general principles used in linear regression (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). 
LR is different from other classification techniques in that it thoroughly analyses a major 
subset of variable combinations to explain the positive and negative nature of the 
observations (e.g., to describe high-FSR or low-FSR banks, solvent or insolvent banks; 
Hammer et al., 2012).   
The coefficient generated by LR for each independent variable explains the contribution of 
that variable to variations in the dependent variable. However, the dependent variable can 
only be defined by two values: 0 or 1. The nature of the dependent variable is the main 
difference between linear and logistic regression. In linear regression, the outcome of 
regression predicts a numerical value of the dependent variable from relevant independent 
variables and coefficients. In logistic regression, the result predicts the probability ( ) that it 
is 1 rather than 0 (i.e., the event/person fits in one group rather than the other). 
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Consequently, the log transformation of the   values is employed to normalise the 
distribution and thus create a link with the linear regression equation. This process also is 
known as logit of   or logit ( ). Logit ( ) is the log (to base e) of the odds ratio or likelihood 
ratio that the dependent variable is 1 and can be defined as follows: 
Logit ( ) = log[  / (1 -   )] = ln[  / (1 -   )] (11) 
where   is the range from 0 to 1, the Logit ( ) scale ranges from negative infinity to positive 
infinity. LR uses binomial probability theory to develop a logit model that is derived from 
linear regression. The logit model is described in the following equation (Abdou et al., 2008):  
    
 
   
                     (12) 
where   is the probability of the outcome of interest,   is the constant of the equation and    
is the coefficient in the linear combination of independent variables,   , for   = 1 to  . LR 
finds a best-fit equation using the maximum likelihood method instead of the least-squared 
deviations method used for linear regression (Freund et al., 2006). The maximum likelihood 
method maximises the probability of getting the observed results into the appropriate 
category given the fitted regression coefficients. Consequently, the following nonlinear 
function is used to express the relationship between independent variables and binary 
dependent variable (Canbas et al., 2005; Premachandra et al., 2009): 
      
   
      
 
 
       
  (13) 
where       is a cumulative probability function that takes values between 0 and 1; and 
                       (14) 
Thus the objective of LR is to predict banks’ FSR group memberships correctly for individual 
observations using the most prudent model. A model is developed based on the inclusion of 
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all independent variables that are valid in predicting the dependent variable, namely, banks’ 
FSR group memberships.  
In the literature of finance, LR is a widely used technique among practitioners to predict 
corporate and bank failure (Boyacioglu et al., 2009; Brezigar-Masten and Masten, 2012; 
Canbas et al., 2005; Doğanay et al., 2006; Hua et al., 2007; Jones and Hensher, 2004; Kick 
and Koetter, 2007; Kolari et al., 2002; Lanine and Vennet, 2006; Li et al., 2010;Loannidis et 
al., 2010; Martin, 1977; Ohlson, 1980;  Premachandra et al., 2009; Zhao et al., 2009); credit 
ratings (Chaveesuk et al., 1999; Ederington, 1985; Kim et al., 1993; Kim and Ahn, 2012; 
Maher and Sen, 1997; Oelerich and Poddig, 2006; Tsai and Chen, 2010) and credit scoring 
models (Abdou, 2009a; Abdou et al., 2008; Akkoc, 2012; Desai et al., 1996; Joanes, 1993; 
Laitinen, 1999; Lee et al., 2002, 2006; Lee and Chen, 2005; Ruo-wei and Chun-yang, 2007; 
West, 2000; Westgaard and Wijst, 2001; Wiginton, 1980). Finally, the LR model has been 
employed by Öğüt et al. (2012), Hammer et al. (2012), Poon et al. (1999), and Belloti et al. 
(2011a, 2011b) to predict BFSRs. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter presents and justifies the research method used in this thesis to fulfill the 
research objectives. This study has followed positivism as research philosophy because it 
depends entirely on application of various statistical techniques to a large set of quantitative 
data to test certain designated hypotheses to achieve the research objectives.  
This chapter starts by explaining the data collection process via Bank scope database. The 
researcher divided the dataset into three samples: entire dataset, subsample1 and subsample2. 
This is followed by a description of the numerical rating of the dependent variable (i.e., bank 
FSR issued by CI) and categorises the FSRs into four quartiles (i.e., high FSR, near-high 
FSR, low FSR and near-low FSR). In addition, bank financial performance variables are 
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elucidated thoroughly (i.e., asset quality, capital adequacy, credit risk, liquidity and 
profitability categories) along with the designated proxies that belong to each category and 
the expected sign associated with each proxy for bank FSR. Finally, a list of control variables 
is introduced to control for bank financial performance variables (i.e., country effect, size 
effect, time effect and SR).  
The ultimate goal of this thesis is to enhance the performance of banks in the Middle East 
region by identifying the main financial and nonfinancial variables associated with high- and 
near-high FSRs using publicly available data. Consequently, the ML technique is introduced 
to achieve this goal. This thesis is intended to provide the banking sector in the Middle East 
region with a vast range of different bank FSR group membership modeling techniques (i.e., 
CHAID, CART, MLP neural networks, DA and LR) and to evaluate the predictive capability 
of these models using various evaluation criteria (i.e., ACC, EMC and gains charts). The key 
challenge is to build bank FSR group membership models to increase classification and 
prediction accuracy and to reduce the misclassification costs. The following two chapters 
introduce and interpret the empirical results.  
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CHAPTER 4 : MULTINOMIAL LOGIT (ML) RESULTS 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the researcher reports the results that identify the main bank performance 
measures (i.e., financial and nonfinancial variables) associated with high- and near-high FSRs 
versus low- and near-low FSRs in the Middle East region. The results of ML technique are 
presented in the following order: (1) descriptive statistics and (2) results obtained from the 
various models (i.e., asset quality, capital adequacy, credit risk, liquidity, profitability) and 
(3) all financial category models (with and without dummies). 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Appendices B, C and D display the descriptive statistics tables for FSRs and all explanatory 
variables (financial and nonfinancial) for low- and near-low-FSR banks; high- and near-high-
FSR banks and for all four quartiles of FSR banks in the Middle East region. As shown in 
appendix B, the mean FSR for low- and near-low-FSR banks is 10.62. This indicates that 
most of low- and near-low-FSR banks in the Middle East region are assigned BBB
-
 ratings. 
This is similar to the values of median and mode. The standard deviation of the FSR is 1.554, 
which means that low- and near-low-FSR banks are not highly dispersed.   
Appendix C shows that the mean FSR for high- and near-high-FSR banks is 14.824. This 
indicates that majority of high- and near-high-FSR banks in the Middle East region are 
assigned an A rating. This is consistent with the values of median and mode. Also, the 
standard deviation is 1.118, which means that there is not a large gap between high- and near-
high-FSR banks. It is noteworthy that the mean for all four quartiles of bank FSRs is 12.678, 
which corresponds to a BBB rating. This finding indicates that most of rated banks in the 
Middle East are assigned a BBB rating, which is confirmed by median and mode values. The 
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higher standard deviation (2.503) than the other two subsamples indicates high dispersion of 
FSRs across all banks in the Middle East. 
4.3 ML results  
The researcher used ML because the characteristics of the model fit both the objective of the 
study and the characteristics of the data. The researcher performed a separate regression run 
for each financial performance category (Model 1) and another run that added the 
nonfinancial variables to each category (Model 2) to examine their relative explanatory power 
for banks’ FSRs. Finally, the researcher conducted regression runs for the overall financial 
performance categories (with and without nonfinancial variables) to examine the overall 
explanatory power for banks’ FSRs. The bank performance financial categories are classified 
as asset quality, capital adequacy, credit risk, liquidity and profitability. 
Tables 4.1, 4.4, 4.7, 4.10, 4.13 and 4.16 show the overall fitting for each model. The 2 for 
each variable indicates its significance (based on Likelihood Ratio Test) over various bank 
ratings using forward stepwise algorithm which guarantees entering the significant variable in 
each subsequent run
45
. The reported variables in each model represent the significant 
predictors that explain the change in the dependent variables (bank FSRs) which is measured 
by the probability of moving from a current to subsequent bank FSRs (Greene, 2000; 
Studenmund, 2001and Verbeek, 2012). 
  
                                                 
45
 Forward stepwise method is defensible under certain conditions, such as: (1) no previous research exists on 
which to base the hypothesis for testing, and (2) when causality is not of interest and the researcher merely 
wishes to find a model that fits data. 
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4.3.1 Asset quality models 
Table 4.1: Asset quality results for ML model with and without bank FSR dummies46 
 
                                   
                                                  2            df                    2             df 
Intercept                   44.73
*** 
        10                 132.19
*** 
        10 
CS    40.02
***
        10    30.26
***
   10 
LLRIL    35.54
***
        10    19.32
**   
   10 
ILGL  186.95
***
        10   79.53
***
   10 
LLPNIR    37.82
***
        10    34.05
***  
   10 
Size    169.62
*** 
   10 
SR    137.15
***  
   10 
    
No.  of observations               503           506  
2  415.7
***
 726.0
***
  
Log Likelihood 0.001744
***
 0.001446
***
  
2R(Pseudo)
1 
  57.0%  77.2%  
Overall classification 
accuracy   
 35.2% 40.1%  
Note. Multicollinearity is addressed by examining the correlation matrix and VIF scores. The predictors 
associated with VIF > 5 are excluded. Outliers are also excluded. *, **, and ***denote a statistically significant 
difference at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
1
The researcher reports the value of Nagelkerke, which is an adjustment to Cox and Snell measure. 
 
As shown in Table 4.1, the first run (Model 1) includes the main explanatory (financial) 
variables in the asset quality category. The second run (Model 2) includes the main 
explanatory variables in addition to non-financial variables (dummy variables) that control 
for sovereign ratings, size, country and time. As previously mentioned, FSRs is divided into 
four quartiles: (1) the first quartile ranges from B to BBB
-
 ratings and representing low-FSR 
banks in the Middle East region; (2) the second quartile consists of only BBB ratings, which 
corresponds to near-low-FSR banks; (3) the third quartile includes BBB
+ 
and A
-
 ratings, 
which indicate near-high-FSR banks; and (4) the fourth quartile identifies high-FSR banks 
with ratings that range from A to AA
-
. The results show that the two models approximate the 
                                                 
46
 NCONIBLLP and UILE are excluded from both models because of a large number of missing observations. 
47
 ILGL and ILE variables are highly correlated at 82.3%. The researcher included ILGL and removed ILE from 
the ML regression model. This is mainly because the regression model Pseudo R-square with ILGL is 57.0% but 
it is only 46.2% with ILE instead of ILGL. All of the results are available from the researcher. 
48
 Country and SR are highly correlated at 81.7%. The researcher ran the model several times and finally 
concluded that it was advantageous to remove the country dummy variable and keep SR.  
 
Variables Model 1 without 
dummies
47
 
Model 2 with dummies
48
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behaviour of data for Middle East banks fairly as far as the two models are significant at 1% 
level. Therefore, the two models outperform the null. The detailed statistical characteristics of 
the asset quality category (with and without dummies) are as follows: 
(1) As presented in Table 4.1, forward stepwise regression results show that four 
statistically significant predictors are included in Model 1. Four predictors are 
statistically significant at the 1% level: total equity to total assets (proxy for bank 
CS), loan loss reserve to impaired loans (LLRIL), impaired loans to gross loans 
(ILGL) and loan loss provision to net interest revenue (LLPNIR). For Model 2, 
the results show that six statistically significant predictors are included in the final 
model: five (CS, ILGL, LLRNIR, SR and size) are statistically significant at the 
1% level and one (LLRIL) is statistically significant at the 5% level.
49
 
(2) For Models 1 and 2, goodness-of-fit shows that the significance of the two tests 
(Pearson and deviance) are greater than 0.05 (1.00). This means that the two 
models adequately fit the data. 
(3) Regarding the explanatory power of Model 1 (pseudo R-square), the results show 
that four significant predictors account for 57% of FSR variations in the 
probability of moving from a current to subsequent bank FSR. For Model 2, the 
results show that six significant predictors account for 77.2% of FSR variations in 
the probability of moving from a current to subsequent bank FSR. 
                                                 
49
 It is worth mentioning that the researcher ran the ML regression using the first and fourth quartiles for the 
asset quality category. The number of observations for Models 1 and 2 are 294 and 297, respectively. For Model 
1, the results show that four significant predictors (CS, LLRIL, ILGL and LLPNIR) account for 68.4% of FSR 
variations. Furthermore, the cross classification matrix shows that the asset quality category under Model 1 
classifies 50.7% of predicted FSR correctly and that it is relatively powerful in predicting B and A ratings that 
correspond to 100% and 70.7 %, respectively. For Model 2, the results show that five significant predictors (CS, 
ILGL, LLPNIR, size and SR) account for 82.3% of FSR variations. The cross-classification matrix shows that 
this category under Model 2 classifies 52.2% of predicted FSRs correctly and that this model is relatively 
powerful in predicting A, B and BBB- ratings that correspond to 80.6%, 66.7% and 62.7%, respectively. 
Detailed results are available upon request.  
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(4) Regarding the classification power of asset quality for Model 1, the results show 
that this category classifies 35.2% of predicted FSR as correct. Furthermore, the 
cross-classification matrix shows that the asset quality category for Model 1 is 
relatively powerful in predicting B, A and BBB ratings that correspond to 100%, 
73.2 % and 67%, respectively. Regarding Model 2, the results show that the asset 
quality category with dummies classifies 40.1% of predicted FSRs correctly. 
Model 2 is relatively powerful in predicting B, BBB and A ratings that correspond 
to 66.7%, 62.1% and 58.2%, respectively.  
The estimation algorithm of Multinomial Logit offers an advantage of examining the 
significant asset quality predictors that are associated with each bank rating individually. That 
is, Table 4.1 does not show the trend and the magnitude of each predictor coefficient across 
bank FSRs. It is important for bank managers to find out and focus on the significant asset 
quality predictors that help increasing the probability of moving from a current to a higher 
FSR. 
Table 4.2 shows that the parameters of estimates of B, BB-, BB, BB+ and BBB-, BBB, 
BBB+, A- and A+ ratings are most representative for Model 1 and the available data. The 
parameters of final predictors (1) CS, (2) LLRIL, (3) ILGL and (4) LLPNIR vary in their 
significance across different FSRs. Table 4.3 shows that the parameters of estimates of B, 
BB-, BB, BB+, BBB- , BBB, BBB+, A- and A ratings are most representative for Model 2 
and the available data. The parameters of final predictors (1) CS, (2) LLRIL, (3) ILGL, (4) 
LLPNIR, (5) size and (6) SR vary in significance. 
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Table 4.2: Parameter estimates for the asset quality model without dummies (Model 1) 
FSR Variables B Std. Error Wald df Sig. 
6 (B) ILGL 122.553 38.873 9.939 1 .002 
8(BB-) ILGL 70.605 16.633 18.018 1 .000 
9(BB) LLPNIR 4.972 2.399 4.296 1 .038 
ILGL 74.376 16.461 20.415 1 .000 
CS -14.902 9.147 2.654 1 .100 
10(BB+) LLRIL -3.278 .890 13.568 1 .000 
ILGL 63.367 16.296 15.120 1 .000 
CS -13.568 7.508 3.265 1 .071 
11(BBB-) ILGL 64.117 16.220 15.626 1 .000 
CS -18.185 6.875 6.997 1 .008 
12(BBB) LLRIL -1.363 .481 8.018 1 .005 
ILGL 48.640 16.134 9.089 1 .003 
CS -13.863 6.579 4.440 1 .035 
13 (BBB+) ILGL -36.094 16.771 4.632 1 .031 
14(A-) ILGL -48.075 16.165 8.845 1 .003 
16(A+) ILGL -28.481 16.875 2.848 1 .091 
 
 
Table 4.3: Parameter estimates for the asset quality model with dummies (Model 2) 
FSR Variables B Std. Error Wald df Sig. 
6(B) SR -2.089 .562 13.824 1 .000 
LLPNIR 6.260 3.922 2.548 1 .100 
ILGL 35.515 14.948 5.645 1 .018 
8(BB-) SR -.988 .241 16.765 1 .000 
LLPNIR 4.297 2.640 2.649 1 .100 
ILGL 23.551 14.318 2.705 1 .100 
9(BB) SR -.996 .222 20.199 1 .000 
ILGL 26.870 14.062 3.651 1 .056 
10(BB+) SR -.860 .207 17.283 1 .000 
LLRIL -2.310 .978 5.574 1 .018 
ILGL 23.159 13.948 2.757 1 .097 
Size -5.494 .950 33.450 1 .000 
11(BBB-) SR -.994 .202 24.284 1 .000 
CS -20.565 9.740 4.457 1 .035 
LLPNIR 5.727 2.227 6.613 1 .010 
Size -4.465 .874 26.070 1 .000 
12(BBB) SR -.738 .194 14.420 1 .000 
LLRIL -1.191 .560 4.523 1 .033 
LLPNIR 4.557 2.195 4.309 1 .038 
Size -4.613 .850 29.487 1 .000 
13(BBB+) SR .512 .203 6.374 1 .012 
LLPNIR -5.759 2.172 7.031 1 .008 
Size 4.359 .869 25.141 1 .000 
14(A-) LLPNIR -3.678 2.107 3.049 1 .081 
Size 2.741 .824 11.057 1 .001 
15 (A) SR .401 .189 4.524 1 .033 
LLPNIR -4.941 2.090 5.590 1 .018 
Size 2.807 .815 11.854 1 .001 
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As reported in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, the significant predictors are not determinants of every 
bank FSR. The forward stepwise algorithm helps show the significant asset quality 
predictor(s) for each FSR individually. Moreover, the trend (either positive or negative) of 
each predictor may vary across FSRs. This result carries important implications to bank 
managers when planning for improving bank FSRs using asset quality predictors. That is, 
bank FSR may require an increase (or decrease) in a certain predictor. In terms of assessing 
the robustness of an estimate, if the estimate of a predictor is associated with the same trend 
and significance across all FSRs, the estimate of this predictor is to be considered fragile. 
That is, bank managers will not be able to use that predictor to plan for an improvement in the 
probability of moving from a current to subsequent bank FSR.   
Table 4.2 shows that CS has a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level 
for a BBB- rating, at the 5% level for BBB ratings and at the 10% level for BB and BB+ 
ratings. In line with Pasiouras et al. (2006, 2007), the negative sign associated with predictor 
estimates indicates that low- and near-low-FSR banks in the Middle East are 
undercapitalised. As shown in Table 4.3, CS has a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient at the 5% level for a BBB- rating. This finding is in harmony with results reported 
earlier. 
In Table 4.2, ILGL has positive and statistically significant coefficients at 1% level for low- 
and near-low FSRs (i.e., B, BB-, BB, BB+, BBB- and BBB ratings). Also, ILGL has negative 
and statistically significant coefficients at the 1% level for an A- rating, at the 5% level for a 
BBB+ rating and at the 10% level for an A+ rating. This finding explains the relative 
importance of this ratio in regard to FSR assignment. The positive sign associated with 
predictor estimates denotes that higher impaired loans to gross loans leads to deterioration of 
bank asset quality and thus lower FSRs are assigned. This result confirms the theoretical 
assumption of banking activity. This finding may reflect peculiarities of bank financing in the 
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Middle East. That is, banks in the Middle East used to sell loans (mostly uncollateralised) 
according to governmental directions. This resulted in accumulated loans (mostly 
nonperforming) over the years. On the contrary, the negative sign associated with predictor 
estimates concludes that high- and near-high-FSR banks are more conservative and careful 
about selling loans. This approach yields a relatively lower impaired loan to gross loan ratio 
and consequently better asset quality and loan portfolio value. This argument is supported by 
the evidence that the average rate of ILGL for low- and near-low-FSR banks (14%) is much 
higher than that for high- and near-high-FSR banks (4%)
50
 (see appendix B and C, 
respectively). In Table 4.3, ILGL has positive and statistically significant coefficients at the 
5% level for B ratings and at the 10% level for BB- , BB and BB+ ratings. This finding is 
similar to results reported for Model 1.   
Table 4.2 indicates that LLRIL has a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 
1% level for BB+ and BBB ratings. The negative sign associated with predictor estimates 
concludes that low- and near-low-FSR banks in the Middle East are not accumulating 
adequate balances of loan loss reserves to compensate for the increase in non-performing 
loans. Consequently, investor confidence concerning bank asset quality deteriorates and thus 
negatively affects banks’ assigned FSRs. This is supported by the fact that average rate of 
LLRIL for high- and near-high-FSR banks (139%) is relatively higher than for low- and near-
low FSR banks (90.4%)( see appendix C and B, respectively). Table 4.3 shows that LLRIL 
has a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 5% level for BB+ and BBB 
ratings. This finding is compatible with results reported for Model 1.       
As indicated in Table 4.2, LLPNIR has positive and statistically significant coefficients at the 
5% level for BB ratings. The positive sign associated with predictor estimate indicates that 
                                                 
50
 It is also worth noting that the average rate of ILGL for low-FSR banks (19.28%) is much higher than the 
average rate for high-FSR banks (3.06%). 
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low-FSR banks in the Middle East have an increasing amount of loan loss provision relative 
to net interest revenue generated. Low-FSR banks are accepting highly risky loans without 
being properly compensated by margins. Accordingly, bank asset quality deteriorates, which 
negatively affects assigned FSRs. This finding is intuitive and consistent with Van-Roy 
(2006) and Pasiouras et al. (2006). Table 4.3 specifies that LLPNIR has positive and 
statistically significant coefficients at the 1% level for BBB- ratings, at the 5% level for BBB 
and at the 10% level for B and BB- ratings. Furthermore, LLPNIR has a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for BBB+ ratings, at the 5% level for A 
ratings and 10% level for A- ratings. The negative sign associated with predictor estimates 
denotes that high- and near-high-FSR banks in the Middle East are well-run banks in the 
sense that they compensate highly risky loans with greater interest margins. However, the 
positive sign associated with predictor estimates validates results reported for Model 1. 
Finally, this argument is supported by the fact that average rate of LLPNIR for low- and near-
low-FSR banks (26.7%) is higher than the same average for high- and near-high-FSR banks 
(17.4%)
51
 (see appendix B and C , respectively).   
As seen in Table 4.3, SR has negative and statistically significant coefficients at the 1% level 
for B, BB-, BB, BB+, BBB- and BBB ratings. Moreover, SR has positive and statistically 
significant coefficient at the 5% level for BBB+ and A ratings. The negative sign associated 
with predictor estimates signifies that banks operating in countries with low SRs are assigned 
low- and near-low FSRs. On the other hand, the positive sign associated with predictor 
estimates indicates that banks operating in countries with high SRs are assigned high- and 
near-high FSRs. It is worth noting that the average SR associated with low- and near-low-
FSR banks is 10.776, which corresponds to a BBB- SR; and high- and near-high-FSR banks 
                                                 
51
 The average rate of loan loss provisions to net interest revenue for low-FSR banks (34.32%) is much higher 
than the average rate for high-FSR banks (16.27%). 
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operate in countries with an average SR of 14.932, which correspond to an A SR ( see 
appendix B and C, respectively). These findings confirm that CI identifies the relative impact 
of macroeconomic variables and the surrounding environment on the overall performance of 
banks, which eventually affects their FSRs. This finding is intuitive and consistent with 
results reported by (Belloti et al., 2011a; Poon and Firth, 2005; Poon, et al. 2009; Van-Roy, 
2006)
52 
.  
Table 4.3 shows that size has negative and statistically significant coefficients at the 1% level 
for BB+, BBB- and BBB ratings. Moreover, size has a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient at the 1% level for BBB+, A- and A ratings. The positive sign associated with 
predictor estimates indicates that large size banks are assigned high- and near-high FSRs. 
This finding complies with results reported by (Belloti et al., 2011a; Pasiouras et al., 2006; 
Poon and Firth, 2005; Van-Roy, 2006). This result confirms that large banks are generally 
stronger as they may be more diversified (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997) and thus are better 
able to survive shocks; in addition, many investors believe in the existence of the too-big-to-
fail assumption, which presumes that troubled large banks must be bailed out by governments 
because of their systemic importance to the country’s economic stability (Laere et al., 2012). 
 On the contrary, the negative sign associated with predictor estimates implies that small 
banks are assigned low- and near-low FSRs. This argument is supported by the fact that 
average bank size for low- and near-low-FSR banks (1.417) is smaller than the average bank 
size for high- and near-high-FSR banks (2.381) (see appendix B and C, respectively). It is 
also worth noting that large banks have a stronger capacity to access new capital markets to 
                                                 
52
 Poon et al. (2009) assumed two hypotheses about the effect of country SRs on bank tendency to seek bank 
ratings. The two hypotheses are the certification hypothesis and counter-certification hypothesis. The former 
assumes that banks located in countries with low SRs will seek higher ratings to reduce the information 
asymmetry problem. Thus, certification from rating agencies will resolve such asymmetry problems. On the 
contrary, the latter hypothesis assumes that countries with low SRs are characterised by poor legal systems and 
disclosure environments. Thus, rating agency decisions are affected negatively. That is, banks located in 
countries with low SRs are probably assigned low ratings.      
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overcome any unexpected liquidity problems (Konishi and Yasuda, 2004). In line with this, 
Pettit et al. (2004) stated, ‘Larger companies tend to have higher credit ratings’ and that ’size 
metrics offer the strongest statistical correlation with credit ratings—reflecting important 
qualitative factors such as geographic and product market diversification, competitive 
position, bargaining power, market share and brand stature power, market share and brand 
stature’ (p. 9).  
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4.3.2 Capital adequacy models 
Table 4.4: Capital adequacy results for the ML model with and without bank FSR dummies 53 
 
                                                                   
2             df                        2        df 
 Intercept                                     58.83
***
        11                   248.7
***
           11 
CS 100.9
***           
11 42.59
***
    11 
ENL 126.3
***            
11     56.06
***
       11 
TCR 53.59
***
       11  61.84
***
    11 
EM  51.50
***
       11   
Size  305.2
***
     11 
SR 
T 
 115.3
***
 
122.5
*** 
    11 
    11 
    
No. of observations  496 496  
2 309.0
*** 
    827.5
***   
  
Log Likelihood  0.001829
***
    0.001321
***   
  
2R(Pseudo)
1 
    47% 82.2%  
Overall classification  
accuracy   
 33.3% 45.8% 
 
Note. Multicollinearity is addressed by examining the correlation matrix and VIF scores. The predictors 
associated with VIF > 5 are excluded. Outliers are also excluded. *, **, and ***denote a statistically significant 
difference at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
1
The researcher reports the value of Nagelkerke, which is an adjustment to Cox and Snell measure. 
 
(1) As shown in Table 4.4, forward stepwise regression55 results show that four 
statistically significant predictors are included in Model 1. The four predictors are 
statistically significant at the 1% level, which is total equity to total assets (CS), 
the ratio of equity to net loans (ENL), total capital ratio (TCR) and equity 
multiplier (EM). For Model 2, the results show that six significant predictors are 
                                                 
53
 TR, CFTA, CFNL, CFDSTF, CFL and SDCF are excluded from both models because of large numbers of 
missing observations. 
54
 SR and Country dummy variables are highly correlated at 73.4%. The researcher performed the regression run 
with the SR variable alone, the pseudo R-square was 82.2% .The researcher conducted another regression run 
with Country dummy variable alone, and pseudo R-square was 70.4%. Thus, the researcher included the SR 
variable and dropped the country dummy variable for the final ML regression run for this category. 
55
 The researcher ran the ML regression using first and fourth quartile data for the capital adequacy category. 
The number of observations for Models 1 and 2 were 298 and 296, respectively. For Model 1, the results show 
that four statistically significant predictors (CS, ENL, TCR and EM) accounted for 56.9% of FSR variations. 
Furthermore, the cross-classification matrix shows that the capital adequacy category for Model 1 classifies 48% 
of predicted FSRs correctly and that it is relatively powerful in predicting A ratings at 92.1%. For Model 2, the 
results show that six statistically significant predictors (CS, TCR, ENL, time effect, size and SR) accounted for 
89% of FSR variations. The cross-classification matrix shows that this category of Model 2 classifies 60.8% of 
predicted FSRs correctly and that this model is relatively powerful in predicting B, BBB-
 
and A ratings with 
100%, 75% and 73.3%, respectively. Detailed results are available upon request. 
Variables Model 1 without dummies Model 2 with dummies
54
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included in final model. The six predictors, CS, TCR, ENL, SR, size and time 
effect (T), are statistically significant at the 1% level.  
(2) For Model 1, the statistical characteristic of model fitting shows that final model is 
significant at 1% level (χ2 = 309.03, df = 44) and so outperforms the null. For 
Model 2, the statistical characteristic of model-fitting shows that final model is 
significant at the 1% level (χ2 = 827.47, df = 66) and consequently outperforms 
the null. 
(3) For Models 1 and 2, the goodness-of-fit shows that the significance of the two 
tests (Pearson and deviance) are greater than 0.05 (1.00). This means that the two 
models are fitting data.  
(4) For Model 1, the researcher reports the value of Nagelkerke for the explanatory 
power of the model (pseudo R-square). The results show that four significant 
predictors account for 47% of FSR variations in the probability of moving from a 
current to subsequent bank FSR. For Model 2, the results show that six significant 
predictors account for 82.2 % of FSR variations in the probability of moving from 
a current to subsequent bank FSR. 
(5) For Model 1, the classification power of capital adequacy is of great interest. The 
results show that this category classifies 33.3% of predicted FSRs correctly. It is 
also noteworthy that the cross-classification matrix shows that the capital 
adequacy category is powerful in predicting A ratings that correspond to 73.3%. 
For Model 2, the results show that the capital adequacy category with dummies 
classifies 45.8% of predicted FSR correctly. Additionally, Model 2 is relatively 
powerful in predicting B, BBB and BB+ ratings that correspond to 100%, 63.9% 
and 61.1%, respectively.  
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The estimation algorithm of Multinomial Logit offers an advantage of examining the 
significant capital adequacy predictors that are associated with each bank rating individually. 
That is, Table 4.4 does not show the trend and the magnitude of each predictor coefficient 
across bank FSRs. It is important for bank managers to find out and focus on the significant 
capital adequacy predictors that help increasing the probability of moving from a current to a 
higher FSR. 
Table 4.5 indicates that the parameters for estimates of B, B+, BB–, BB, BB+, BBB-, BBB, 
BBB+, A- , A and A+ ratings are best representative for Model 1 and the available data. The 
parameters of final predictors CS, ENL, TCR and EM vary in their significance across 
different FSRs. Table 4.6 shows that the parameters estimates of  B+, BB-, BB, BB+, BBB-, 
BBB, BBB+, A-, A and A+ ratings are most representative for Model 2 and the available 
data. The parameters of the final predictors, CS, ENL, TCR, size, SR and time effect (T), 
vary in their significance across different ratings.  
Table 4.5: Parameter estimates for the capital adequacy model without dummies (Model 1) 
FSR Variables B Std. Error Wald df Sig. 
6 (B) EM .567 .149 14.494 1 .000 
CS -68.589 19.351 12.564 1 .000 
ENL -11.248 4.123 7.442 1 .006 
7(B+) EM .608 .168 13.074 1 .000 
8(BB-) EM .525 .211 6.174 1 .013 
9 (BB) TCR -19.697 7.579 6.754 1 .009 
ENL -6.541 3.139 4.343 1 .037 
10(BB+) CS -19.019 8.290 5.263 1 .022 
TCR -12.002 7.195 2.783 1 .095 
11(BBB-) EM .633 .152 17.350 1 .000 
CS -32.087 11.100 8.357 1 .004 
ENL -6.422 3.045 4.449 1 .035 
12(BBB) EM .625 .152 16.909 1 .000 
CS -41.129 11.073 13.797 1 .000 
TCR -16.990 6.946 5.983 1 .014 
13(BBB+) EM .459 .202 5.151 1 .023 
CS 37.598 14.566 6.663 1 .010 
TCR 16.380 7.837 4.368 1 .037 
14(A-) EM .397 .184 4.659 1 .031 
CS 31.442 13.129 5.736 1 .017 
15(A) EM .617 .152 16.432 1 .000 
CS 41.637 11.335 13.494 1 .000 
TCR 24.340 6.976 12.174 1 .000 
ENL 12.920 3.637 12.623 1 .000 
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16(A+) EM .285 .138 4.256 1 .039 
TCR 14.877 7.832 3.608 1 .057 
ENL 8.001 4.324 3.423 1 .064 
 
Table 4.6: Parameter estimates for the capital adequacy model with dummies (Model 2) 
FSR Variables B Std. Error Wald df Sig. 
7(B+) SR -2.342 .826 8.041 1 .005 
T 1.219 .527 5.354 1 .021 
Size -5.277 2.127 6.153 1 .013 
8(BB-) SR -2.177 .530 16.879 1 .000 
TCR -57.966 25.433 5.195 1 .023 
T 1.159 .315 13.511 1 .000 
9(BB) SR -1.508 .421 12.844 1 .000 
CS -37.548 17.929 4.386 1 .036 
T 1.542 .266 33.644 1 .000 
Size -9.806 1.491 43.231 1 .000 
10(BB+) SR -1.900 .414 21.009 1 .000 
CS -31.363 17.721 3.132 1 .077 
T 1.703 .245 48.239 1 .000 
Size -8.998 1.102 66.658 1 .000 
11(BBB-) SR -1.831 .408 20.183 1 .000 
T 1.074 .223 23.125 1 .000 
Size -6.731 1.005 44.852 1 .000 
12(BBB) SR -1.795 .404 19.697 1 .000 
T 1.012 .214 22.379 1 .000 
Size -6.218 .975 40.675 1 .000 
13(BBB+) SR 1.527 .409 13.925 1 .000 
T 1.132 .222 25.987 1 .000 
Size 6.102 .998 37.357 1 .000 
14(A-) SR 1.231 .401 9.415 1 .002 
T .669 .206 10.519 1 .001 
Size 4.269 .945 20.398 1 .000 
15(A) SR 1.285 .398 10.416 1 .001 
TCR 19.658 9.625 4.171 1 .041 
ENL 14.600 6.339 5.304 1 .021 
T .689 .202 11.629 1 .001 
Size 3.754 .935 16.134 1 .000 
16(A+) TCR 20.773 10.350 4.028 1 .045 
As shown in Tables 4.5 and 4.6, the reported significant predictors are not determinants of 
every bank FSR. The forward stepwise algorithm helps show the significant capital adequacy 
predictor(s) for each FSR individually. Moreover, the trend (either positive or negative) of 
each predictor may vary across FSRs. This result carries important implications to bank 
managers when planning for improving bank FSRs using capital adequacy predictors. That is, 
bank FSR may require an increase (or decrease) in a certain predictor. In terms of assessing 
the robustness of an estimate, if the estimate of a predictor is associated with the same trend 
and significance across all FSRs, the estimate of this predictor is to be considered fragile. 
124 
 
That is, bank managers will not be able to use that predictor to plan for an improvement in the 
probability of moving from a current to subsequent bank FSR.   
As shown in Table 4.5, CS has negative and statistically significant coefficients at the 1% 
level for B, BBB- and BBB ratings and at the 5% level for BB+ ratings. Also, CS has a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for BBB+ and A ratings and at 
the 5% level for A- ratings. This finding is in line with results reported by Pasiouras et al. 
(2006, 2007), Belloti et al. (2011a) and Chen (2012). The negative sign associated with 
predictor estimates indicates that low- and near-low-FSR banks are undercapitalised. On the 
contrary, the positive sign associated with the predictor estimates implies that high and near-
high-FSR banks are well capitalised. This debate is supported by the fact that the average rate 
of CS ratio associated with high- and near-high-FSR banks (12.5%) is higher than the same 
average rate associated with low- and near-low-FSR banks (10.9%) (see appendix C and B, 
respectively). Moreover, Table 4.6 indicates that CS has a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient at the 5% level for BB ratings and at the 10% level for BB+ ratings. 
This finding confirms results reported for Model 1.   
As shown in Table 4.5, ENL has a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% 
level for B ratings and at the 5% level with BB and BBB- ratings. On the other hand, ENL 
has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for A ratings and at the 
10% level for A+ ratings. The negative sign associated with the predictor estimates denotes 
that low-FSR banks are undercapitalised. Furthermore, the positive sign associated with 
predictor estimates indicates that high-FSR banks are well capitalised. In line with this, the 
average rate of ENL for low-FSR banks (22.5%) is lower than average rate of ENL for high-
FSR banks (39.5%). This requires further investigation and development to identify the main 
credit characteristics of low-FSR banks in the Middle East.  
125 
 
Apparently, low-FSR banks are selling more loans (although mostly non-performing) without 
compensating with available equity. Conversely, high-FSR banks are concerned about equity 
accumulation to withstand expected future credit risk problems. As shown in Table 4.6, ENL 
has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 5% level for A ratings. The 
positive sign associated with the predictor estimate confirms the results reported for Model 1. 
As previously mentioned, it seems that managers of high-FSR banks are more firm and strict 
about maintaining the appropriate amount of equity cushion to absorb expected losses on 
their loan books. This finding validates results reported by Poon et al. (2009).
56
   
Table 4.5 shows that TCR has negative and statistically significant coefficients at the 1% 
level for BB ratings, at the 5% level for BBB ratings and at the 10% level for BB+ ratings. 
Also, TCR has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for A ratings; 
at the 5% level for BBB+ ratings and at the 10% level for A+ ratings. The signs associated 
with the predictor estimates confirm results reported under the CS category. Specifically, 
mangers of low- and near-low-FSR banks in the Middle East are not capable of mitigating 
high risk weighted assets by increasing Tier 1 and Tier 2 bank capital. On the contrary, high- 
and near-high-FSR banks are maintaining an adequate level of TCR to satisfy Basel I and II 
requirements.  
This debate is supported by the fact that the average rate of TCR associated with high- and 
near-high-FSR banks (20.8%) is higher than average rate of TCR associated with low- and 
near-low-FSR banks (10%) (see appendix B and C, respectively). In line with this, Table 4.6 
indicates that TCR has a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 5% level for 
BB- ratings. Also, TCR has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 5 % level 
                                                 
56
 Poon et al. (2009) reported that solicited banks (i.e., with higher ratings in general than other unsolicited 
banks) have a higher average mean of equity to total loans ratio than that of unsolicited banks.  
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for high A and A+ ratings. This finding confirms that low-FSR banks in the Middle East are 
undercapitalised and that high-FSR banks are paying more attention to TCR  
Table 4.5 reveals that EM has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% 
level for B, B+, BBB- , BBB and A ratings and at the 5% level for BB-, BBB+, A- and A+ 
ratings. The positive sign associated with the predictor estimates provides further evidence 
that EM matters apart from FSRs assigned by CI. This finding confirms that banks in the 
Middle East are relying more on debt (i.e., deposits) to finance their assets rather than equity 
regardless of the assigned FSR. This finding is intrinsic to the banking industry in the Middle 
East in light of the historical evolution of the banking industry from governmental funds. 
Specifically, the contribution of public equity has emerged recently according to openings 
and the progress or pace of stock markets in the region.  
Table 4.6 shows that time effect (T) has positive and statistically significant coefficients at 
the 1% level for BB-, BB, BB+, BBB-, BBB, BBB+, A- and A ratings and at the 5% level for 
B+ ratings. This finding implies that there was a slight improvement in bank FSRs during 
period from 2001 to 2009. This is supported by the fact that the banking sector in the Middle 
East region has not been significantly affected by the financial crises because of their limited 
integration into the global financial crises. In addition, many banks have employed robust 
lending decisions that resulted in a credit dry-out (Kouame, 2009).     
As indicated in Table 4.6, size has negative and statistically significant coefficients at the 1% 
level for BB, BB+, BBB- and BBB ratings and at the 5% level for B+ ratings. In addition, 
size has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at 1% level for BBB+, A- and A 
ratings. This finding is in line with results reported for the asset quality category. Namely, 
banks with high- and near-high FSRs are larger in size than banks with low- and near-low 
FSRs in the Middle East region.  
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Table 4.6 shows that SR has negative and statistically significant coefficients at the 1% level 
for B+, BB-, BB, BB+, BBB- and BBB ratings. Additionally, SR has a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for BBB+, A- and A ratings. This finding is 
similar to results reported for the asset quality category. The positive sign associated with the 
predictor estimates implies that banks with high- and near-high FSRs are mainly located in 
countries with high SRs. On the contrary, the negative sign associated with the predictor 
estimates confirms that banks located in countries with low SRs are assigned low- and near-
low FSRs.  
4.3.3 Credit risk models 
Table 4.7: Credit risk results for ML model with and without bank FSR dummies57 
 
                                                                                                 
2                    df                         2      df 
Intercept                                      111.0
***
        11                    167.5
***           
11 
CS  46.18
***
        11   47.80
***   
       11 
LLRGL  131.6
***
        11  171.4
***
         11  
LLRE   70.97
***
       11  
LLPTL 
LLPE 
  46.32
***
       11  
  47.02
***          
11 
 
Size  273.40
***
        11 
SR 
T 
  156.30
***
        11 
120.84
*** 
       11 
 
No. of observations  556 556 
2 483.5
***
 875.3
***
 
Log Likelihood 0.001970
***
 0.001578
***
 
2R(Pseudo)
1 
 58.8% 80.3% 
Overall classification 
accuracy   
33.3% 39.4% 
Note. Multicollinearity is addressed by examining the correlation matrix and VIF scores. The predictors 
associated with VIF > 5 are excluded. Outliers also are excluded. *, **, and ***denote a statistically significant 
difference at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
1
The researcher reports the value of Nagelkerke, which is an adjustment to Cox and Snell measure.  
 
                                                 
57
 NCOAGL is excluded from both models because of large numbers of missing observations. 
58
 SR and the country dummy variable are highly correlated at 73.4%. The researcher performed a regression run 
with the SR variable alone and the pseudo R-square equals 80.3%. The researcher conducted another regression 
run with the country dummy variable alone and the pseudo R-square equals 77.5%. Thus, the researcher 
included the SR variable and dropped the country dummy variable for the final ML regression run for this 
category. 
Variables Model 1 without 
dummies 
Model 2 with dummies
58
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(1) Results of the forward stepwise regression59 in Table 4.7 indicate that five 
significant predictors—total equity to total assets (CS), loan loss reserves to gross 
loans (LLRGL), loan loss reserves to total equity (LLRE), loan loss provisions to 
total loans (LLPTL) and loan loss provision to equity (LLPE)—are included in 
Model 1 and are statistically significant at the 1% level. For Model 2, the results 
show that five significant predictors—CS, LLRGL, SR, time effect (T) and size 
effect—are included in the final model and are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. .  
(2) For Model 1, the statistical characteristics of model-fitting show that the final 
model is significant at the 1% level (χ2 = 483.456, df = 55) and hence outperforms 
the null. The same is true for Model 2, in which the statistical characteristics of 
model-fitting shows that the final model is significant at the 1% level (χ2 = 
875.321, df = 55) and accordingly outperforms the null. 
(3) For Models 1 and 2, the goodness-of-fit show that the significance of the two tests 
(Pearson and deviance) are greater than 0.05 (1.00). This confirms that the two 
models satisfactorily fit the data.  
(4) Regarding the explanatory power of Model 1 (pseudo R-square), the results show 
that five significant predictors account for 58.8% of FSR variations in the 
probability of moving from a current to subsequent bank FSR. For Model 2, the 
                                                 
59
 The researcher ran the ML regression using first and fourth quartile for the credit risk category. The number of 
observations for Models 1 and 2 are 341 and 340, respectively. For Model 1, the results show that four 
statistically significant predictors (CS, LLRGL, LLPTL and LLRE) account for 68.7% of FSR variations. 
Furthermore, the cross-classification matrix shows that the credit risk category under Model 1 classifies 47.2% 
of predicted FSRs correctly and that it is relatively powerful in predicting A and B ratings that correspond to 
91.5% and 77.8%, respectively. For Model 2, the results show that five statistically significant predictors (CS, 
LLRGL, time effect, size and SR) account for 86.8% of FSR variations. The cross-classification matrix shows 
that the credit risk category with dummies classifies 56.2% of predicted FSRs correctly and that this model is 
relatively powerful in predicting A, B and BBB-
 
ratings that correspond to 81.1%, 77.8% and 65.7%, 
respectively. Detailed results are available upon request. 
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results show that five significant predictors account for 80.3% of FSR variations 
in the probability of moving from a current to subsequent bank FSR. 
(5) Regarding the classification power of credit risk for Model 1, the results show that 
this category classifies 33.3% of predicted FSRs correctly. Furthermore, the cross-
classification matrix shows that the credit risk category is relatively powerful in 
predicting B and A ratings that correspond to 88.9% and 66%, respectively. For 
Model 2, the results show that the credit risk category with dummies classifies 
39.4% of predicted FSR correctly. In line with the asset quality category, Model 2 
is relatively powerful in predicting B, BBB and A ratings that correspond to 
77.8% , 62.4% and 52.8%, respectively. 
The estimation algorithm of Multinomial Logit offers an advantage of examining the 
significant credit risk predictors that are associated with each bank rating individually. That 
is, Table 4.7 does not show the trend and the magnitude of each predictor coefficient across 
bank FSRs. It is important for bank managers to find out and focus on the significant credit 
risk predictors that help increasing the probability of moving from a current to a higher FSR. 
As shown in Table 4.8, the results of the parameter estimates show that B, B+, BB- , BB, 
BB+, BBB- , BBB, BBB+, A- and A ratings are most representative for Model 1 and the 
available data. The parameters of final predictors CS, LLRGL, LLRE, LLPTL and LLPE 
vary in their significance across different FSRs. As shown in Table 4.9, the results of the 
parameters estimates show that B, B+, BB- , BB, BB+, BBB-, BBB, BBB+, A-
 
and A ratings 
are most representative for Model 2 and the available data. The parameters of final predictors 
CS, LLRGL, size, SR and time effect (T) vary in their significance across different FSRs.  
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Table 4.8: Parameter estimates for the credit risk model without dummies (Model 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.9: Parameter estimates for the credit risk model with dummies (Model 2) 
FSR Variable B Std. Error Wald df Sig. 
6 (B) LLRGL 86.907 19.852 19.165 1 .000 
SR -3.251 1.508 4.648 1 .031 
T 2.820 .802 12.372 1 .000 
7(B+) LLRGL 54.571 15.021 13.198 1 .000 
CS -25.726 13.259 3.765 1 .052 
SR -1.270 .412 9.480 1 .002 
T .801 .326 6.031 1 .014 
Size -5.784 1.204 23.096 1 .000 
8(BB-) LLRGL 51.333 14.001 13.442 1 .000 
CS -21.948 12.162 3.257 1 .071 
SR -1.536 .383 16.047 1 .000 
T 1.183 .272 18.875 1 .000 
9(BB) LLRGL 62.957 13.628 21.341 1 .000 
CS -15.035 11.173 1.811 1 .100 
SR -1.472 .371 15.753 1 .000 
T 1.625 .244 44.261 1 .000 
Size -8.258 1.103 56.102 1 .000 
10(BB+) LLRGL 51.735 13.456 14.783 1 .000 
SR -1.486 .367 16.413 1 .000 
T 1.455 .224 42.057 1 .000 
Size -8.561 1.056 65.750 1 .000 
11(BBB-) LLRGL 49.370 13.327 13.723 1 .000 
SR -1.611 .365 19.489 1 .000 
T 1.114 .219 25.992 1 .000 
Size -6.294 .989 40.471 1 .000 
12(BBB) LLRGL 27.173 13.235 4.215 1 .040 
SR -1.383 .362 14.626 1 .000 
T 1.021 .210 23.652 1 .000 
FSR Variable B 
Std. 
Error Wald df Sig. 
6 (B) LLRGL 86.583 27.986 9.572 1 .002 
7(B+) CS -38.148 20.483 3.469 1 .063 
8(BB-) LLRGL 66.991 26.148 6.564 1 .010 
LLPTL 125.977 78.494 2.576 1 .100 
LLPE 31.748 19.081 2.768 1 .096 
9(BB) LLRGL 61.719 25.357 5.924 1 .015 
10(BB+) LLRGL 75.411 25.278 8.900 1 .003 
LLPTL 196.048 70.840 7.659 1 .006 
LLPE 43.513 18.426 5.577 1 .018 
11(BBB-) LLRGL 71.732 25.300 8.039 1 .005 
LLPTL 171.047 70.293 5.921 1 .015 
CS -19.195 6.443 8.876 1 .003 
LLPE 41.705 18.396 5.140 1 .023 
12(BBB) CS -15.105 6.167 5.999 1 .014 
13(BBB+) CS 15.223 6.834 4.962 1 .026 
14(A-) LLRGL -45.043 25.646 3.085 1 .079 
LLPTL -126.210 78.281 2.599 1 .100 
CS 14.086 6.355 4.913 1 .027 
15(A) LLPTL -168.728 72.485 5.419 1 .020 
LLPE -41.196 18.391 5.018 1 .025 
LLRE -2.438 10.468 6.378 1 .012 
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Size -6.275 .963 42.466 1 .000 
13(BBB+) SR 1.154 .366 9.957 1 .002 
T 1.084 .218 24.725 1 .000 
Size 6.090 .987 38.087 1 .000 
14(A-) LLRGL -31.179 12.805 5.928 1 .015 
SR .906 .362 6.275 1 .012 
T .777 .205 14.420 1 .000 
Size 4.143 .940 19.432 1 .000 
15(A) SR 1.029 .358 8.273 1 .004 
T .693 .201 11.881 1 .001 
Size 4.102 .927 19.598 1 .000 
As presented in Tables 4.8 and 4.9, the reported significant predictors are not determinants of 
every bank FSR. The forward stepwise algorithm helps show the significant credit risk 
predictor(s) for each FSR individually. Moreover, the trend (either positive or negative) of 
each predictor may vary across FSRs. This result carries important implications to bank 
managers when planning for improving bank FSRs using credit risk  predictors. That is, bank 
FSR may require an increase (or decrease) in a certain predictor. In terms of assessing the 
robustness of an estimate, if the estimate of a predictor is associated with the same trend and 
significance across all FSRs, the estimate of this predictor is to be considered fragile. That is, 
bank managers will not be able to use that predictor to plan for an improvement in the 
probability of moving from a current to subsequent bank FSR.   
Table 4.8 shows that CS has a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level 
for BBB- ratings, at the 5% level for BBB ratings and at the 10% level for B
+
 ratings. Also, 
CS has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 5% level for BBB+ and A- 
ratings. The negative sign associated with predictor estimates provides further evidence that 
low- and near-low-FSR banks in Middle East suffer from CS problems. In contrast, the 
positive sign associated with the predictor estimates confirms that high- and near-high-FSR 
banks maintain appropriate levels of capital buffers to absorb expected future credit risk 
exposures. Table 4.9 shows that CS has a negative and statistically significant coefficient at 
the 10% level for B+, BB- and BB
 
ratings. In line with Model 1, the negative sign associated 
with the predictor estimates implies that low-FSR banks in Middle East are undercapitalised. 
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This finding provides a source of validity for the asset quality category as both categories are 
very close in terms of the nature of banking business. 
Table 4.8 indicates that LLRGL has positive and statistically significant coefficients at the 
1% level for B, BB-, BB+ and BBB- ratings and at the 5% level for BB ratings. In addition, 
LLRGL has negative and statistically significant coefficients at the 10% level for A- ratings. 
In line with Van-Roy (2006), the positive sign associated with predictor estimates implies that 
low-FSR banks have poor quality loan portfolios. In addition, this result provides a source of 
validity for the ILGL ratio result in the asset quality category. Also, this finding was 
confirmed by Poon and Firth’s (2005) conclusion that banks with high LLRGL ratios—while 
holding charge-off policy constant—will have poor quality loan portfolios and thus lower 
assigned FBRs.  
However, the negative sign associated with the predictor estimates indicates that near-high-
FSR banks have better quality loan portfolios. This is mainly because near-high-FSR banks 
are adopting firm management strategies and policies regarding issuance of corporate and 
retail loans. This argument is supported by the fact that average rate of LLRGL for low- and 
near-low-FSR banks (11.11%) is higher than the same average for high- and near-high-FSR 
banks (4.4%)
60
(see appendix B and C, respectively). Similar to this, Table 4.9 shows that 
LLRGL has positive and statistically significant coefficients at the 1% level for B, B+, BB-, 
BB, BB+ and BBB- rating and at the 5% level for BBB ratings. On the other hand, LLRGL 
has a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 5% level for A- ratings. This 
finding validates results reported for Model 1.  
As shown in Table 4.8, LLRE has negative and statistically significant coefficients at the 5% 
level for A ratings. The negative sign associated with the predictor estimate implies that high-
                                                 
60
 It is worth mentioning that the average rate of loan loss reserve to gross loans for low-FSR banks (14.27%) is 
higher than the same average for high-FSR banks (3.65%). 
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FSR banks are more conservative and rational regarding expected loan losses. This is done by 
building up a capital buffer against expected loan losses that are written off against banks. In 
line with banking activity, high-FSR banks are willing to maintain their good reputation and 
depositors’ confidence level by reducing their probability of failure or bankruptcy by 
applying defensive or firm techniques to guide corporate and retail loans issuance. This 
argument is supported by the fact that average rate of LLRE for high-FSR banks (22.9%) is 
somewhat lower than the average rate of LLRE for low-FSR banks (62.3%).  
As shown in Table 4.8, LLPTL has positive and statistically significant coefficients at the 1% 
level for BB
+
 ratings, at the 5% level for BBB- ratings and at the 10% level for BB- ratings. 
In addition, LLPTL has negative and statistically significant coefficients at the 5% level for A 
ratings and at the 10% level for A- ratings. This finding is in accordance with results reported 
for the LLRGL ratio. The positive sign associated with the predictor estimates indicates that 
low-FSR banks employ poor credit-management techniques. Consequently, banks are forced 
to increase balances of annual provisions to alleviate expected future losses from poor quality 
loan portfolios.  
However, the negative sign associated with the predictor estimates confirms that high- and 
near-high-FSR banks are more conservative in terms of loan issuance. It seems that high- and 
near-high-FSR banks are implementing firm credit-management techniques that result in 
better loan portfolio quality than low-FSR banks. Accordingly, high- and near-high-FSR 
banks estimate lower annual provisions than low-FSR banks. This argument is supported by 
the fact that the average rate of LLPTL for low- and near-low-FSR banks (1.47%) is higher 
than that for high- and near-high-FSR banks (0.73%) (see appendix B and C, respectively).  
As observed in Table 4.8, LLPE has positive and statistically significant coefficients at the 
5% level for BB+ and BBB-
 
ratings and at the 10% level for BB- ratings. Moreover, LLPE 
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has a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 5% level for A ratings. In line 
with results reported for both LLPTL and LLRE, the positive sign associated with the 
predictor estimates validates that low-FSR banks are less conservative about their expected 
future loan losses. Accordingly, these banks do not accumulate appropriate amounts of capital 
cushion to lessen high credit risk exposure. This is mainly because low-FSR banks employ 
primitive credit-management techniques that ultimately result in poor credit decisions. This 
forces banks to anticipate higher provisions each year. However, the negative sign associated 
with the predictor estimate confirms an opposite scenario for high-FSR banks. This debate is 
confirmed by the fact that average rate of LLPE ratio for low-FSR banks (9.4%) is slightly 
higher than the average rate for high-FSR banks (8.35%).  
Table 4.9 reveals that time effect (T) has positive and statistically significant coefficients at 
the 1% level for B, BB-, BB, BB+, BBB- , BBB, BBB+, A-
 
and A ratings and at the 5% level 
for B+ ratings. This finding is compatible with results reported for the capital adequacy 
category. 
Table 4.9 shows that SR has negative and statistically significant coefficients at the 1% level 
for B+, BB-, BB, BB+, BBB- and BBB ratings and at the 5% level for B ratings. Also, SR 
has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for BBB+ and A ratings 
and at the 5% level for A- ratings. This finding is similar to the results reported for both the 
asset quality and capital adequacy categories. The negative sign associated with the predictor 
estimates implies that low- and near-low-FSR banks are mainly located in countries that 
suffer from poor economic and financial conditions. However, the positive sign associated 
with the predictor estimates confirms that high- and near-high-FSR banks operate in countries 
with better economic and financial conditions.    
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As shown in Table 4.9, size has negative and statistically significant coefficients at the 1% 
level for B+, BB, BB+, BBB- and BBB ratings. Furthermore, size has a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for BBB+, A- and A ratings. This finding is 
comparable to results reported for both the asset quality and capital adequacy categories. The 
negative sign associated with the predictor estimates confirms that low- and near-low-FSR 
banks are small banks. On the contrary, the positive sign associated with the predictor 
estimates implies that high- and near-high-FSR banks are larger. This is mainly because large 
banks can diversify risk exposure more easily than small size banks because of economies of 
scale.  
4.3.4 Liquidity models 
Table 4.10: Liquidity results for ML models with and without bank FSR dummies 61 
 
                                                                                         
2                 df                          2                   df 
  Intercept                                    63.01
***
          11                        233.9
***
     11 
CS         54.88
***
           11  48.06
***
      11 
LADSTF         63.38
***
           11 50.69
***
       11 
LR         73.14
***
           11   42.43
*** 
      11 
Size  300.8
***
       11 
SR 
T 
 137.3
*** 
      11
 
91.98
***
       11 
 
No. of observations  568 568 
2 243.6
***
 815.0
***
 
Log Likelihood 0.002283
***
 0.001711
***
 
2R(Pseudo)
1 
 35.3% 77.1% 
Overall classification 
accuracy   
27.5% 38.0% 
Note. Multicollinearity is addressed by examining the correlation matrix and VIF scores. The predictors 
associated with VIF > 5 and outliers are excluded. *, **, and *** denote statistically significant differences at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
1
The researcher reports the value of Nagelkerke, which is an adjustment to Cox and Snell measure. 
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 The addition of IBR to the ML run increases the pseudo R
2
 to 46.15%. However, unexpected singularities in 
the Hessian matrix were encountered. Therefore, the researcher excluded IBR from both models because of a 
large number of missing observations. The results are available from the researcher.   
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 SR and the country dummy variable are highly correlated at 73.4%. The researcher performed a regression run 
with the SR variable alone and pseudo R-square equals 77.1%. The researcher conducted another regression run 
with the country dummy variable alone and the pseudo R-square equals 72.0%. Thus, the researcher included 
the SR variable and dropped the country dummy variable for final the ML regression run for this category. 
Variables Model 1 without dummies Model 2 with 
dummies
62
 
136 
 
 
(1) Table 4.10 summarises the forward stepwise regression63 results for Models 1 and 
2 using the liquidity category. For Model 1, the results show that three statistically 
significant predictors—total equity to total assets ratio (CS), the ratio of liquid 
assets to deposits and short term funding ratio (LADSTF) and net loans to total 
assets ratio (LR)—are included in final model. For Model 2, the results show that 
six statistically significant predictors— CS, LADSTF, LR sovereign ratings (SR), 
time effect (T) and Size—are included in final model and are statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  
(2) For Model 1, the statistical characteristic of model-fitting shows that final model 
is significant at the 1% level (χ2 = 243.648, df = 33) and therefore outperforms the 
null. for Model 2, the statistical characteristic of model-fitting shows that final 
model is significant at the 1% level (χ2 =814.974, df = 66) and as a result, 
outperforms the null. 
(3) For Models 1 and 2, the goodness-of-fit shows that the significance of the two 
tests (Pearson and deviance) are greater than 0.05 (1.00). This implies that the two 
models satisfactorily fit the data. 
(4) For the explanatory power of Model 1 (pseudo R-square), the results show that 
three significant predictors account for 35.3% of FSR variation in the probability 
of moving from a current to subsequent bank FSR. For Model 2, the results show 
                                                 
63
 Note that the researcher ran the ML regression using the first and fourth quartile only for the liquidity 
category. The number of observations for Models 1 and 2 was 345. For Model 1, the results show that three 
statistically significant predictors (CS, LADSTF and LR) account for 42.4% of FSR variations. In line with this, 
the cross-classification matrix shows that the liquidity category classifies 38.8% of predicted FSR as correct and 
that it is relatively powerful in predicting A ratings with 84%. For Model 2, the results show that six statistically 
significant predictors (CS, LADSTF, LR, size, time and SR) account for 84.9% of FSR variations. The cross-
classification matrix shows that the liquidity category with dummies classifies 54.8% of predicted FSRs 
correctly and that this model is relatively powerful in predicting B+, B and A
 
 ratings with 100%, 88.9% and 
74.5%, respectively. Detailed results are available upon request. 
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that six significant predictors account for 77.1% of FSR variations in the 
probability of moving from a current to subsequent bank FSR. 
(5) Regarding the classification power of liquidity for Model 1, the results show that 
this category classifies 27.5% of predicted FSRs correctly. Additionally, the cross-
classification matrix shows that the liquidity category is relatively powerful in 
predicting BB- ratings, which corresponds to 63.6%. For Model 2, the results 
show that the liquidity category with dummies correctly classifies 38% of 
predicted FSRs. In addition, Model 2 is relatively powerful in predicting B and 
BB- ratings with 88.9% and 63.6%, respectively.  
The estimation algorithm of Multinomial Logit offers an advantage of examining the 
significant liquidity predictors that are associated with each bank rating individually. That is, 
Table 4.10 does not show the trend and the magnitude of each predictor coefficient across 
bank FSRs. It is important for bank managers to find out and focus on the significant liquidity 
predictors that help increasing the probability of moving from a current to a higher FSR. 
As revealed in Table 4.11, the results of the parameter estimates show that B, B+, BB- , BB, 
BB+, BBB-, BBB, BBB+, A-, A and A+ ratings are most representative for Model 1 and the 
available data. The parameters of the final predictors—CS, LADSTF and LR—vary in their 
significance across different FSRs. As shown in Table 4.12, the results of the parameter 
estimates show that B, B+,BB-, BB, BB+, BBB-, BBB, BBB+, A-, A and A+ ratings are 
most representative for Model 2 and the available data. The results show that parameters of 
the final predictors CS, LADSTF, LR, size, SR and time effect (T) vary in their significance 
across different ratings.  
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Table 4.11: Parameter estimates for the liquidity model without dummies (Model 1) 
FSR Variable B Std. Error Wald df Sig. 
6(B) CS -32.256 10.226 9.949 1 .002 
LR 12.009 4.651 6.667 1 .010 
7(B+) CS -23.518 8.681 7.339 1 .007 
8(BB-) LADSTF -17.196 3.517 23.900 1 .000 
 CS -22.246 8.183 7.390 1 .007 
9(BB) LADSTF -5.468 2.213 6.105 1 .013 
10(BB+) LADSTF -3.976 1.979 4.038 1 .044 
11(BBB-) LADSTF -5.963 1.944 9.411 1 .002 
12(BBB) LADSTF -6.196 1.870 10.976 1 .001 
13(BBB+) LADSTF 7.956 2.334 11.618 1 .001 
 LR -6.075 2.428 6.262 1 .012 
14(A-) LADSTF 7.782 2.002 15.103 1 .000 
 LR -4.595 1.977 5.403 1 .020 
15(A) LADSTF 3.184 1.867 2.907 1 .088 
LR -3.047 1.771 2.961 1 .085 
16(A+) LR -3.377 2.052 2.710 1 .100 
 
Table 4.12: Parameter estimates for the liquidity model with dummies (Model 2) 
FSR Variable B Std. Error Wald df Sig. 
6(B) CS -45.510 15.749 8.350 1 .004 
LR 39.304 20.056 3.841 1 .050 
SR -6.464 2.006 10.379 1 .001 
T 2.673 .625 18.319 1 .000 
7(B+) CS -33.624 11.804 8.114 1 .004 
 
SR -1.965 .504 15.168 1 .000 
 
T 1.140 .277 16.887 1 .000 
 
Size -6.527 1.218 28.703 1 .000 
8(BB-) LADSTF -12.343 3.680 11.252 1 .001 
CS -27.795 12.299 5.108 1 .024 
SR -2.221 .519 18.322 1 .000 
T 1.088 .294 13.667 1 .000 
9(BB) CS -28.717 11.186 6.591 1 .010 
SR -1.907 .492 15.051 1 .000 
T 1.357 .257 27.912 1 .000 
Size -8.896 1.164 58.394 1 .000 
10(BB+) CS -19.192 10.617 3.267 1 .071 
SR -2.144 .486 19.476 1 .000 
T 1.292 .248 27.118 1 .000 
Size -9.141 1.132 65.199 1 .000 
11(BBB-) LADSTF -4.075 2.336 3.042 1 .081 
LR 6.651 3.805 3.055 1 .080 
SR -2.252 .483 21.738 1 .000 
T 1.042 .244 18.211 1 .000 
Size -6.706 1.059 40.116 1 .000 
12(BBB) LADSTF -3.999 2.206 3.285 1 .070 
 
LR 10.197 3.675 7.699 1 .006 
 
SR -2.171 .481 20.375 1 .000 
 
T 1.077 .240 20.167 1 .000 
 
Size -6.484 1.040 38.861 1 .000 
13(BBB+) LADSTF 6.219 2.632 5.585 1 .018 
 
LR -11.099 4.080 7.402 1 .007 
 
SR 1.891 .486 15.123 1 .000 
 
T 1.172 .247 22.554 1 .000 
 
Size 6.219 1.069 33.843 1 .000 
14(A-) LADSTF 6.907 2.027 11.606 1 .001 
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LR -10.304 3.606 8.165 1 .004 
 
SR 1.645 .480 11.760 1 .001 
 
T .844 .236 12.790 1 .000 
 
Size 4.282 1.014 17.827 1 .000 
15(A) LR -9.668 3.384 8.160 1 .004 
SR 1.761 .477 13.631 1 .000 
T .831 .234 12.651 1 .000 
Size 4.232 1.005 17.718 1 .000 
16(A+) LR -7.070 3.584 3.891 1 .049 
As shown in tables 4.11 and 4.12, the reported significant predictors are not determinants of 
every bank FSR. The forward stepwise algorithm helps show the significant liquidity 
predictor(s) for each FSR individually. Moreover, the trend (either positive or negative) of 
each predictor may vary across FSRs. This result carries important implications to bank 
managers when planning for improving bank FSRs using liquidity predictors. That is, bank 
FSR may require an increase (or decrease) in a certain predictor. In terms of assessing the 
robustness of an estimate, if the estimate of a predictor is associated with the same trend and 
significance across all FSRs, the estimate of this predictor is to be considered fragile. That is, 
bank managers will not be able to use that predictor to plan for an improvement in the 
probability of moving from a current to subsequent bank FSR.   
As seen in Table 4.11, CS has negative and statistically significant coefficients at the 1% 
level for B, B+ and BB- ratings. CS is statistically insignificant for high- and near-high-FSR 
banks in this category. The negative sign associated with the predictor estimates reflects the 
nature of the bank-rating system. As far as bank capitalisation is concerned, low-FSR banks 
are considered to be undercapitalised in comparison to high- and near-high-FSR banks. This 
finding complies with results reported under the asset quality category. Table 4.12 shows that 
CS has negative and statistically significant coefficients at the 1% level for B, B+ and BB 
ratings, at the 5% level for BB- ratings and at the 10% level for BB+ ratings. This finding 
verifies results reported for Model 1.  
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As shown in Table 4.11, LR has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% 
level for B ratings. In addition, the LR ratio has a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient at the 5% level for BBB+ and A- ratings and at the 10% level for A and A+ 
ratings. This finding confirms results reported by Belloti et al. (2011a), Chen (2012) and Öğüt 
et al. (2012), which indicate that banks with higher liquidity positions tend to obtain higher 
bank ratings. The positive sign associated with the predictor estimate for low-FSR banks is 
compatible with banking activity. Apparently, low-FSR banks are selling a larger number of 
poor quality loans that result in a higher degree of liquidity risk exposure. Subsequently, 
FSRs assigned by the CI rating agency are affected negatively. This finding validates asset 
quality category outcomes, which state that the average rate of ILGL for low- and near-low-
FSR banks exceeds the average rate of ILGL for high- and near-high-FSR banks. Moreover, 
Poon et al. (2009) confirmed that banks with high loan-to-total asset ratios are assigned low 
FBRs. This is mainly because an increase in LR results in higher bank liquidity risk, which is 
the reason that a low-FSR is assigned.  
Alternatively, the negative sign associated with the predictor estimates indicates that high- 
and near-high-FSR banks do not depend entirely on selling loans as their main source of 
revenue. However, they invest in other financial activities or instruments to maintain a safe 
liquidity position. It should be also noted that the average rate of LR for low- and near-low-
FSR banks (54.7%) is higher than that for high- and near-high-FSR banks (43.5%) (see 
appendix B and C, respectively). In light of the global financial crisis of 2008, Basel III 
proposed new liquidity requirements to rectify liquidity positions within the banking industry. 
This explains why LR is relatively important for rating agencies in this region. Table 4.12 
indicates that LR has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for 
BBB ratings; at the 5% level for B ratings and at the 10% level for BBB- ratings. In addition, 
LR has a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for BBB+, A- and A 
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ratings and at the 5% level for A+ ratings. This finding is in accordance with results reported 
for Model 1.  
As shown in Table 4.11, LADSTF has a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 
1% level for BB-, BBB- and BBB ratings and at the 5% level for BB and BB+ ratings. Also, 
LADSTF has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for BBB+ and 
A- ratings and at the 10% level for A ratings. The positive sign associated with the predictor 
estimates suggests that high- and near-high-FSR banks invest more in liquid assets. High- and 
near-high-FSR banks tend to maintain good liquidity positions to withstand sudden 
withdrawals by customers and short-term funding. The findings are consistent with those of 
Poon and Firth (2005), Pasiouras et al. (2006), Godlewski (2007) and Chen (2012), who 
concluded that high-rated banks hold more liquid assets than low-rated bank.  
It should be noted that high-FSR banks in the Middle East prefer excess liquidity. High 
liquidity is needed to fund growth in the retail market and to finance the booming small-
medium size corporate sector (Corbett, 2009). In general, these two areas are considered huge 
opportunities for the potential growth of the banking industry in the Middle East region. 
Conversely, the negative sign associated with the predictor estimates indicates that low- and 
near-low-FSR banks do not maintain an appropriate level of liquid assets. Thus, banks are 
able neither to withstand sudden customer withdrawals nor to meet minimum liquidity 
requirement levels set by central banks. It also is worth mentioning that the average rate of 
LADSTF for high- and near-high-FSR banks (41.6%) is greater than the average rate for low- 
and near-low-FSR banks (33.1%) (see appendix C and B, respectively). As shown in Table 
4.12, LADSTF has a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for BB-
 
ratings and at the 10% level for BBB- and BBB ratings. Moreover, LADSTF has a positive 
and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for A-
 
ratings and at the 5% level for 
BBB+ ratings. Concisely, this finding is in agreement with results reported for Model 1.   
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Table 4.12 shows that SR has negative and statistically significant coefficients at the 1% level 
for B, B+, BB-, BB, BB+, BBB- and BBB ratings. In addition, SR has a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for BBB+, A- and A ratings. This finding is 
compatible with results reported for asset quality, capital adequacy and credit risk categories. 
As indicated in Table 4.12, time effect (T) has positive and statistically significant 
coefficients at the 1% level for B, B+, BB-, BB, BB+, BBB-, BBB, BBB+, A- and A ratings. 
The positive sign associated with the predictor estimates confirms that bank FSRs in the 
Middle East region slightly improved during period from 2001 to 2009. This result is 
consistent with results reported for both credit risk and capital adequacy categories. 
Table 4.12 shows that size has negative and statistically significant coefficients at the 1% 
level for B+, BB, BB+, BBB- and BBB ratings. Moreover, size has a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient at the 1% level for BBB+, A- and A ratings. This finding is similar to 
results reported for the asset quality, capital adequacy and credit risk categories. 
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4.3.5 Profitability models 
Table 4.13: Profitability results for the ML model with and without bank FSR dummies 
64
 
Variables Model 1 without 
Dummies 
Model 2 with 
Dummies
65
 
                                                          2            df         2           df 
  Intercept                  60.88
***
        11                108.9
*** 
    11 
CS        11          86.13
***
         38.59
***
    11 
CIR          79.33
***
        11       38.95
***      
11  
TME 80.70
***      
   11       73.25
***
     11 
NIM         11           20.93
**
   11      33.63
***
 
AU  86.13
***
        11       87.62
*** 
    11 
REP          24.69
***
        11       53.26
***
     11 
R0AE         11         25.72
***
       21.89
**
      11 
ECE        16.50
*
       11 
Size        270.3
***
     11 
SR        73.46
***
     11   
 
No. of observations 
  
491 
    
   491 
2 588.7
***
    969.7
***
 
Log Likelihood 0.001603
***
  0.001222
***
 
2R(Pseudo)
1 
 70.7%     87.1% 
Overall classification  
accuracy   
38.5%    49.5% 
Note. The multicollinearity is addressed by examining the correlation matrix and VIF scores. The predictors 
associated with VIF > 5 and outliers are excluded. *, **, and *** denote statistically significant differences at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
  
1
The researcher reports the value of Nagelkerke, which is an adjustment to Cox and Snell measure. 
   
(1) Table 4.13 reports forward stepwise regression66 results for Models 1 and 2 for the 
profitability category. For Model 1, the results show that seven predictors are 
                                                 
64
 PTOIAA, NOITAA, DPO, INODAE, NOINI are excluded from the two models because of a large number of 
missing observations. 
65
 SR and country dummy variables are highly correlated at 73.4%. The researcher performed a regression run 
with the SR variable alone, and pseudo R-square equals 87.1%. The researcher conducted another regression run 
with the country dummy variable alone, and pseudo R-square equals 75.7%. Thus, the researcher included the 
SR variable and dropped the country dummy variable for the final ML regression run for this category. 
66
 The researcher ran the ML regression using first and fourth quartiles only for the profitability category. The 
number of observations for Models 1 and 2 were 302. For Model 1, the result shows that five statistically 
significant predictors (CS, CIR, TME, NIM and AU) account for 77.3% of FSR variations. In addition, the 
cross-classification matrix shows that profitability category classifies 54.3% of predicted FSRs correctly and 
that it is relatively powerful in predicting B, A, B+
 
and BBB
-
 ratings that correspond to 100%, 77%, 75% and 
65.6%, respectively. For Model 2, the result shows that nine statistically significant predictors (CS, CIR, TME, 
AU, REP, OER, size, time and SR) accounted for 92% of FSR variations. The cross-classification matrix shows 
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included in the final model. Six predictors—ratio of total equity to total assets 
(CS), the ratio of cost to income ratio (CIR), the ratio of tax management 
efficiency (TME), asset utilisation (AU), recurring earning power (REP) and 
return on average equity (ROAE)—are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
One predictor, the ratio of net interest margin (NIM), is statistically significant at 
the 5% level. For Model 2, the results show that 10 significant predictors are 
included in the final model. Eight predictors, CS, CIR, TME, NIM, AU, REP, SR 
and Size effect, are statistically significant at the 1% level. One predictor, ROAE, 
is significant at the 5% level. One predictor, expense control efficiency (ECE), is 
significant at the 10% level.  
(2) For Model 1, the statistical characteristic of model fitting confirms that the final 
model is significant at the 1% level (χ2 = 588.719; df = 77) and accordingly 
outperforms the null. For Model 2, the statistical characteristic of model-fitting 
shows that the final model is significant at the 1% level (χ2 = 969.713; df = 110) 
and thus outperforms the null. 
(3) For Models 1 and 2, the goodness-of-fit shows that the significance of the two 
tests (Pearson and deviance) are greater than 0.05 (1.00). This indicates that the 
two models acceptably fit the data. 
(4) Regarding the explanatory power of the Model 1 (pseudo R-square), the results 
show that seven significant predictors account for 70.7% of FSR variations in the 
probability of moving from a current to subsequent bank FSR. For Model 2, the 
results show that 10 significant predictors account for 87.1% of FSR variations in 
the probability of moving from a current to subsequent bank FSR. 
                                                                                                                                                        
that the profitability category with dummies classifies 68.9% of predicted FSR as correct and that this model is 
relatively powerful in predicting B, B+ and A ratings that correspond to 100%, 100% and 83.9%, respectively. 
Detailed results are available from the researcher. 
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(5) Concerning the classification power of profitability for Model 1, the results show 
that this category classifies 38.5% of predicted FSRs correctly. Additionally, the 
cross-classification matrix shows that profitability category is relatively powerful 
in predicting B, B+
 
and A ratings that correspond to 100%, 87.5% and 67.8%, 
respectively. For Model 2, the results show that the profitability category with 
dummies classifies 49.5% of the predicted FSRs as correct. In addition, Model 2 is 
relatively powerful in predicting B, B+, A+, BB- and A ratings which corresponds 
to 100%, 100%, 69.4%, 66.7% and 63.2%, respectively. 
The estimation algorithm of Multinomial Logit offers an advantage of examining the 
significant profitability predictors that are associated with each bank rating individually. That 
is, Table 4.13 does not show the trend and the magnitude of each predictor coefficient across 
bank FSRs. It is important for bank managers to find out and focus on the significant 
profitability predictors that help increasing the probability of moving from a current to a 
higher FSR. 
Table 4.14 shows that the parameters estimates of B+, BB-, BB, BB+, BBB-, BBB, BBB+, 
A- and A ratings are most representative for Model 1 and the available data. The parameters 
of the final predictors CS, CIR, TME, NIM, AU, REP and ROAE vary in their significance 
across different FSRs. Table 4.15 reports that the parameters estimates of B+, BB-, BB, BB+, 
BBB-, BBB, BBB+, A- and A ratings are most representative for Model 2 and the available 
data. The parameters of the final predictors CS, CIR, TME, NIM, AU, REP, ROAE, ECE, 
size and SR vary in significance across bank FSRs. 
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Table 4.14: Parameter estimates for the profitability model without dummies (Model 1) 
FSR Variable B 
Std. 
Error Wald df Sig. 
7(B+) AU -495.034 139.891 12.522 1 .000 
CIR 21.856 5.162 17.926 1 .000 
CS -47.856 23.437 4.169 1 .041 
NIM -225.934 84.533 7.144 1 .008 
ROAE -16.887 6.151 7.538 1 .006 
 
REP -247.804 146.429 2.864 1 .091 
 
TME -16.183 6.289 6.621 1 .010 
8(BB-) CIR 20.195 4.834 17.456 1 .000 
ROAE -9.318 5.411 2.965 1 .085 
 
REP -135.360 103.419 2.913 1 .081 
 
TME -14.991 6.225 5.799 1 .016 
9(BB) AU -187.119 41.507 20.323 1 .000 
CIR 10.891 5.286 4.245 1 .039 
NIM -126.597 55.420 5.218 1 .022 
TME -13.786 6.418 4.614 1 .032 
10(BB+) AU -147.927 35.597 17.269 1 .000 
CIR 19.481 4.737 16.916 1 .000 
CS -20.684 10.376 3.974 1 .046 
NIM -126.407 51.124 6.114 1 .013 
11(BBB-) AU -116.132 35.108 10.942 1 .001 
CIR 19.448 4.744 16.806 1 .000 
CS -35.710 10.256 12.123 1 .000 
NIM -141.854 51.322 7.640 1 .006 
ROAE -9.853 4.322 5.199 1 .023 
 
TME -12.426 6.233 3.974 1 .046 
12(BBB) AU -88.737 33.562 6.990 1 .008 
CIR 15.287 4.710 10.535 1 .001 
CS -27.488 9.959 7.618 1 .006 
 
NIM -119.944 50.112 5.729 1 .017 
 
TME -14.170 6.198 5.227 1 .022 
13(BBB+) AU 99.648 36.870 7.305 1 .007 
 
CIR -15.965 5.060 9.954 1 .002 
 
NIM 101.005 51.636 3.826 1 .050 
 
ROAE 10.101 4.284 5.559 1 .018 
14(A-) NIM 141.439 51.019 7.686 1 .006 
 
ROAE 10.084 4.221 5.707 1 .017 
15(A) AU 55.909 32.366 2.984 1 .084 
 
NIM 112.051 50.198 4.983 1 .026 
 
ROAE 8.421 4.189 4.041 1 .044 
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Table 4.15: Parameter estimates for the profitability model with dummies (Model 2) 
FSR Variable B Std. Error Wald df Sig. 
7(B+) AU -765.356 417.550 3.360 1 .067 
CIR 21.053 9.519 4.892 1 .027 
 
NIM -473.137 178.661 7.013 1 .008 
 
TME -21.449 12.432 2.977 1 .084 
8(BB-) AU -435.700 207.229 4.421 1 .036 
 
CIR 67.597 21.304 10.068 1 .002 
 
REP -892.693 313.924 8.086 1 .004 
 
SR -3.123 .917 11.602 1 .001 
9(BB) ECE -18.395 8.133 5.116 1 .024 
AU -234.608 67.668 12.020 1 .001 
NIM -354.180 85.320 17.233 1 .000 
ROAE -22.250 13.295 2.801 1 .094 
Size -10.583 1.498 49.901 1 .000 
SR -.601 .370 2.639 1 .100 
10(BB+) ECE -23.862 7.638 9.761 1 .002 
AU -154.717 62.421 6.143 1 .013 
CIR 13.768 7.719 3.181 1 .074 
CS -42.994 23.603 3.318 1 .069 
NIM -315.296 79.111 15.884 1 .000 
Size -9.879 1.369 52.104 1 .000 
SR -1.086 .365 8.865 1 .003 
11(BBB-) ECE -22.603 7.563 8.933 1 .003 
AU -113.826 61.262 3.452 1 .063 
CIR 13.892 7.710 3.247 1 .072 
CS -56.538 23.063 6.010 1 .014 
NIM -305.404 77.971 15.342 1 .000 
Size -7.907 1.300 36.994 1 .000 
SR -.934 .359 6.771 1 .009 
12(BBB) ECE -21.308 7.428 8.229 1 .004 
CS -45.397 23.120 3.855 1 .050 
NIM -292.212 76.830 14.466 1 .000 
ROAE -22.418 13.084 2.936 1 .087 
Size -7.669 1.286 35.578 1 .000 
SR -.712 .356 4.009 1 .045 
13(BBB+) ECE 23.697 7.670 9.545 1 .002 
CIR -13.518 7.753 3.040 1 .081 
NIM 255.951 76.447 11.210 1 .001 
Size 6.795 1.299 27.346 1 .000 
14(A-) ECE 19.726 7.009 7.921 1 .005 
 NIM 253.244 75.829 11.154 1 .001 
 TME 8.265 10.464 5.799 1 .030 
 Size 5.094 1.233 17.058 1 .000 
15(A) ECE 16.786 6.644 6.384 1 .012 
 NIM 204.107 72.905 7.838 1 .005 
 TME 8.610 10.658 6.621 1 .019 
 Size 4.331 1.210 12.824 1 .000 
 SR .647 .346 3.506 1 .061 
As shown in Tables 4.14 and 4.15, the reported significant predictors are not determinants of 
every bank FSR. The forward stepwise algorithm helps show the significant profitability 
predictor(s) for each FSR individually. Moreover, the trend (either positive or negative) of 
each predictor may vary across FSRs. This result carries important implications to bank 
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managers when planning for improving bank FSRs using profitability predictors. That is, 
bank FSR may require an increase (or decrease) in a certain predictor. In terms of assessing 
the robustness of an estimate, if the estimate of a predictor is associated with the same trend 
and significance across all FSRs, the estimate of this predictor is to be considered fragile. 
That is, bank managers will not be able to use that predictor to plan for an improvement in the 
probability of moving from a current to subsequent bank FSR.   
As can be seen in Table 4.14, CS has negative and statistically significant coefficients at the 
1% level for BBB- and BBB ratings and at the 5% level for B+ and BB+
 
ratings. CS is 
statistically insignificant for high- and near-high-FSR banks in this category. This finding is 
in accordance with results reported earlier for the asset quality and liquidity categories. The 
negative sign associated with predictor estimates indicates that low- and near-low-FSR banks 
in the Middle East are not accumulating an appropriate amount of capital buffer to 
compensate high risk weighted assets. In line with this, Table 4.15 reports that CS has a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 5% level for BBB- and BBB ratings 
and at the 10% level for BB+
 
ratings.     
As shown in Table 4.14, the TME ratio has a negative and statistically significant coefficient 
at 1% level for B+ ratings and at the 5% level for BB-, BB, BBB- and BBB ratings. The 
negative sign associated with the predictor estimates indicates that low- and near-low-FSR 
banks are incapable of using security gains or losses and other tax-management tools (such as 
the purchase of tax-exempt bonds) to minimise banks’ tax exposure. Table 4.15 reveals that 
the TME ratio has a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 10% level for B+ 
ratings. In addition, TME has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 5% level 
for A- and A ratings. The positive sign associated with the predictor estimates confirms that 
high- and near-high-FSR banks are proficient and experienced in terms of using new financial 
instruments or techniques to reduce banks tax exposure. This argument is supported by the 
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fact that average rate of TME for low- and near-low-FSR banks (80.5%) is somewhat lower 
than the average rate for high- and near-high-FSR banks (97.1%) (see appendix B and C, 
respectively).   
Table 4.14 shows that CIR has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% 
level for B+, BB-, BB+, BBB-
 
and BBB ratings and at the 5% level for BB
 
ratings. In 
addition, CIR has a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for BBB+ 
ratings. This ratio provides insight into bank management quality as well as operating cost 
variations. The positive sign associated with the predictor estimates implies that low- and 
near-low-FSR banks are managing cost-side activities inefficiently relative to the generated-
income side. On the other hand, the negative sign associated with the predictor estimate 
shows that near-high-FSR banks are operating at low cost. 
 This result is along the lines of Pasiouras et al. (2006) and Van-Roy (2006), who concluded 
that banks with fairly low cost-to-income ratios are assigned high ratings. This finding also is 
consistent with the new era of banking industry, which focuses on movement toward 
automation and installation of sophisticated electronic systems instead of older, labour-based 
production and delivery systems. This brings about the reduction in bank overhead costs 
relative to generated income. In line with this, Poon et al. (1999) stated that profitability is 
positively associated with high ratings in the case of Moody’s BFSRs. It is worth mentioning 
that the average rate of CIR for low- and near-low-FSR banks (46.5%) is higher than the 
average rate for high- and near-high-FSR banks (34.6%) (see appendix B and C, 
respectively). Table 4.15 reports that CIR has a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient at the 1% level for BB- ratings, at the 5% level for B+
 
ratings and at the 10% level 
for BB+ and BBB- ratings. Furthermore, CIR has a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient at the 10% level for BBB+ ratings. This finding is compatible with results 
reported for Model 1.   
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As can be seen in Table 4.14, AU has a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 
1% level for B+, BB, BB+, BBB- and BBB ratings. In addition, AU has a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for BBB+ ratings and at the 10% level for 
A ratings. The negative sign associated with the predictor estimates indicates that low- and 
near-low-FSR banks do not efficiently utilise their available assets (i.e., loans, investment 
securities and fees earned from fiduciary activities) to generate an appropriate amount of total 
operating revenue (interest and non-interest). On the contrary, the positive sign associated 
with the predictor estimates implies that high- and near-high-FSR banks are implementing 
effective asset portfolio management policies. It should be noted that average rate of AU for 
low- and near-low-FSR banks (6.2%) is slightly lower than average rate for high- and near-
high-FSR banks (7.3%) (see appendix B and C, respectively). Table 4.15 reveals that AU has 
a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for BB ratings, at the 5% 
level for BB- and BB+
 
ratings and at the 10% level for B+ and BBB- ratings. This finding 
confirms results reported for Model 1.  
As shown in Table 4.14, NIM has a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% 
level for B+ and BBB-
 
ratings and at the 5% level for BB, BB+ and BBB ratings. In addition, 
the NIM ratio is associated with a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% 
level for A- and at the 5% level for BBB+ and A ratings. The negative sign associated with 
predictor estimates denotes that low- and near-low-FSR banks in the Middle East make 
unprofitable operating decisions, which means that banks pay interest expenses that are 
considerably higher than returns generated by bank investments. In other words, low- and 
near-low-FSR banks are incapable of increasing the spread between interest revenue 
generated by earning assets and interest expense paid on interest-bearing liabilities.  
On the other hand, the positive sign associated with the predictor estimates implies that high- 
and near-high-FSR banks are proficient and qualified in generating the maximum amount of 
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revenue by using the cheapest sources of funding. This is confirmed by Godlewski (2007), 
who stated that profitable banks are associated with lower bank default probability and thus 
higher bank ratings. Additionally, this argument is supported by the fact that the average rate 
of NIM for high- and near-high-FSR banks (3.2%) is slightly higher than the average rate for 
low- and near-low-FSR banks (3.0%) (see appendix C and B, respectively). Furthermore, this 
finding is in line with results reported for CIR ratio. Finally, these results provide clear 
evidence that bank profitability is a strong determinant of bank ratings (Pasiouras et al., 2006; 
Poon et al., 1999; Poon and Firth, 2005; Van-Roy, 2006). It can be also observed in Table 
4.15 that NIM has a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for B+, 
BB, BB+, BBB-, BBB ratings. In addition, NIM has a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient at the 1% level for BBB+, A- and A ratings. This finding is in agreement with 
results reported for Model 1.   
Table 4.14 indicates that ROAE has a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 
1% level for B+ ratings, at the 5% level for BBB- ratings and at the 10% level for BB- 
ratings. In addition, ROAE has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 5% 
level for BBB+, A- and A ratings. This finding is in line with results reported by Belloti et al. 
(2011a) and Öğüt et al. (2012). It is worth noting that this ratio must be carefully analysed as 
it neglects overleveraged banks. The negative sign associated with the predictor estimates 
indicates that low-FSR banks either suffer from expense-control problems or a decline in 
revenues. This definitely erodes net income, which negatively affects the rate of return earned 
on funds invested by stockholders of low-FSR banks.  
In contrast, the positive sign associated with the predictor estimates implies that high- and 
near-high-FSR banks employ efficient banking operation techniques and strategies that result 
in superior shareholder returns. This debate is confirmed by the fact that average rate of 
ROAE for low- and near-low-FSR banks (15.4%) is relatively lower than the average rate for 
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high- and near-high-FSR banks (17.8%) (see appendix B and C, respectively). Whereas Table 
4.15 reveals that ROAE has a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 10% 
level for BB and BBB ratings. The negative sign associated with the predictor estimates is 
similar to results reported for Model 1. 
It can be observed from Table 4.14 that REP has a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient at the 10% level for B+ and BB- ratings. The negative sign associated with the 
predictor estimates denotes that low-FSR banks unable to use their assets to generate an 
appropriate amount of income even after adding back the provision for loan losses. This 
finding is in harmony with results reported by Poon et al. (1999) Poon and Firth (2005), 
Pasiouras et al. (2006) and Van-Roy (2006). Consequently, Table 4.15 shows that REP has a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for BB- ratings. This finding 
is compatible with results reported for Model 1. 
As seen in Table 4.15, ECE has a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% 
level for BB+, BBB- and BBB ratings and at the 5% level for BB ratings. Also, ECE has a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for BBB+ and A- ratings and 
at the 5% level for A ratings. The negative sign associated with the predictor estimates 
implies that low- and near-low-FSR banks are incapable to control operating expenses 
efficiently.  
On the contrary, the positive sign associated with the predictor estimates denotes that high- 
and near-high-FSR banks have better control over their operating expenses. This is mainly 
because high- and near-high-FSR banks are more enthusiastic about advances in automation 
and mergers. Accordingly, this brings about the elimination of many overlapping facilities 
and thus reduces overhead and operating expenses. It is also worth mentioning that the 
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average rate of ECE for high- and near-high-FSR banks (34.5%) is slightly higher than the 
average rate for low- and near-low-FSR banks (27%) (see appendix C and B, respectively).    
Table 4.15 reveals that SR has negative and statistically significant coefficients at the 1% 
level for BB-, BB+ and BBB- ratings, at the 5% level for BBB ratings and at the 10% level 
for BB ratings. Correspondingly, SR has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at 
the 10% level for A ratings. The negative sign associated with the predictor estimates 
provides further evidence that banks located in countries with low SRs are assigned low- and 
near-low FSRs. On the contrary, the positive sign associated with the predictor estimate 
confirms that banks located in countries with better macroeconomic and institutional 
indicators are assigned high- and near-high FSRs. This finding is consistent with results 
reported for Model 2 for the asset quality, capital adequacy, credit risk and liquidity 
categories. 
As shown in Table 4.15, size has negative and statistically significant coefficients at the 1% 
level for BB, BB+, BBB- and BBB ratings. Moreover, size has a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient at the 1% level for BBB+, A- and A ratings. The negative sign 
associated with the predictor estimates implies that small banks are assigned low- and near-
low FSRs. This may be a result of the higher probability of failure or the lesser ability to 
diversify small banks’ operations. On the contrary, the positive sign associated with the 
predictor estimates signifies that large banks are assigned high- and near-high FSRs. 
Apparently, large banks benefit from economies of scale. This finding is in agreement with 
results reported for Model 2 for asset quality, capital adequacy, credit risk and liquidity 
categories. 
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4.3.6 All financial category models 
Table 4.16: Results for all financial categories for the ML model with and without bank FSR 
dummies  
 
                                                                                              
2             df                              2           df 
 Intercept                   23.75***         10                         27.56***    10 
CS 46.10
***
        10                     111.9
***
     10 
LLRGL         102.8
***
        10              108.8
***
     10 
TME         398.1
***
        10              48.82
***
     10 
ECE         30.48
*** 
        10
 
              60.47
***
     10 
TCR         39.09
***
        10              51.75
***
     10 
AU         44.73
***
        10              58.82
***
     10 
EM         28.09
***
        10                  32.05
***
     10 
CIR         34.45
***
        10             27.63
***
    10 
LR          41.63
***
       10                        32.89
***       
10
LLPTL 
LLRIL 
         23.09
***
        10 
         46.30
***
        10 
            27.09
***
    10 
            40.90
***
    10 
NIEAA          17.41
*
          10  
SR                62.09
***  
   10 
 
No. of observations               419                   419 
2             823.4
***
 868.0
***
 
Log Likelihood             0.00997
***     
 0.00952
***
 
2R(Pseudo)
1 
             87.1%                   88.6% 
Overall classification 
accuracy   
            53.5%                      56.1% 
The multicollinearity is addressed by examining the correlation matrix and VIF scores. The predictors 
associated with VIF > 5 and outliers are excluded. *, **, and *** denote statistically significant differences at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
1
The researcher reports the value of Nagelkerke, which is an adjustment to the Cox and Snell measure. 
 
 
(1) Table 4.16 presents forward stepwise regression67 results for Models 1 and 2 for 
all financial categories. For Model 1, the results show that 12 statistically 
                                                 
67
 The researcher ran the ML regression using first and fourth quartile data only for all financial categories. The 
number of observations for Models 1 and 2 were 246. For Model 1, the result shows that nine statistically 
significant predictors (CS, LLPTL, ILGL, TME, LADSTF, AU, REP, TCR and EM) account for 88.1% of FSR 
variations. In addition, the cross-classification matrix shows that all financial categories without dummies model 
(model 1) classify 63.4% of predicted FSR as correct and that it is relatively powerful in predicting B, BB-, A 
and BBB- ratings that correspond to 100%, 100%, 86.4% and 73.5% , respectively. For Model 2, the result 
shows that 10 statistically significant predictors (CS, AU, TCR, TME, LLRIL, ENL, LLPNIR, SR, time and 
size) account for 94.7% of FSR variations. The cross-classification matrix shows that all financial categories 
with dummies model (model 2) classify 76% of predicted FSRs as correct. In addition, this model is relatively 
powerful in predicting B, BB+, BB- , BBB-, BB- and A ratings that corresponds to 100%, 88.2%, 85.7%, 85.7% 
and 84%, respectively. Detailed results are available from the researcher. 
 
Variables Model 1 without  
dummies 
Model 2 with 
dummies 
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significant predictors are included in final model. Eleven predictors—total equity 
to total assets (CS), loan loss reserve to gross loans (LLRGL), tax-management 
efficiency (TME), expense-control efficiency (ECE), total capital ratio (TCR), 
asset utilisation (AU), equity multiplier (EM), cost-to-income ratio (CIR), loan 
ratio (LR), loan loss provision to total loans (LLPTL) and loan loss reserve to 
impaired loans (LLRIL)—are statistically significant at the 1% level. One 
predictor—non-interest expense to average assets (NIEAA)—is statistically 
significant at the 10% level. For Model 2, the results indicate that 12 statistically 
significant predictors are included in final model. These predictors—CS, LLRGL, 
TME, ECE, TCR, AU, EM, CIR, LR, LLPTL, LLRIL and SR—are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. 
(2) For Model 1, the statistical characteristic of model-fitting shows that the final 
model is significant at the 1% level (χ2 = 823.357; df = 120) and thus outperforms 
the null. For Model 2, the statistical characteristic of model-fitting shows that the 
final model is significant at the 1% level (χ2 = 868.036; df = 120) and accordingly 
outperforms the null. 
(3) For Models 1 and 2, the models’ goodness-of-fit shows that the significance of the 
two tests (Pearson and deviance) are greater than 0.05 (1.00). This means that the 
two models adequately fit the data. 
(4) Regarding the explanatory power of Model 1 (pseudo R-square), the results show 
that 12 significant predictors account for 87.1% of FSR variations in the 
probability of moving from a current to subsequent bank FSR. For Model 2, the 
results show that 12 significant predictors account for 88.6% of FSR variations in 
the probability of moving from a current to subsequent bank FSR.  
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(5) Regarding the classification power of all financial categories for Model 1, the 
results show that this model classifies 53.5% of predicted FSRs as correct. 
Moreover, the cross-classification matrix shows that Model 1 is comparatively 
powerful in predicting B, BB-, BB+ and A ratings, which corresponds to 100%, 
100%, 67.6% and 65.4%, respectively. In line with Model 1, Model 2 results show 
that all financial ratios including dummies classify 56.1% of predicted FSRs as 
correct. In addition, Model 2 is fairly powerful in predicting B, BB-, BBB and 
BB+ ratings, which corresponds to 100%, 100%, 69.5% and 64.7%, respectively. 
The estimation algorithm of Multinomial Logit offers an advantage of examining the 
significant all financial predictors that are associated with each bank rating individually. That 
is, Table 4.16 does not show the trend and the magnitude of each predictor coefficient across 
bank FSRs. It is important for bank managers to find out and focus on the significant 
financial predictors that help increasing the probability of moving from a current to a higher 
FSR. 
As can be seen in Table 4.17, the parameter estimates for BB, BB+, BBB-, BBB, BBB+, A-, 
A and A+ ratings are most representative for Model 1 and available data. The parameters of 
the final predictors CS, LLRGL, TME, ECE, TCR, AU, EM, CIR, LR, LLPTL, LLRIL and 
NIEAA vary in their significance across different FSRs. Table 4.18 indicates that the 
parameter estimates for BB, BB+, BBB- , BBB, BBB+, A-, A and A+
 
ratings are most 
representative for Model 2 and the available data. The parameters of final predictors CS, 
LLRGL, TME, ECE, TCR, AU, EM, CIR, LR, LLPTL, LLRIL and SR vary in their 
significance across different FSRs. 
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Table 4.17: Parameter estimates for all financial categories’ model without dummies 
(Model 1) 
FSR Variable B Std. Error Wald df Sig. 
9 (BB) LLRGL 96.815 22.369 18.733 1 .000 
AU -171.044 52.048 10.800 1 .001 
CIR 22.403 7.623 8.636 1 .003 
NIEAA 276.978 133.730 4.290 1 .038 
EM 1.433 .365 15.426 1 .000 
CS -81.607 21.604 14.269 1 .000 
LLRIL -6.174 2.102 8.626 1 .003 
TCR -29.406 13.144 5.005 1 .025 
TME -20.178 7.092 8.095 1 .004 
LR 20.624 5.720 12.999 1 .000 
10(BB+) LLRGL 88.932 22.232 16.001 1 .000 
ECE -17.752 6.030 8.667 1 .003 
AU -218.326 47.184 21.410 1 .000 
CIR 17.120 8.253 4.303 1 .038  
EM 1.290 .345 14.002 1 .000 
CS -85.279 20.589 17.157 1 .000 
LLRIL -6.124 1.362 20.213 1 .000 
TME -12.427 7.443 2.787 1 .095 
LLPTL 199.379 122.091 2.667 1 .100 
11(BBB-) LLRGL 91.303 21.903 17.376 1 .000 
ECE -13.340 4.188 10.146 1 .001 
AU -155.507 41.086 14.326 1 .000 
CIR 18.488 6.913 7.153 1 .007 
EM 1.818 .398 20.913 1 .000 
CS -132.167 23.864 30.674 1 .000 
LLRIL -1.477 .728 4.124 1 .042 
TCR -20.472 12.116 2.855 1 .091 
TME -18.302 6.856 7.126 1 .008 
LR 11.201 4.772 5.510 1 .019 
12(BBB) LLRGL 68.531 21.730 9.946 1 .002 
ECE -7.719 3.776 4.178 1 .041 
AU -128.461 38.771 10.978 1 .001 
CIR 15.362 6.243 6.055 1 .014 
EM 1.876 .398 22.190 1 .000 
CS -112.659 23.106 23.773 1 .000 
LLRIL -2.431 .619 15.410 1 .000 
TCR -33.191 11.618 8.162 1 .004 
TME -18.158 6.782 7.167 1 .007 
LR 16.691 4.453 14.049 1 .000 
13(BBB+) LLRGL -39.201 23.464 2.791 1 .095 
ECE 13.361 4.166 10.286 1 .001 
AU 133.465 40.091 11.083 1 .001 
EM 1.751 .417 17.666 1 .000 
CS 103.883 24.282 18.303 1 .000 
LLRIL .964 .546 3.116 1 .078 
TCR 32.306 12.101 7.127 1 .008 
TME 13.108 6.843 3.669 1 .055 
LR -14.898 4.625 10.374 1 .001 
14(A-) LLRGL -62.357 21.294 8.575 1 .003 
ECE 15.672 3.906 16.101 1 .000 
EM 1.570 .440 12.719 1 .000 
CS 99.657 24.658 16.334 1 .000 
LLRIL .708 .436 2.641 1 .100 
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TCR 20.557 11.356 3.277 1 .070 
LR -10.383 4.290 5.858 1 .016 
15(A) ECE -9.587 3.737 6.581 1 .010 
EM 1.815 .399 20.749 1 .000 
CS 82.780 23.108 12.833 1 .000 
TCR 35.752 10.919 10.720 1 .001 
LR -12.684 4.140 9.388 1 .002 
16(A+) EM 1.745 .550 10.069 1 .002 
CS 60.483 33.324 3.294 1 .070 
TCR 29.639 11.460 6.689 1 .010 
LR -11.035 4.601 5.752 1 .016 
 
 
Table 4.18: Parameter estimates for all financial categories’ model with dummies (Model 2) 
FSR Variable B Std. Error Wald df Sig. 
9(BB) AU -149.516 40.880 13.377 1 .000 
LLPTL 127.493 75.867 2.824 1 .093 
TCR -24.800 15.015 2.728 1 .099 
LLRIL -6.468 2.357 7.529 1 .006 
CS -108.565 27.741 15.316 1 .000 
EM 1.699 .434 15.325 1 .000 
LLRGL 100.356 26.518 14.322 1 .000 
CIR 12.004 6.088 3.887 1 .049 
LR 12.879 7.323 3.093 1 .079 
10(BB+) SR -1.264 .438 8.340 1 .004 
ECE -20.493 6.187 10.971 1 .001 
AU -194.027 38.314 25.645 1 .000 
LLPTL 259.671 88.060 8.695 1 .003 
LLRIL -5.862 1.470 15.912 1 .000 
CS -121.947 27.092 20.262 1 .000 
EM 1.503 .416 13.066 1 .000 
LLRGL 98.376 26.338 13.952 1 .000 
CIR 9.822 6.051 2.635 1 .100 
LR 14.090 6.634 4.510 1 .034 
11(BBB-) SR -1.747 .418 17.457 1 .000 
ECE -13.990 4.451 9.879 1 .002 
AU -114.580 35.335 10.515 1 .001 
LLPTL 130.131 74.688 3.036 1 .081 
CS -172.460 29.070 35.195 1 .000 
EM 2.048 .447 20.977 1 .000 
LLRGL 103.496 26.171 15.639 1 .000 
CIR 9.984 5.225 3.652 1 .056 
LR 22.684 5.883 14.867 1 .000 
12(BBB) SR -1.237 .395 9.797 1 .002 
ECE -11.250 3.899 8.326 1 .004 
AU -98.684 31.660 9.716 1 .002 
LLPTL 138.669 74.001 3.511 1 .061 
TCR -26.943 13.648 3.897 1 .048 
LLRIL -2.140 .643 11.093 1 .001 
CS -139.804 28.108 24.738 1 .000 
EM 2.043 .447 20.919 1 .000 
LLRGL 75.979 25.901 8.605 1 .003 
LR 22.295 5.536 16.221 1 .000 
13(BBB+) SR .978 .396 6.088 1 .014 
ECE 16.541 4.186 15.618 1 .000 
AU 117.914 32.306 13.322 1 .000 
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TCR 27.361 14.095 3.768 1 .052 
LLRIL .940 .571 2.708 1 .100 
CS 124.727 29.556 17.809 1 .000 
EM 1.874 .476 15.483 1 .000 
LLRGL -46.658 27.345 2.911 1 .088 
LR -19.001 5.649 11.314 1 .001 
14(A-) SR 1.091 .390 7.842 1 .005 
ECE 17.899 3.923 20.818 1 .000 
LLPTL -135.646 72.590 3.492 1 .062 
CS 126.343 29.128 18.814 1 .000 
EM 1.743 .479 13.221 1 .000 
LLRGL -70.906 25.551 7.701 1 .006 
LR -17.714 5.349 10.968 1 .001 
15(A) SR 1.320 .382 11.924 1 .001 
ECE -13.337 3.813 12.235 1 .000 
TME 20.538 10.943 3.522 1 .061 
TCR 28.233 13.062 4.672 1 .031 
CS 112.103 27.962 16.073 1 .000 
EM 1.984 .447 19.693 1 .000 
LR -20.234 5.249 14.862 1 .000 
16(A+) TME 43.130 18.514 5.427 1 .020 
TCR 35.110 13.878 6.400 1 .011 
EM 1.712 .607 7.963 1 .005 
LLRGL -47.169 26.310 3.214 1 .073 
LR -13.160 5.432 5.869 1 .015 
As shown in tables 4.17 and 4.18, the reported significant predictors are not determinants of 
every bank FSR. The forward stepwise algorithm helps show the significant financial 
predictor(s) for each FSR individually. Moreover, the trend (either positive or negative) of 
each predictor may vary across FSRs. This result carries important implications to bank 
managers when planning for improving bank FSRs using all financial and non-financial 
predictors. That is, bank FSR may require an increase (or decrease) in a certain predictor. In 
terms of assessing the robustness of an estimate, if the estimate of a predictor is associated 
with the same trend and significance across all FSRs, the estimate of this predictor is to be 
considered fragile. That is, bank managers will not be able to use that predictor to plan for an 
improvement in the probability of moving from a current to subsequent bank FSR.   
As shown in Table 4.17, CS has negative and statistically significant coefficients at the 1% 
level for BB, BB+, BBB- and BBB ratings. Also, CS has positive and statistically significant 
coefficients at the 1% level for BBB+, A- and A ratings and at the 10% level for A+ ratings. 
The negative sign associated with the predictor estimates confirms that low- and near-low-
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FSR banks in the Middle East are undercapitalised. On the contrary, the positive sign 
associated with the predictor estimates validates that high- and near-high-FSR banks are well 
capitalised.  
This finding act is in accordance with results reported for the capital adequacy and credit risk 
categories. Table 4.18 shows that CS has a negative and statistically significant coefficient at 
the 1% level for low- and near-low-FSR banks (e.g., BB, BB+, BBB- and BBB ratings). In 
addition, CS has positive and statistically significant coefficients at the 1% level for high- and 
near-high-FSR banks (e.g., BBB+, A- and A ratings). This finding is in harmony with results 
reported for Model 1.  
Table 4.17 indicates that LLRGL has positive and statistically significant coefficients at the 
1% level for low- and near-low-FSR banks (e.g., BB, BB+, BBB- and BBB ratings). Also, 
LLRGL has a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for A- ratings 
and at 10% for BBB+ ratings. This finding is consistent with results reported for the credit 
risk category. The positive sign associated with the predictor estimates means that low- and 
near-low-FSR banks have poor quality loan portfolios. On the other hand, the negative sign 
associated with the predictor estimates implies that near-high-FSR banks are more 
conservative about selling loans and thus have better quality loan portfolios.  
As mentioned previously, this argument is supported by the fact that the average rate of 
LLRGL for high- and near-high-FSR banks (4.37%) is less than that of low- and near-low-
FSR banks (11.11%). It also can be observed in Table 4.18 that LLRGL has a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for low- and near-low-FSR banks (i.e., BB, 
BB+, BBB- and BBB ratings). On the contrary, LLRGL has a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient at the 1% level for A- ratings and at the 10% level for BBB+ and A+ 
ratings. This finding is compatible with results reported for Model 1. The negative sign 
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associated with the predictor estimates indicates that high- and near-high-FSR banks 
implement conservative policies and strategies to amass high quality loan portfolios. Thus, 
lower loan loss reserve is needed.  
As shown in Table 4.17, TME has a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% 
level for BB, BBB- and BBB ratings and at the 10% level for BB+ ratings. Also, TME has a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 10% level for BBB+ ratings. This 
finding validates results reported for the profitability category. The negative sign associated 
with the predictor estimates shows that low- and near-low-FSR banks inefficiently use 
security gains or losses and other tax-management tools (e.g., purchase of tax-exempt bonds) 
to minimise banks’ tax exposure. On the contrary, the positive sign associated with the 
predictor estimates indicates that near-high-FSR banks allocate more funds to invest in tax-
exempt financial assets to reduce tax exposure. Table 4.18 shows that TME has a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient at the 5% level for A+ ratings and at the 10% level for A 
ratings. The positive sign associated with the predictor estimates indicates that high-FSR 
banks are capable of minimising their tax exposure and hence generating higher profits than 
low- and near-low-FSR banks.  
As shown in Table 4.17, ECE has a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% 
level for BB+ and BBB- ratings and at the 5% level for BBB ratings. Also, ECE has a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for BBB+, A- and A ratings. 
The negative sign associated with the predictor estimates indicates that low- and near-low-
FSR banks are not expert in reducing bank operating expenses. However, the positive sign 
associated with the predictor estimates implies that high- and near-high-FSR banks 
implement advanced strategies and policies that assist in reducing operating expenses.  
162 
 
As earlier mentioned, one of these strategies and policies is the introduction of automation 
systems and mergers and acquisition actions to eliminate overlapping facilities. Finally, this 
finding complies with results reported for the profitability category. In line with this, Table 
4.18 shows that ECE has a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for 
low- and near-low-FSR banks (e.g., BB+, BBB- and BBB ratings). On the other hand, ECE 
has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for high- and near-high-
FSR banks (e.g., BBB+, A- and A ratings). This finding supports the results reported for 
Model 1.  
Table 4.17 shows that TCR has a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% 
level for BBB ratings, the 5% level for BB ratings and at the 10% level for BBB- ratings. In 
addition, TCR has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for BBB+, 
A and A+ ratings and at the 10% level for A- ratings. The negative sign associated with the 
predictor estimates confirms that low- and near-low-FSR banks in the Middle East are 
undercapitalised. On the contrary, the positive sign associated with the predictor estimates 
confirms that high- and near-high-FSR banks are well capitalised and intend to comply with 
the Basel agreements (i.e., Basel I, II and III). This finding is in line with results reported for 
the capital adequacy category. In agreement with this, Table 4.18 shows that TCR has a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 5% level for BBB ratings and at the 
10% level for BB ratings. Also, TCR has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at 
the 5% level for A and A+ ratings and at the 10% level for BBB+ ratings. This finding is in 
agreement with results reported for Model 1.     
Table 4.17 indicates that AU has a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% 
level for low- and near-low-FSR banks (i.e., BB, BB+, BBB- and BBB ratings). Also, AU 
has a positive and statistically coefficient at the 1% level for BBB+ ratings. This finding is 
compatible with results reported for the profitability category. The negative sign associated 
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with the predictor estimates provides further evidence about the incapability of low- and near-
low-FSR banks to implement efficient portfolio management policies, especially the mix and 
yield on assets. However, the positive sign associated with the predictor estimate implies that 
near-high-FSR banks have succeeded in generating maximum amounts of operating revenue 
from the available mix of assets. Consistent with this, Table 4.18 shows that AU has a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for low- and near-low-FSR 
banks (i.e., BB, BB+, BBB- and BBB ratings). In additional, AU has a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for BBB+ ratings. This finding is 
compatible with results reported for Model 1.   
It can be observed in Table 4.17 that EM has a positive and statistically significant coefficient 
at the 1% level for BB, BB+, BBB-, BBB, BBB+, A-, A and A+ ratings. This finding is in 
agreement with results reported for the capital adequacy category. The positive sign 
associated with the predictor estimates indicates that banks in the Middle East depend heavily 
on debt financing rather than equity financing regardless of their assigned FSRs. This is 
supported by the fact that the historical evolvement of the banking industry in the Middle 
East has relied mainly on government funding as its main source of equity financing as a 
substitute for the absence of stock markets in the region during this period. Accordingly, 
Table 4.18 indicates that EM has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% 
level for BB, BB+, BBB-, BBB, BBB+, A-, A and A+ ratings. This finding is in harmony 
with results reported for Model 1.    
Table 4.17 shows that CIR has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% 
level for BB and BBB- ratings and at the 5% level for BB+ and BBB ratings. CIR is 
insignificant for high- and near-high-FSR banks. The positive sign associated with the 
predictor estimates indicates that low- and near-low-FSR banks implement inadequate 
strategies to control cost-side activities relative to the generated-income side. It seems that 
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low- and near-low-FSR banks depend entirely on older, labour-based production and delivery 
systems and hence incur higher overhead and costs (i.e., salaries). This finding confirms 
results reported by Pasiouras et al. (2006) and Van-Roy (2006). Similarly, Table 4.18 shows 
that CIR has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 5% level for BB ratings 
and at the 10% level for BB+ and BBB- ratings. This finding is in agreement with results 
reported for Model 1. 
As shown in Table 4.17, LR has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% 
level for BB and BBB ratings and at the 5% level for BBB- ratings. Also, LR has a negative 
and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for BBB+ and A ratings and at the 5% 
level for A- and A+ ratings. In line with Poon et al. (2009), the positive sign associated with 
the predictor estimates indicates that low- and near-low-FSR banks in the Middle East sell 
larger amounts of poor quality loans at the expense of their safe liquidity positions. On the 
contrary, the negative sign associated with the predictor estimates signifies that high- and 
near-high-FSR banks do not depend entirely on the sale of loans as their main source of 
revenue. It seems that high- and near-high-FSR banks invest in financial activities to maintain 
good liquidity positions. These financial activities withstand sudden withdrawals of 
customers and short-term funding and also yield high returns.  
As previously noted, the importance of this ratio has increased significantly since the global 
financial crisis and Basel III proposed new liquidity requirements to rectify liquidity position 
within banking industry. In line with this, Table 4.18 reveals that LR has a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for BBB- and BBB ratings, at the 5% level 
for BB+ ratings and at the 10% level for BB ratings. Moreover, LR has a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for BBB+, A- and A ratings and at the 5% 
level for A+ ratings. This finding is consistent with results reported for Model 1.  
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As revealed in Table 4.17, LLPTL has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 
10% level for BB+ ratings. The positive sign associated with the predictor estimates denotes 
that low-FSR banks have poor loan portfolio quality. Accordingly, low-FSR banks are forced 
to forecast higher estimates of annual provisions relative to total loan portfolio to mitigate 
future expected loan losses. As seen in Table 4.18, LLPTL has a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient at the 1% level for BB+ ratings and at the 10% level for BB, BBB- and 
BBB ratings. On the contrary, LLPTL has a negative and statistically significant coefficient at 
the 10% level for A- ratings. The negative sign associated with the predictor estimates 
implies that near-high-FSR banks are more cautious about their loan portfolio quality and 
thus loan issuance is rigorously monitored and regulated. Consequently, the proportion of 
annual loan loss provisions to total loan portfolio decreases significantly. This result in a 
lower credit risk that eventually boosts assigned FSRs. This finding is compatible with the 
nature of bank operating activities as well as results reported for the credit risk category. 
As shown in Table 4.17, LLRIL has a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 
1% level for BB, BB+ and BBB ratings and at the 5% level for BBB- ratings. In addition, 
LLRIL has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 10% level for BBB+ and 
A- ratings. The negative sign associated with the predictor estimates confirms that low- and 
near-low-FSR banks do not accumulate an appropriate amount of reserve (either legal or 
general) to compensate for high balances of impaired loans. Accordingly, the value of bank 
asset quality declines over time and thus bank FSR deteriorates. 
 On the contrary, the positive sign associated with the predictor estimates implies that high- 
and near-high-FSR banks are more enthusiastic and cautious about reserve accumulation than 
low- and near-low-FSR banks. Eventually, this enhances the value of bank asset quality and 
therefore bank FSR improves. According to this, Table 4.18 shows that LLRIL has a negative 
and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for BB, BB+ and BBB ratings. In 
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addition, LLRIL has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 10% level for 
BBB+ ratings. This finding is in harmony with results reported for Model 1.  
Table 4.17 shows that NIEAA has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 5% 
level for BB ratings. The positive sign associated with the predictor estimates indicates that 
low-FSR banks suffer from inefficient control over the cost side (overhead plus loan loss 
provisions) of bank activities relative to assets invested. This finding is line with results 
reported for CIR and ECE ratios.    
Table 4.18 indicates that SR has negative and statistically significant coefficients at the 1% 
level for low- and near-low-FSR banks (i.e., BB+, BBB- and BBB ratings). Also, SR has a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level for A and A- ratings and at the 
5% level for BBB+ ratings. This finding validates results reported for the asset quality, capital 
adequacy, credit risk, liquidity and profitability categories. The negative (positive) sign 
associated with the predictor estimates implies that banks operating in countries with poor 
(good) macroeconomic factors are assigned low- and near-low (high- and near-high) FSRs.  
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter reveals the most consistent and significant financial and nonfinancial variables 
that are associated with high- and near-high FSRs assigned by CI to banks in the Middle East 
region. In practice, bank managers as well as stockholders need to focus on the major banking 
activities and measures (e.g., asset quality, capital adequacy, credit risk, liquidity and 
profitability) that help achieve high- and near-high FSRs. This understanding is supported by 
the fact that each RA has its own customised rating system the details of which are not 
published.  
Practitioners as well as researchers can benefit from the information in this chapter as it may 
help them to design and adjust financial strategies that enable banks in the Middle East 
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achieve high- and near-high FSRs. Banks that seek high- and near-high FSRs should improve 
their asset quality, profitability and capital adequacy and reduce credit and liquidity risks. In 
particular, banks in the Middle East should focus on reducing LLRGL, LLPTL, LR, CIR and 
NIEAA and increasing LLRIL, CS, TCR, TME, ECE and AU. It should also be noted that 
bank profitability is associated with the highest relative explanatory power in comparison to 
all other categories. This implies that the CI rating process depends heavily on assessments of 
bank profitability measures.  
This chapter concludes that the addition of nonfinancial variables improves the explanatory 
power of ML models. The empirical results reveal that a nonfinancial variable, namely SR, 
plays a crucial role in determining bank FSRs issued by CI in the Middle East. That is, banks 
that operate in countries with a high SR are assigned high- and near-high FSRs and vice-
versa.  
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CHAPTER 5 PREDICTIVE TECHNIQUES RESULTS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter constructs bank FSR group membership models for banks in the Middle East 
using three machine-learning techniques—CHAID, CART and MLP neural networks—and 
two conventional techniques—DA and LR. The reasons for the use of various statistical 
techniques is to (1) examine whether various results for ACC rates, EMCs and gains charts 
are achieved; (2) investigate the effects of various data sets, namely the entire data set (351 
observations), subsample1 (67% training, 235 observations and 33% testing; 116 
observations) and subsample2 (2001-2006 training, 235 observations and 2007-2009 testing; 
116 observations) for ACC rates and EMCs; (3) provide the practitioners and researchers 
with a wide range of bank FSR group membership models that help evaluate the predictive 
ability of various statistical techniques. 
The researcher used 17 financial and nonfinancial variables to predict and discriminate bank 
FSR group membership. The researcher removed the variables associated with high volumes 
of missing data. The issue of multicollinearity also is addressed using VIF and a correlation 
matrix. The variables examined in this chapter are as follows. 
(1) LLPNIR, LLRIL and ILGL as proxies for asset quality; 
(2) TCR, CS, ENL and EM as proxies for capital adequacy; 
(3) NIM, NIEAA, REP, AU and TME as proxies for profitability; 
(4) LLPTL as a proxy for credit risk;  
(5) LADSTF as a proxy for liquidity; and 
(6) SR, size and time as proxies for nonfinancial variables. 
The two bank FSR group memberships are mainly high FSR (172 observations) and low FSR 
(179 observations). The PASW® Modeler 14 was used to run the proposed bank FSR group 
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membership models. This chapter concludes with a comparison of all statistical predictive 
techniques using different data sets and applying the ACC rate and EMC criteria to provide a 
sensitivity analysis of the obtained results. 
5.2 CHAID 
In this section, all CHAID bank FSR group membership models are built using the entire data 
set (351 observation), subsample1 (67% training, 235 observations and 33% testing; 116 
observations) and subsample2 (2001-2006 training, 235 observations and 2007-2009 testing; 
116 observations). 
5.2.1 Entire data set 
The PASW® Modeler 14 was used to design the CHAID bank FSR group membership model 
using the entire data set and the 17 independent variables. The reason for using the entire data 
set to build the proposed model is to enable comparison of the results with those of other 
statistical techniques (i.e., conventional and machine-learning) used in this thesis.  
Table 5.1: Classification results for CHAID using entire data set 
Actual Group Membership No. of Cases Predicted Group Membership 
  High FSR Low FSR 
High FSR 172 166 6 
  96.5% 3.5% 
Low FSR 179 
7 172 
3.9% 96.1% 
Source: Developed by the researcher (based on the statistical output). 
 
Table 5.1 summarises the results for the CHAID bank FSR group membership model using 
the entire data set. It can be observed that the ACC rate is 96.3% ((166+172)/351), which is 
the highest ACC rate of all of the conventional and machine-learning statistical techniques 
employed in this thesis to predict bank FSR group membership. Additionally, of the 172 high 
FSRs, 166 (96.5%) were predicted to be high FSRs. The predictive accuracy for low FSRs is 
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96.1% (172/179), which is similar to the figure for high FSRs. The EMC associated with this 
model is relatively inexpensive (0.256) basically because of a low Type II error rate (3.9%).    
5.2.2 Subsample1: 67% training subsample and 33% testing subsample 
Following the same method applied to the entire data set, the CHAID bank FSR group 
membership model utilises all the 17 of the financial and nonfinancial variables to build a 
model using training subsample1. This is followed by testing the predictive power using 
testing subsample1.   
Table 5.2: Classification results for CHAID using training subsample1 
Actual Group Membership No. of Cases Predicted Group Membership 
  High FSR Low FSR 
High FSR 114 110 4 
  96.5% 3.5% 
Low FSR 121 
2 119 
1.7% 98.7% 
Source: Developed by the researcher (based on the statistical output). 
 
Table 5.2 summarises the classification results for training subsample1 using the CHAID 
decision-tree technique. The classification matrix in Table 5.2 shows that the ACC rate for 
training subsample1, for which data are used to fit a model, is 97.4% ((110+119)/235), which 
is somewhat higher than that of the entire data set (96.3%). Also, the predictive accuracy for 
low FSRs (98.7%) is superior to that for high FSRs (96.5%). Finally, the EMC associated 
with the CHAID model using the training subsample1 is 0.119, which is inexpensive EMC 
because of the minimal percentage of Type II errors (1.7%). 
Table 5.3: Classification results for CHAID using testing subsample1 
Actual Group Membership No. of Cases Predicted Group Membership 
  High FSR Low FSR 
High FSR 58 48 10 
  82.8% 17.2% 
Low FSR 58 
4 54 
6.9% 93.1% 
Source: Developed by the researcher (based on the statistical output). 
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The results reported in Table 5.3 indicate that the ACC rate for testing subsample1, for which 
the data were used only to test the predictive power of the model, is 87.9% ((48+54)/116). 
The CHAID model predicts low FSRs (93.1%) better than high FSRs (82.8%). The EMC for 
testing subsample1 is 0.5, which is more costly than that for the entire data set and training 
subsample1 as a result of high Type I and II error rates associated with testing subsample1.  
5.2.3 Subsample2: 2001-2006 training subsample and 2007-2009 testing subsample 
In this section, the CHAID bank FSR group membership model is developed using training 
subsample2 and testing subsample2. Using the same 17 financial and nonfinancial variables, 
training subsample2 is used to build the CHAID bank FSR group membership model and 
testing subsample2 is employed to test the model’s predictive power.  
Table 5.4: Classification results for CHAID using training subsample2 
Actual Group Membership No. of Cases Predicted Group Membership 
  High FSR Low FSR 
High FSR 105 100 5 
  95.2% 4.8% 
Low FSR 130 
1 129 
0.8% 99.2% 
Source: Developed by the researcher (based on the statistical output). 
 
Table 5.4 shows the results for CHAID bank FSR group membership model using training 
subsample2. The ACC rate is 97.4% ((100+129)/235), which is higher than the ACC rate 
using the entire data set (96.3%) and equal to the ACC rate for training subsample1 (97.4%). 
In line with training subsample1, the CHAID model using the training subsample2 predicts 
low FSRs (99.2%) better than high FSRs (95.2%). The EMC for training subsample2 is 
0.0723, which is inexpensive mainly because of an insignificant Type II error rate (0.8%). 
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Table 5.5: Classification results for CHAID using testing subsample2 
Actual Group Membership No. of Cases Predicted Group Membership 
  High FSR Low FSR 
High FSR 67 61 6 
  91% 9% 
Low FSR 49 
7 42 
14.3% 85.7% 
Source: Developed by the researcher (based on the statistical output). 
 
As indicated in Table 5.5, the CHAID bank FSR group membership model using testing 
subsample2 predicts high FSRs (91%) better than low FSRs (85.7%), which is different from 
the result reported previously for testing subsample1. The ACC rate using testing subsample2 
is 88.8% ((61+42)/116), which is more or less equal to the ACC rate using testing subsample1 
(87.9%).  
As illustrated in Figure 5.1, the similarity in the ACC rates between both testing subsamples 
can be observed in the gains charts for testing subsample1 and subsample2, respectively. The 
EMC for testing subsample2 is 0.776, which is more costly than that for testing subsample1 
(0.5). This is supported by the fact that Type II error rates associated with testing subsample2 
(14.3%) are almost double than the same rate associated with testing subsample1 (6.9%). 
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Figure 5.1: Gains charts for testing subsample1 and testing subsample2 using CHAID    
 
 
 
5.3 CART 
Following the CHAID method explained earlier and using PASW® Modeler 14, all of the 
selected 17 independent variables were used to build CART bank FSR group membership 
models using the entire data set, subsample1 (67% training and 33% testing) and subsample2 
(2001-2006 training and 2007-2009 testing). 
5.3.1 Entire data set 
CART bank FSR group membership model is designed using the entire data set and the 17 
financial and nonfinancial variables.  
  
174 
 
Table 5.6: Classification results for CART using entire data set 
Actual Group Membership No. of Cases Predicted Group Membership 
  High FSR Low FSR 
High FSR 172 163 9 
  94.8% 5.2% 
Low FSR 179 
7 172 
3.9% 96.1% 
Source: Developed by the researcher (based on the statistical output) 
 
As shown in Table 5.6, the CART model reveals a 95.4% ACC rate ((163+172)/351) using 
the entire data set, which is considered to be the second highest ACC rate across all statistical 
techniques employed in this thesis, after the ACC rate for the CHAID model (96.3%). 
Table 5.6 shows that the CART bank FSR group membership model predicts low FSRs 
(96.1%) somewhat better it predicts high FSRs (94.8%). The EMC associated with the CART 
model using entire data set is 0.265, which is costly than that associated with the CHAID 
model (0.256) using the same data set.   
5.3.2 Subsample1: 67% training subsample and 33% testing subsample 
Following the same method employed for the entire data set, training subsample1 with all 17 
independent variables was used to fit the CART bank FSR group membership model. 
Consequently, testing subsample1 tests the predictive effectiveness of the fitted model. 
Table 5.7: Classification results for CART using training subsample1 
Actual Group Membership No. of Cases Predicted Group Membership 
  High FSR Low FSR 
High FSR 114 111 3 
  97.4% 2.6% 
Low FSR 121 
4 117 
3.3% 96.7% 
Source: Developed by the researcher (based on the statistical output) 
 
Table 5.7 indicates that the ACC rate for training subsample1, for which the data are used to 
build a model, is 97% ((111+117)/235), which is higher than the ACC rate for the entire data 
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set (95.4%). It can be observed that the CART bank FSR group membership model classifies 
high FSRs with slightly better predictive accuracy than it does low FSRs (97.4% and 96.7%, 
respectively). The EMC associated with the CART model for training subsample1 is 0.217, 
which considered more expensive than the EMC associated with CHAID model for the same 
subsample (0.0119). This is supported by the fact that the Type II error rate associate with the 
CART model (3.3%) is almost double the rate associated with CHAID model (1.7%) for  
training subsample1. 
Table 5.8: Classification results for CART using testing subsample1 
Actual Group Membership No. of Cases Predicted Group Membership 
  High FSR Low FSR 
High FSR 58 52 6 
  89.7% 10.3% 
Low FSR 58 
3 55 
5.2% 94.8% 
Source: Developed by the researcher (based on the statistical output). 
 
Table 5.8 summarises the classification results for testing subsample1 using the CART 
technique. The classification matrix in Table 5.8 shows that the ACC rate for testing 
subsample1, for which the data played no role in fitting the model, is 92.2% ((52+55)/116). 
Because CART and CHAID are decision-tree techniques, it is worth noting that the ACC rate 
associated with the CART model is higher than that associated with the CHAID model 
(87.9%) for testing subsample1. This is supported by the fact that the predictive accuracy of 
the CART model for high and low FSRs (89.7% and 94.8%, respectively) is higher than the 
predictive accuracy of the CHAID model for high and low FSRs (82.8% and 93.1%, 
respectively). In line with this, the EMC associated with the CART model (0.362) is less 
costly than the EMC associated with CHAID model (0.5) for testing subsample1. 
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5.3.3 Subsample2: 2001-2006 training subsample and 2007-2009 testing subsample 
In this section, using the same 17 financial and nonfinancial variables, the CART bank FSR 
group membership model is built using training subsample2 and is tested using testing 
subsample2. 
Table 5.9: Classification results for CART using training subsample2 
Actual Group Membership No. of Cases Predicted Group Membership 
  High FSR Low FSR 
High FSR 105 102 3 
  97.1% 2.9% 
Low FSR 130 
4 126 
3.1% 96.9% 
Source: Developed by the researcher (based on the statistical output). 
 
Table 5.9 shows the classification results for training subsample2 using the CART technique. 
Table 5.9 reveals that the ACC rate is 97% ((102+126)/235), which is equal to the ACC rate 
associate with CHAID using the same subsample. Unlike the CHAID model, the predictive 
accuracy of the CART model for high FSRs (97.1%) is somewhat higher than the predictive 
accuracy for low FSRs (96.9%). In line with this, using training subsample2, the EMC 
associated with the CART model (0.217) is more costly than the EMC associated with 
CHAID model (0.072). This is mainly a result of the fact that the Type II error rate for the 
CART model (3.1%) is four times greater than the type II error rate for the CHAID model 
(0.8%).    
Table 5.10: Classification results for CART using testing subsample2 
Actual Group Membership No. of Cases Predicted Group Membership 
  High FSR Low FSR 
High FSR 67 55 12 
  82.1% 17.9% 
Low FSR 49 
8 41 
16.3% 83.7% 
Source: Developed by the researcher (based on the statistical output). 
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From results revealed in Table 5.10, the ACC rate associated with the CART model using the 
testing subsample2 is 82.8% ((55+41)/116). This ACC rate is lower than the ACC rate 
associated with the CHAID model (88.8%) for the same sample. In addition, it is significantly 
lower than the ACC rate associated with the CART model (92.24%) using the testing 
subsample1.  
As shown in Figure 5.2, the difference between CART models using testing subsample1 and 
testing subsample2 can be observed clearly in the graphical analysis. This significant decline 
in the ACC rate is mainly a result of the lower predictive power of the CART model (82.1% 
for high FSRs and 83.7% for low FSRs) using testing subsample2. Accordingly, the EMC 
associated with the CART model using testing subsample2 (0.931) is more expensive than the 
EMC associated with the CHAID model using the same subsample (0.776).   
Figure 5.2: Gains charts for testing subsample1 and testing subsample2 using CART 
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5.4 Multilayer perceptron neural networks 
In this section, MLP models are developed because of the categorical nature of the dependent 
variable. MLP bank FSR group membership models are designed using the same 17 financial 
and nonfinancial variables listed earlier for the entire data set, subsample1 (training and 
testing) and subsample2 (training and testing). 
5.4.1 Entire data set 
The PASW® Modeler 14 was used in this thesis to design the MLP bank FSR group 
membership model using the entire data set and the 17 independent variables.       
Table 5.11: Classification results for MLP neural network using entire data set 
Actual Group Membership No. of Cases Predicted Group Membership 
   High FSR Low FSR 
High FSR 172 158 14 
  91.9% 8.1% 
Low FSR 179 
7 172 
3.9% 96.1% 
Source: Developed by the researcher (based on the statistical output). 
 
Table 5.11 presents the classification results for the MLP bank FSR group membership model 
for the entire data set. Table 5.11 indicates that the ACC rate is 94.02% ((158+172)/351), 
which is the lowest ACC rate across all other machine-leaning techniques employed in this 
thesis to predict banks’ FSR group memberships (i.e., CHAID and CART). Moreover, of the 
172 high FSRs, 158 (91.9%) were predicted to be high FSRs. The predictive accuracy for low 
FSRs is exceptional at 96.1% (172/179). The EMC associated with the MLP model is more 
costly (0.279) than the EMCs associated with other machine-learning techniques, namely, 
CHAID (0.256) and CART (0.265). This is supported by the fact that the Type I error rate is 
significantly higher for the MLP model than for other machine-learning techniques. 
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5.4.2 Subsample1: 67% training subsample and 33% testing subsample 
In line with the same method used in the entire data set MLP section, and using only training 
subsample1, all of the 17 independent variables were used to build the MLP bank FSR group 
membership model. Testing subsample1 was used to test the predictive power of the fitted 
model.   
Table 5.12: Classification results for MLP neural network using training subsample1 
Actual Group Membership No. of Cases Predicted Group Membership 
  High FSR Low FSR 
High FSR 114 110 4 
  96.4% 3.6% 
Low FSR 121 
10 111 
8.3% 91.7% 
Source: Developed by the researcher (based on the statistical output). 
As seen in Table 5.12, the MLP model predicts high FSRs (96.4%) better than it does lower 
FSR banks (91.7%) using training subsample1. Consequently, the ACC rate for training 
subsample1, for which data are used to fit a model, is 94.0% ((110+111)/235), which is lower 
than the ACC rates associated with CHAID (97.4%) and CART (97.02%) using the same 
subsample1.  
Accordingly, the EMC associated with the MLP model using training subsample1 is 0.528. It 
is the most costly EMC of those associated with the two other machine-learning techniques 
using same subsamples1. Apparently, the high Type II error rate (8.3%) associated with the 
MLP model enlarges the overall EMC of the model.  
Table 5.13: Classification results for MLP neural network using testing subsample1 
Actual Group Membership No. of Cases Predicted Group Membership 
  High FSR Low FSR 
High FSR 58 53 5 
        91.4%        8.6% 
Low FSR 58 
11 47 
  19%    81% 
Source: Developed by the researcher (based on the statistical output). 
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Table 5.13 shows the classification results for testing subsample1 using the MLP neural 
network model. The classification matrix in Table 5.13 indicates that the ACC rate for testing 
subsample1, for which the data are used only to test the predictive power of the model, is 
86.21% ((53+47)/116). The MLP neural network model predicts high FSRs (91.4%) better 
than it does low FSRs (81%). The EMC associated with the MLP model using testing 
subsample1 (1.181) is much more expensive than the EMCs associated with CHAID (0.5) and 
CART (0.362) using same testing subsample1. Apparently, the high Type II error rate (19%) 
associated with the MLP model enlarges its EMC. 
5.4.3 Subsample2: 2001-2006 training subsample and 2007-2009 testing subsample 
The same validation technique used for the entire data set and subsample1 is repeated for 
subsample2 using the original 17 independent variables.  
Table 5.14: Classification results for MLP neural network using training subsample2 
Actual Group Membership No. of Cases Predicted Group Membership 
  High FSR Low FSR 
High FSR 105 100 5 
  95.2% 4.8% 
Low FSR 130 
7 123 
5.4% 94.6% 
Source: Developed by the researcher (based on the statistical output). 
 
Table 5.14 summarises the results for MLP bank FSR group membership model using 
training subsample2.The ACC rate using training subsample2 is 94.9% ((100+123)/235), 
which is lower than the ACC rates using same training subsamples2 for both CHAID (97.4%) 
and CART (97.02%). The MLP model, using training subsample2, predicts high FSRs 
(95.2%) better than it does low FSRs (94.6%). The EMC for training subsample2 is 0.379, 
which is significantly more expensive than the EMCs associated with both CHAID (0.072) 
and CART (0.217) using same training subsamples2.   
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Table 5.15: Classification results for MLP neural network using testing subsample2 
Actual Group Membership No. of Cases Predicted Group Membership 
  High FSR Low FSR 
High FSR 67 54 13 
  80.6% 19.4% 
Low FSR 49 
9 40 
18.4% 81.6% 
Source: Developed by the researcher (based on the statistical output) 
 
As shown in Table 5.15, the MLP bank FSR group membership model, using testing 
subsample2, predicts low FSRs (81.6%) slightly better than it does high FSRs (80.6%), which 
is different from results reported previously for testing subsample1. The ACC rate using 
testing subsample2 is 81% ((54+40)/116), which is lower than the ACC rate for testing 
subsample1 (86.21%). This is supported by the fact that the predictive capability of the MLP 
model for high FSRs using testing subsample2 (80.6%) declined significantly in contrast to 
that using testing subsample1 (91.4%).  
As illustrated in Figure 5.3, the difference in the ACC rates between both testing subsamples 
can be observed in the gains charts for testing subsample1 and testing subsample2. Finally, the 
EMC for testing subsample2 is 1.04 that is relatively less costly to that for testing subsample1 
(1.181).  
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Figure 5.3: Gains charts for testing subsample1 and testing subsample2 using MLP neural 
network 
 
5.5 Discriminant analysis  
According to the method adopted in this thesis, one linear discriminating function with its Z 
index (Z model) is derived. This procedure develops a set of discriminating functions that 
helps predict bank FSR group memberships in the Middle East region based on 17 bank 
financial and nonfinancial variables using the entire data set, subsample1 (training and 
testing) and subsample2 (training and testing). 
5.5.1 Entire data set    
The stepwise selection algorithm produces certain significant variables as predictors of 
grouping. The forward stepwise approach ensures that at each step the variable that minimises 
the overall Wilk’s lambda will be entered. The minimum partial F to enter is 3.84, and the 
minimum partial F to remove is 2.71. Prior probabilities are computed from group sizes
68
 and 
                                                 
68
As mentioned earlier, low-FSR banks had 179 observations and high-FSR banks had 172 observations. 
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the covariance matrix is applied within groups. The one discriminating function with p-value 
 0.05 is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. Table 5.16 presents the 
discriminating function with its standardised coefficients for bank financial and nonfinancial 
variables using the entire data set.  
Table 5.16 reports the significant coefficients of bank financial and nonfinancial variables 
that discriminate between high- and low-FSR group memberships using the entire data set. 
The large Eigenvalue (5.018) presented in Table 5.16 indicates that the estimated 
discriminant model has high discriminating ability. A canonical correlation of 0.913 suggests 
that the model explains 83.4% of the variation in the grouping variables. A small value for 
Wilk’s lambda (0.166) means that only 16.6% of the total variability is unexplained.  
The results show that eight financial and three nonfinancial variables are statistically 
significant. The financial variables are the ratio of loan loss provision to net interest revenue 
(LLPNIR) and the ratio of impaired loans to gross loans (ILGL) as proxies for the asset 
quality category; bank CS, total capital ratio (TCR) and the ratio of equity to net loans (ENL) 
as proxies for capital adequacy category; asset utilisation (AU) and the ratio of recurring 
earning power (REP) as proxies for profitability; and the ratio of loan loss provision to total 
loans (LLPTL) as a proxy for credit risk. The nonfinancial variables are bank size, country 
SR and time effect (T).  
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Table 5.16: The components of discriminant model for low-and high-FSR group membership 
Components of the Z model Coefficients
69
 
Bank capital structure (CS) 0.229 
Asset utilisation (AU) 0.602 
Loan loss provision to net interest revenue (LLPNIR) -0.409 
Impaired loans to gross loans (ILGL) -0.367 
Total capital ratio (TCR) 0.380 
Equity to net loans (ENL) 0.464 
Recurring earning power (REP) 0.330 
Loan loss provision to total loans (LLPTL) -0.606 
Country sovereign rating (SR) 0.650 
Size 0.789 
T -0.343 
Eigenvalue
70
 5.018 
% of variance    100% 
Canonical correlation
71
 0.913 
Wilks Lambda
72
 0.166 
2x  428.053
*
 
n 351 
* Significant at the 1% level. 
Source: Developed by the researcher (based on the statistical output). 
 
The results show a considerable degree of consistency as the coefficients of CS, TCR, ENL, 
AU and REP are associated with a positive sign. The positive sign associated with the CS 
coefficient denotes that high-FSR banks are well capitalised. This also is confirmed by the 
positive sign associated with the TCR and ENL coefficients. The positive sign associated 
with the AU coefficient indicates that high-FSR banks efficiently utilise their assets. The 
positive sign associated with the REP coefficient confirms that high-FSR banks generate an 
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 Standardised canonical discriminant function coefficients provide an index of the importance of each variable 
as did the standardised regression coefficients (betas) in multiple regression. The sign indicates the direction of 
the relationship.   
70
 The variance in a set of variables explained by a factor or component and denoted by lambda. An Eigenvalue 
is the sum of squared values in the column of a factor matrix, or 


m
t
kk a
1
2 where aik is the factor loading for 
variable i on factor k, and m is the number of variables. Simply, this figure represents the ratio of the between-
group sums of the square to the within-group sum of squares of the discriminant scores.   
71
 Canonical correlation is the multiple correlations between the variables and the discriminant function.  
72
 Wilk’s Lambda provides a test by which to assess the null hypothesis, which in the population, the vectors of 
means of financial and nonfinancial variables is the same in the two groups. Thus, this figure indicates a highly 
significant function and provides the proportion of total variability not explained (i.e., the converse of the 
squared canonical correlation). 
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appropriate amount of income even after adding provisions for loan losses from their 
available assets.  
On the contrary, the negative signs associated with the LLPTL and LLPNIR coefficients 
suggest that high-FSR banks employ robust credit management techniques and compensate 
large numbers of risky loans with greater interest margins. Consequently, the ratios of loan 
loss provision to either total loans or net interest revenue for high-FSR banks are lower than 
the comparable ratios for low-FSR banks. In line with this, the negative sign associated with 
the ILGL coefficient confirms that high-FSR banks have better quality loan portfolios than 
the low-FSR banks. Consequently, the amount of impaired loans as a percentage of gross 
loans for high-FSR banks is less than the same figure for low-FSR banks. 
With regard to nonfinancial variables, the positive sign associated with the SR coefficient 
implies that high-FSR banks operate in countries associated with relatively stable financial 
and economic conditions (Poon and Firth, 2005; Poon et al., 2009; Van-Roy, 2006). In 
addition, the positive sign associated with the size coefficient indicates that high-FSR banks 
are relatively large in size (Pasiouras et al., 2006). On the contrary, the negative sign 
associated with the coefficient of the time dummy variable implies that FSRs of Middle East 
banks deteriorated slightly during the period from 2001 to 2009.
73
  
Figure 5.4 shows two histograms that illustrate the distribution of discriminant function 
scores for each group membership. The range of scores on the axes, including the means of 
both and the very minimal overlap of the graphs, reveals substantial discriminatory power.
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This implies that the function discriminates well as indicated in Table 5.16. 
                                                 
73
 It is worth mentioning that the stepwise algorithm used in the ML regression produced a positive sign 
associated with the time variable. In terms of robustness, it is evident that the time variable is fragile. That is, the 
decision maker has to exercise caution when using the time variable to make rating decisions.  
74
 An alternative way to interpret the discriminant analysis results is to describe each group in terms of its 
profile, using the group means of the independent variables. These group means are called centroids. That is, 
186 
 
Figure 5.4: Histograms showing the distribution of discriminant scores for low- and high- 
FSR group memberships 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
low-FSR banks have a mean of -2.585 and high-FSR banks have a mean of 1.925. Cases with scores near a 
centroid are predicted to belong to that group. 
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Because the two groups are not in equal size, the estimated prior probability ratios are 0.51 
for group 1 and 0.49 for group 2.
75
 The researcher calculated the cut-off point on the Z-scale 
using the estimated prior probability ratios. The cut-off point on the Z-scale is shown in 
Table 5.17. The cut-off point is calculated as Ln (P1/P2), where P1 = the prior probability of 
low-FSR banks and P2 = the prior probability of high-FSR banks.  
Table 5.17: The cut-off point for low- versus high-FSR group membership 
Prior Probability Low-FSR 
banks 
High-FSR 
banks 
Cut-Off Point 
Bank FSR (low versus high) 0.51 0.49 0.0398 
                                                 
75
 The prior probability ratio is an estimate of the proportion of banks with a ratio profile similar to that of 
groups 1 and 2. 
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5.5.1.1 Relative contribution of the model’s discriminatory power 
The usefulness of DA requires the profile of the final variables to show the relative 
contribution of each variable to the total discriminating power of the Z-score model and the 
interaction between them. The common approach used to assess the relative contribution is 
based on a measurement of the proportion of the Mahalanobis D
2
-distance between the 
centroids of the two constituent groups accounted for by each variable (Mosteller and 
Wallace, 1963; Taffler, 1983).
76
  
Table 5.18: Relative contribution of the models’ discriminatory power 
 
 
 
 
              
             65.5% 
                
 
 
 
 
             
34.5% 
 
Note. * Mosteller-Wallace measure.  
Source: Developed by the researcher (based on the statistical output). 
 
Table5.18 reveals that all financial variables (LLPNIR, ILGL, TCR, CS, ENL, REP, AU and 
LLPTL) contribute to the model’s discriminatory power by 65.5%, and nonfinancial variables 
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Components of the Z model Relative Contribution
*
 
Financial  variables 
Loan loss provision to net interest revenue (LLPNIR) 7.90% 
Impaired loans to gross loans (ILGL) 7.09% 
Total capital ratio (TCR) 7.35% 
Bank capital structure (CS) 4.42% 
Equity to net loans (ENL) 8.98% 
Recurring earning power (REP) 6.39% 
Asset utilisation (AU) 11.65% 
Loan loss provision to total loans (LLPTL) 11.72% 
Nonfinancial variables  
Time effect (T) 6.64% 
Sovereign rating (SR) 12.58% 
Bank size (Size) 15.26% 
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(size, SR and T) contribute to the model’s discriminatory power by 34.5%. This outcome 
shows that financial variables contribute more than nonfinancial variables to the overall 
discriminatory power. This finding implies that bank managers must give relatively higher 
weight to the financial rather than nonfinancial variables when they formulate bank policies 
and strategies.  
For financial variables, LLPTL, AU and ENL have a relatively high contribution to the 
model’s discriminatory power (11.72%, 11.65% and 8.98%, respectively). The overall 
contribution of the three financial variables to bank FSRs is 32.35%. That is, when it comes 
to bank FSRs in the Middle East, RAs depend mainly on the following three aspects: (1) the 
extent to which the banks utilise their available assets efficiently; (2) the extent to which 
banks use leverage to finance their lending activities and (3) the quality of banks’ loan 
portfolios. With regard to nonfinancial variables, bank size and SR contribute much to the 
model’s discriminatory power (15.26% and 12.58%, respectively). This result indicates that 
RAs assign more weight for bank size and country SR in the process of assigning bank FSRs 
in the Middle East.  
5.5.1.2 Classification matrix of discriminant analysis using entire data set 
Table 5.19: Classification results for discriminant analysis using entire data set 
Actual Group Membership No. of Cases Predicted Group Membership 
  High FSR Low FSR 
High FSR 172 166 6 
  96.5% 3.5% 
Low FSR 179 
18 161 
10% 90% 
Source: Developed by the researcher (based on the statistical output). 
 
The final results of the classification matrix using the entire data set are shown in Table 5.19. 
High FSRs are classified with slightly better accuracy (96.5%) than low FSRs (90%). As 
indicated in Table 5.19, Type I and II error rates are less than ACC rates for both levels of 
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low and high FSRs. This is considered to support the relatively high reliability of the 
estimated discriminant models. 
Table 5.19 shows that the model’s classification accuracy reaches a high degree of ACC rate 
and reveals that 93.16% ((161+166)/351) of respondents were classified correctly into high- 
or low-FSR groups. The EMC for the entire data set using DA is 0.632.  
5.5.2 Subsample1: 67% training subsample and 33% testing subsample 
Following the same method used for the entire data set, training subsample1 with all 17 
financial and nonfinancial variables is used to build the DA bank FSR group membership 
model. Tests of subsample1 check the predictive effectiveness of the fitted model.  
Table 5.20: Classification results for discriminant analysis using training subsample1 
Actual Group 
Membership 
No. of 
Cases 
Predicted Group 
Membership 
  High FSR Low FSR 
High FSR 114 111 3 
  97.4% 2.6% 
Low FSR 121 
11 110 
9.1% 90.9% 
Source: Developed by the researcher (based on the statistical output). 
 
 
Table 5.20 summarises the classification results for training subsample1 using the DA 
technique. In line with the results for the entire data set, high FSRs were classified with 
greater accuracy (97.4 %) than low FSRs (90.9%). From the results reported in Table 5.20, 
the ACC rate for training subsample1, for which the data are used to fit a model, is 94.04% 
((110+111)/235), and the EMC associated with this model using training subsample1 is 0.574. 
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Table 5.21: Classification results for discriminant analysis using testing subsample1 
Actual Group Membership No. of Cases Predicted Group Membership 
  High FSR Low FSR 
High FSR 58 55 3 
  94.8% 5.2% 
Low FSR 58 
13 45 
22.4% 77.6% 
Source: Developed by the researcher (based on the statistical output). 
 
Table 5.21 reports the classification results for testing subsample1, for which the data play no 
role in model-fitting. Along the lines of the entire data set and training subsample1, high FSRs 
are classified with greater accuracy (94.8%) than low FSRs (77.6%). The ACC rate for 
testing subsample1 is 86.21% ((45+55)/116). The EMC for testing subsample1 is 1.37, which 
is costly because of the high type II error rate (22.4%).  
5.5.3 Subsample2: 2001-2006 training subsample and 2007-2009 testing subsample 
The same method used for the entire data set and subsample1 was repeated for subsample2 
using the original 17 financial and nonfinancial variables.  
Table 5.22: Classification results for the discriminant analysis using training subsample2 
Actual Group 
Membership 
No. of 
Cases 
Predicted Group 
Membership 
  High FSR Low FSR 
High FSR 105 104 1 
  99.0% 1% 
Low FSR 130 
14 116 
10.7% 89.2% 
Source: Developed by the researcher (based on the statistical output). 
 
Table 5.22 shows that the ACC rate for training subsample2, in which the data are used to 
build the model, is 93.62% ((116+104)/235). The ACC rates for DA models for the entire 
data set, training subsample1 and training subsample2 are similar. Furthermore, high FSRs 
were classified with much higher accuracy (99%) than low FSRs (89.2%). High-FSR 
classification accuracy percentages are superior to these associated with low FSRs for the 
same three samples. The EMC associated with training subsample2 is relatively costly (0.719) 
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compared to that for training subsample1 (0.574). This is supported by the fact that the Type 
II error rate for the training subsample2 (10.7%) is slightly greater than that of training 
subsample1 (9.1%). 
Table 5.23: Classification results for discriminant analysis using testing subsample2 
Actual Group Membership No. of Cases Predicted Group Membership 
  High FSR Low FSR 
High FSR 67 59 8 
  88.1% 11.9% 
Low FSR 49 
1 48 
2% 98% 
Source: Developed by the researcher (based on the statistical output). 
 
 
Table 5.23 presents the classification results for testing subsample2, i.e.  for which the data 
play no role for building the model. Unlike results reported earlier under the entire data set 
and testing subsample1, low-FSR is classified with superior accuracy (98%) than high-FSR 
(88.1%). The ACC rate for the testing subsample2 is 92.24% ((48+59)/116). That is, testing 
subsample2 performs better in terms of correct classification and prediction accuracy than 
testing subsample1.  
In line with this, the EMC associated with testing subsample2 (0.172) is significantly lower 
than that associated with testing subsample1 (1.37). This is mainly because, as shown in Table 
5.23, type I error rate exceeds type II error rate and thus reduces the misclassification cost for 
testing subsample2 relative to that of testing subsample1. Differences between testing 
subsample1 and testing subsample2 can be observed in the graphical analysis in Figures 5.5.    
Figure 5.5 presents the gains charts for testing subsample1 and testing subsample2 using 
discriminant analysis. It is obvious that the gains curve for testing subsample2 is steeper than 
that for testing subsample1. This finding is supported by the fact that the ACC for testing 
subsample2 (92.24%) is better than the ACC for testing subsample1 (86.21%).   
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Figure 5.5: Gains charts for testing subsample1 and testing subsample2 using discriminant 
analysis   
 
 
5.6 Logistic regression 
LR models are developed to describe the relationship between the categorical dependent 
variable (high-FSR versus low-FSR banks) and the 17 financial and nonfinancial variables 
using the entire data set, subsample1 (training and testing) and subsample2 (training and 
testing). 
5.6.1 Entire data set 
Following the LR method explained earlier and using the PASW® Modeler 14, the forward 
stepwise approach was employed to build LR bank FSR group membership models using the 
entire data set. The statistical characteristic of model fitting (see Appendix D) shows that the 
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final model is significant at the 1% level (χ2 = 324.936; df = 18) and thus confirms a 
statistically significant relationship between the variables at the 99% confidence level.  
Table 5.24: Classification results for LR using entire data set 
Actual Group Membership No. of Cases Predicted Group Membership 
   High FSR Low FSR 
High FSR 172 140 32 
  81.4% 18.6% 
Low FSR 179 
61 118 
34.1% 65.9% 
Source: Developed by the researcher (based on the statistical output). 
 
 
Table 5.24 reports the results of the LR bank FSR group membership model for the entire 
data set. The LR model reveals a 73.5% ACC rate ((140+118)/351), which is the lowest ACC 
rate across all of the statistical techniques (i.e., conventional and machine-learning) used in 
this thesis. As shown in Table 5.24, the LR model predicts high FSRs (81.4%) better than it 
does low FSRs (65.9%). The EMC associated with LR model using the entire data set is 
2.177, which is the most expensive EMC across all of the statistical techniques used in this 
thesis. This is mainly a result of high Type II errors associated with the LR model. 
5.6.2  Subsample1: 67% training subsample and 33% testing subsample 
The main objective of this section is to examine whether different results in terms of ACC 
rates and EMCs are achieved using different sample sizes. Following the same method 
employed for the entire data set, training subsample1 with all 17 independent variables is used 
to fit the LR bank FSR group membership model. Subsequently, testing subsample1 tests the 
predictive effectiveness of the fitted model. 
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Table 5.25: Classification results for LR using training subsample1 
Actual Group Membership No. of Cases Predicted Group Membership 
  High FSR Low FSR 
High FSR 114 111 3 
  97.4% 2.6% 
Low FSR 121 
22 99 
18.2% 81.8% 
Source: Developed by the researcher (based on the statistical output). 
 
 
As revealed in Table 5.25, the ACC rate for training subsample1, for which data are used to 
building a model, is 89.36%, which is higher than the ACC rate for the entire data set 
(73.5%). It can be observed that the LR bank FSR group membership model classifies high 
FSRs with greater predictive accuracy than it does low FSRs (97.4% and 81.8%, 
respectively).  
The EMC associated with the LR model for training subsample1 is 1.136, which is almost 
double the EMC associated with discriminant analysis model for the same subsample (0.574). 
This is supported by the fact that the Type II error rate associated with the LR model (18.1%) 
is almost double the same rate associated with the DA model (9.1%) using training 
subsample1. 
Table 5.26: Classification results for LR using testing subsample1 
Actual Group Membership No. of Cases Predicted Group Membership 
  High FSR Low FSR 
High FSR 58 53 5 
  91.4% 8.6% 
Low FSR 58 
12 46 
20.7% 79.3% 
Source: Developed by the researcher (based on the statistical output). 
 
 
Table 5.26 summarises the classification results for testing subsample1 using the LR 
technique. The classification matrix in Table 5.26 shows that the ACC rate for testing 
subsample1, for which data played no role in fitting the model, is 85.34% ((53+46)/116). 
Because DA and LR are conventional techniques, it is worth noting that the ACC rate 
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associated with the DA model (86.21%) is higher than that associated with the LR model 
using testing subsample1.  
Similar to results reported using the entire data set and training subsample1, the predictive 
accuracy of the LR model for predicting high FSRs (91.4%) is higher than for low FSRs 
(79.3%). The EMC associated with the LR model (1.284) is relatively inexpensive compared 
to the EMC associated with the discriminant analysis model (1.37) using same subsample1.  
5.6.3 Subsample2: 2001-2006 training subsample and 2007-2009 testing subsample 
Using the same 17 financial and nonfinancial variables, the LR model in this section is built 
using training subsample2 and is tested using testing subsample2. 
Table 5.27: Classification results for LR using training subsample2 
Actual Group Membership No. of Cases Predicted Group Membership 
  High FSR Low FSR 
High FSR 105 78 27 
  74.3% 25.7% 
Low FSR 130 
61 69 
46.9% 53.1% 
Source: Developed by the researcher (based on the statistical output). 
 
 
Table 5.27 reveals that the ACC rate associated with the LR model using training subsample2 
is 62.55% ((78+69)/235), which is significantly lower than the ACC rate associated with the 
DA using the same subsample. Along the lines of the DA model using training subsample2, 
the predictive accuracy of the LR model for high FSRs (74.3 %) is higher than the predictive 
accuracy for low FSRs (53.1%).  
The EMC associated with the LR model (3.23) is significantly expensive compared to the 
EMC associated with DA model (0.719) using training subsample2.This is mainly a result of 
the fact that the Type II error rate for the LR model (46.9%) is almost five times greater than 
Type II error rate for the DA model (10.7%).    
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Table 5.28: Classification results for LR using testing subsample2 
Actual Group Membership No. of Cases Predicted Group Membership 
  High FSR Low FSR 
High FSR 67 16 51 
  23.9% 76.1% 
Low FSR 49 
19 30 
38.8% 61.2% 
Source: Developed by the researcher (based on the statistical output). 
 
 
As seen in Table 5.28, the ACC rate associated with the LR model using testing subsample2 is 
39.66% ((16+30)/116). Apparently, this ACC rate is the lowest ACC rate across all 
conventional and machine-learning techniques employed in this thesis using any data set. In 
addition, this rate is significantly lower than the ACC rate associated with the LR model 
(85.34%) using testing subsample1. 
 As shown in Figure 5.6, the difference between LR models using testing subsample1 and 
testing subsample2 can be observed clearly in the graphical analysis. For testing subsample2, 
the significant decline in the ACC rate is mainly a result of the lower predictive power of the 
LR model (23.9% for high FSRs and 61.2% for low FSRs). Accordingly, the EMC associated 
with the LR model using testing subsample2 (2.405) is extremely expensive compared to the 
EMC associated with the DA model using same subsample (0.172) and the EMC associated 
with the LR model using testing subsample1 (1.284).    
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Figure 5.6: Gains charts for testing subsample1 and testing subsample2 using LR  
 
5.7 Comparison of results of various bank FSR group membership models 
In this section, the researcher compared the ACC rates of the various models to evaluate the 
classification capability of the proposed models. Table 5.29 summarises the ACC rate results 
for machine-learning techniques (CHAID, CART and MLP neural nets) and conventional 
techniques (DA and LA) using the three different samples [i.e., the entire data set, subsample1 
(training and testing) and subsample2 (training and testing)]. 
Table 5.29 suggests that CHAID has the highest ACC rates (93.6%, 97.4% and 97.4%) 
among all machine-learning and conventional techniques applied in this thesis using the 
entire data set, training subsample1 and training subsample2, respectively. However, using 
testing subsample2, CART has the highest ACC rate (92.2%). For testing subsample2, the 
highest ACC rate is associated with DA (92.2%). All machine-learning techniques predict 
low FSRs better than high FSRs using the entire data set, except one model (i.e., CHAID). On 
the other hand, both conventional techniques (i.e., DA and LR) predict high FSRs better than 
they do low FSRs using the entire data set. 
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Table 5.29: Comparing classification results for various techniques  
Bank FSR Group Membership Model Classification Results 
High FSR % Low FSR % Overall % 
CHAID 
*Entire data set 96.5 96.1 96.3 
Subsample1    
  **   Training  96.5 98.7 97.4 
   Testing 82.2 93.1 87.9 
Subsample2    
   ****   Training 95.2 99.2 97.4 
   Testing 91 85.7 88.8 
CART 
Entire data set 94.8 96.1 95.4 
Subsample1    
   Training  97.4 96.7 97 
***Testing  89.7 94.8 92.2 
Subsample2    
   Training  97.1 96.9 97 
   Testing 83.1 83.7 82.8 
MLP neural nets 
Entire data set 91.9 96.1 94 
Subsample1    
   Training  96.4 91.7 94 
   Testing 91.4 81 86.2 
Subsample2    
   Training 95.2 94.6 94.9 
   Testing 80.6 81.6 81 
DA 
Entire data set 96.5 90 93.2 
Subsample1    
   Training  97.4 90.9 94 
   Testing 94.8 77.6 86.2 
Subsample2    
   Training 99 89.2 93.6 
   *****    Testing 88.1 98 92.2 
LR 
Entire data set 81.4 65.9 73.5 
Subsample1    
   Training  97.4 81.8 89.3 
   Testing 91.4 79.3 85.3 
Subsample2    
   Training 74.3 53.1 62.6 
   Testing 23.9 61.2 39.7 
Source: Developed by the researcher (based on the statistical output). 
Note. * Best of all technique using entire data set; ** Best of all techniques using training subsample1; *** Best 
of all techniques using testing subsample1; **** Best of all techniques using training subsample2; ***** Best of 
all techniques using testing subsample2. 
In line with this, the researcher compared the various models’ EMCs to evaluate the overall 
effectiveness of the techniques and to find the minimum estimated misclassification cost for 
the proposed models. Table 5.30 summarises the Type I and II errors and the EMC for all 
proposed models in this study.  
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Table 5.30: Errors and estimated misclassification costs for all proposed models 
Bank FSR group 
membership models 
Entire data-set Training subsample1 Testing subsample1 Training subsample2 Testing subsample2 
 Error results 
EMC 
Error results 
EMC 
Error results 
EMC 
Error results 
EMC 
Error results 
EMC 
Type I  Type II Type I  Type II Type I Type II Type I Type II Type I Type II 
CHAID 0.035 0.039 0.256 0.035 0.017 0.119 0.172 0.069 0.5 0.048 0.008 0.072 0.09 0.143 0.776 
CART 0.052 0.039 0.265 0.026 0.033 0.217 0.103 0.052 0.362 0.029 0.031 0.217 0.179 0.163 0.931 
MLP neural nets 0.081 0.039 0.279 0.036 0.083 0.528 0.086 0.19 1.181 0.048 0.054 0.379 0.194 0.184 1.04 
DA 0.035 0.10 0.632 0.026 0.091 0.574 0.052 0.224 1.37 0.01 0.107 0.719 0.119 0.02 0.172 
LR 0.186 0.341 2.177 0.026 0.182 1.136 0.086 0.207 1.284 0.257 0.469 3.23 0.761 0.388 2.405 
Source: Developed by the researcher (based on the statistical output). 
Note. The ratio of EMC associated with Type I and Type II errors provides a sensitivity analysis using cost ratio at 1:12. This high cost ratio is mainly a result of the high political risk of 
countries in the Middle East region. 
 
Table 5.30 reports that CART, MLP neural nets, DA and LR predict low FSRs much better than high FSRs using the entire data set. This is mainly 
because Type I errors of these four techniques are higher than Type II errors. In contrast, CHAID predicts high FSRs better than it does low FSRs as Type 
I errors are smaller than Type II error. Additionally, Table 5.30 reveals that the three machine-learning technique (i.e., CHAID, CART and MLP neural 
nets) have lower EMCs than do the conventional techniques (i.e., DA and LR) using the entire data set.  
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Furthermore, the results show that CHAID has the lowest EMC at 0.256 across all proposed 
models (conventional and machine-learning techniques) using the entire data set, as the Type 
I error rate is the lowest compared to other machine-learning techniques (i.e., CART and 
MLP neural nets). This supported by the fact that the ACC rate criterion also resulted in 
selection of CHAID at 96.3% using the entire data set (see Table 5.29).   
For training subsample1, the Type II error rates exceed Type I error rates, as in the case of 
CART, MLP neural nets, DA and LR. Correspondingly, the Type I error rate surpasses the 
Type II error rate only in the case of CHAID .The lowest misclassification cost is 0.119 for 
CHAID across all proposed models using training subsample1. It is worth mentioning that 
CHAID has the highest ACC rate at 97.4% using training subsample1 (see Table 5.29). This 
is not the case for testing subsample1, for which Type I error rates outstrip Type II error rates, 
as in the case of CHAID and CART; the lowest EMC is 0.362 for CART across all proposed 
models. This is confirmed by the highest ACC rate at 92.2% associated with CART using 
testing subsample1 (see Table 5.29). Furthermore, where the Type II error rates exceed the 
Type I error rates, as for MLP neural nets, DA and LR; the lowest EMC is 1.181 for MLP 
neural nets. 
For training subsample2, CHAID’s Type I error is higher than its Type II error with the 
lowest EMC at 0.072 across all proposed models. Again, CHAID has the highest ACC rate at 
97.4% using training subsample2 (see Table 5.29). On the other hand, Type II error rates 
exceed Type I error rates, as for CART, MLP neural nets, DA and LR. Finally, CHAID’s 
Type II error rate exceeds its Type I error rate with EMC at 0.776 using testing subsample2. 
In contrast, Type I error rates are higher than Type II error rates, as for CART, MLP neural 
nets, DA and LR; surprisingly, the lowest EMC is 0.172 for DA across all proposed models 
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using testing subsample2 because of a minimal Type II error rate (see Table 5.30). In line with 
this, the highest ACC rate in this case is for DA at 92.2% (see Table 5.29). 
5.8 Conclusion 
In the last few decades, evaluations of the creditworthiness of banks have become very 
challenging because of the opaqueness of the banking sector and the high variability in 
creditworthiness. The recent financial crisis has provided indications that (1) the banking 
system faces severe problems across different regions, and (2) an effective prediction of the 
correct bank FSR group memberships is becoming a necessity. This chapter presents practical 
knowledge to bank managers in the Middle East region regarding the use of publicly 
available data (i.e., financial and nonfinancial variables) to predict bank FSR group 
membership. The well-known methods of estimation employed in this chapter are machine-
learning techniques (i.e., CHAID, CART and MLP neural nets) and conventional techniques 
(i.e., DA and LR). 
The ranking of the models varies according to the sample considered in the sub-runs. When 
the entire data set, training subsample1 and training subsample2 are considered, CHAID is 
preferred in terms of its association with the highest ACC rate and the lowest EMC across all 
proposed models. As for testing subsample1, CART is associated with the highest ACC rate 
and the lowest EMC. The results also reveal that DA is the best model using testing 
subsample2 as it is associated with the highest ACC rate and lowest EMC because of a 
minimal Type II error rate.  
In general, the researcher concludes that machine-learning techniques (i.e., CHAID, CART 
and MLP neural nets) are superior to conventional techniques (DA and LR) in terms of 
predicting correct bank FSR group memberships in the Middle East region. Interestingly, in 
terms of DA, the researcher also concludes that the relative contribution of financial variables 
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(65.5%) is higher than that of nonfinancial variables (34.5%) in the discriminatory function. 
Accordingly, bank managers must give relatively higher weight to financial over nonfinancial 
variables when formulating bank policies and strategies that promote banks’ high FSRs.  
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION 
6.1 Introduction  
Massive interest over recent decades has been turned toward the relationships between bank 
financial and nonfinancial performance measures and FSRs. RAs stress that their ratings are 
based on opinions about the overall creditworthiness of the obligor (e.g., sovereign, corporate 
or bank) regarding its ability to fulfil its financial obligations. Specifically, bank rating is 
conventionally conducted by external RAs who follow opaque and unpublished methods to 
assign ratings based on banks’ financial and nonfinancial variables. Therefore, a lack of 
consensus is observed regarding the ability of RAs to assign correct bank ratings. Bank FSRs 
are ordinal measures that send signals to market participants about banks’ current and future 
financial positions and their default probability. Bank FSRs have become essential especially 
after the recent financial turmoil. 
Additionally, bank FSRs play a crucial role in relation to the creditworthiness of the financial 
system in the Middle East. A strong bank FSR assists the bank in accessing capital markets in 
better condition and positively affects bank operations and performance. However, RAs face 
difficulties in developing an accurate rating system for banks because of the opacity of and 
the leverage across financial institutions. This understanding is supported by the fact the three 
major RAs (i.e., Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch) disagree more highly when issuing 
bank ratings than when issuing ratings for corporations and countries (Cantor and Packer, 
1994; Hammer et al., 2012; Moon and Stotsky, 1993; Morgan, 2002). Some studies have 
concluded that the opacity of rating processes has resulted in, among other issues, the housing 
bubble and consequently the financial crash of 2007-08 (Bussani, 2010; Diomande et al., 
2009).  
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The relevant literature on bank FSRs also includes an intermediary factor that is bank CS. 
The reason for the involvement of bank CS is that it affects bank FSRs given that the 
adjustment of bank CS is largely controlled by bank supervisory regulations (e.g., Basel I, II 
and III). These regulations have a universal objective, which is to protect bank capital by 
using classified guidance for bank asset quality, capital adequacy, credit risk, liquidity and 
profitability. Therefore, because the sources of bank capital are regulated, bank FSRs are 
implicitly regulated. This understanding requires bank managers to design financial strategies 
that do not deviate from regulations and promote the bank to a high- or near-high FSR. 
The next question that occurs is why one needs to know about bank FSRs specifically in the 
Middle East region. The literature on the determinants and prediction of bank ratings is 
extensive and well established in the developed economies (Belloti et al., 2011a; Hammer et 
al., 2012; Öğüt et al., 2012; Pasiouras et al., 2006; Poon et al., 1999; Poon and Firth, 2005). 
It is worth mentioning that the examination and prediction of bank FSR group membership 
issued by CI is not addressed in the relevant studies in either developed or developing 
economies.  
For the Middle East region, the researcher summarised banking sector  problems as follows: 
(1) Middle Eastern banks’ equity financing has been obtained mainly from governments; (2) 
because most Middle East banks were government banks, there was less need to assess 
banks’ creditworthiness (Harington, 1997). Governments use their banks to finance their 
economic activities to an extent that has caused a disconnection between bank FSR and bank 
CS; (3) The market forces that monitor capital risk were absent as the stock markets were 
underdeveloped or even non-existent in many Middle East countries (Godlewski, 2007). 
This situation has led to less interest in bank FSRs (47.4% of commercial banks—64 out of 
135—are rated); and (4) the opening and development of various stock markets in the region 
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has encouraged many foreign banks to establish businesses in the region, which has driven 
the mostly unrated Middle East banks to performance comparable to that of rated foreign 
banks. 
Given the above problems, it was important to examine the impact of bank CS decisions on 
the assignment of bank FSRs. It was equally important to investigate the association between 
bank FSRs and bank performance in terms of financial and nonfinancial variables. To achieve 
this, the ML technique is used to determine the main financial and nonfinancial variables 
associated with high- and near-high FSRs versus low- and near-low FSRs of active 
commercial banks in the Middle East region. In addition, this thesis identified how bank 
managers and investors in the Middle East region can use publicly available financial and 
nonfinancial data to discriminate between bank FSR group memberships (i.e., high- versus 
low-FSRs).  
This thesis predicted bank FSR group memberships using machine-learning techniques (i.e., 
CHAID, CART and MLP neural nets) and conventional techniques (DA and LR). The reason 
for the use of those statistical techniques is to examine whether various results in terms of 
ACC rates, EMCs and gains charts are achieved; to investigate the effect of different sizes of 
data sets [i.e., the entire data set (351 observations), subsample1 (67% training, 235 
observations and 33% testing, 116 observations) and subsample2 (2001-2006 training, 235 
observations and 2007-2009 testing, 116 observations)] on the ACC rates and EMCs ; and to 
provide practitioners and researchers with a wide range of bank FSR group membership 
models by which to evaluate the predictive ability of various statistical predictive techniques. 
The analysis and the results are further discussed in this chapter, which summarises the 
research findings.  
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To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no other studies in the banking sector in the 
Middle East region have been conducted using conventional and machine-learning techniques 
to predict bank FSR group memberships. Therefore, the current thesis can help bank 
managers understand the intrinsic process used by the analysts of an RA when assigning bank 
FSRs. The main objective is to develop strategies that help improve banks’ FSRs. 
6.2 Summary of research findings 
The results of the financial and nonfinancial characteristics of bank FSRs in the Middle East 
region suggest the conclusions that follow.  
6.2.1 Summary of ML findings 
In this section, the researcher summarises the ML results starting by the bank performance 
financial categories separately and then followed by all financial categories.  
6.2.1.1 Bank performance financial categories 
 For the asset quality category, low- and near-low-FSR banks in the Middle East are 
characterised by selling loans (mostly uncollateralised) according to governmental directions. 
This situation has resulted in an accumulation of mostly nonperforming loans over the years. 
On the contrary, high- and near-high-FSR banks are more conservative about selling loans. 
This argument is supported by the evidence that the average rate of ILGL for low- and near-
low-FSR banks (14%) is much higher than that for high- and near-high-FSR banks (4%).  
The observed evidence is that low- and near-low-FSR banks in the Middle East do not 
accumulate adequate balances of loan loss reserves to compensate for increases in 
nonperforming loans. Consequently, investor confidence about bank asset quality deteriorates 
and bank FSRs assigned by RAs are negatively affected. This result is supported by the fact 
 208 
 
that average rate of LLRIL for high- and near-high-FSR banks (139%) is higher than for low- 
and near-low-FSR banks (90.4%).  
In addition, low-FSR banks accept highly risky loans without proper remuneration in terms of 
margins. Accordingly, bank asset quality deteriorates, which negatively affects the bank’s 
FSR. This finding is intuitive and consistent with Van-Roy (2006) and Pasiouras et al. (2006) 
for the developed economies. On the contrary, high- and near-high-FSR banks in the Middle 
East are well-run banks in terms of compensating highly risky loans with greater interest 
margins. This argument is supported by the fact that average rate of LLPNIR for low- and 
near-low-FSR banks (26.7%) is higher than the same average for high- and near-high-FSR 
banks (17.4%). Finally, it is worth noting that because the two models (e.g., Model 1 and 
Model 2) are significant at 99% confidence level, the alternative hypothesis (HA2) is not 
rejected. 
As for capital adequacy results, low- and near-low-FSR banks in the Middle East are 
undercapitalised and high- and near-high-FSR banks are well capitalised. This debate is 
supported by the fact that the average rate of CS ratio associated with high- and near-high-
FSR banks (12.5%) is higher than the same average rate associated with low- and near-low-
FSR banks (10.9%). This finding is in line with results reported by Pasiouras et al. (2006, 
2007), Belloti et al. (2011a) and Chen (2012).  
Additionally, low-FSR banks are selling more loans (although mostly nonperforming) 
without remuneration in terms of available equity. Conversely, it seems that managers of 
high-FSR banks are firm and strict about maintaining the appropriate amount of equity 
cushion to absorb expected losses on their loan book. This finding validates results reported 
by Poon et al. (2009). 
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Moreover, the researcher noted that managers of low- and near-low-FSR banks in the Middle 
East are not capable of mitigating high risk weighted assets by increasing Tier 1 and Tier 2 
bank capital. On the contrary, high- and near-high-FSR banks maintain an adequate level of 
TCR to satisfy Basel I and II requirements. This debate is supported by the fact that the 
average rate of TCR associated with high- and near-high-FSR banks (20.8%) is higher than 
the average rate of TCR associated with low- and near-low-FSR banks (10%). 
Finally, the researcher concludes for the capital adequacy category that Middle East banks 
rely more on debt (i.e., deposits) rather than equity to finance their assets regardless of the 
assigned FSR. This finding is intrinsic to the Middle East banking industry in light of the 
historical evolvement of the banking industry, which arose from governmental funds. 
Specifically, the contribution of public equity has emerged recently according to openings 
and the pace of progress of stock markets in the region. Finally, the two models of the capital 
adequacy category are significant at the 1% level, which indicates that the alternative 
hypothesis (HA3) outperforms the null hypothesis (H03). 
The empirical results revealed that banks in the Middle East have certain credit risk 
characteristics summarised as follows: (1) low-FSR banks have poor quality loan portfolios 
and near-high-FSR banks have better quality loan portfolios because they adopt firm 
management strategies and policies regarding the issuance of corporate and retail loans. This 
argument is supported by the fact that the average rate of loan loss reserve to gross loans ratio 
(LLRGL) for low-FSR banks (14.27%) is higher than same average for high-FSR banks 
(3.65%). Finally, this result supports the validity of the ILGL ratio result under the asset 
quality category.  
Further, high-FSR banks are more conservative and rational regarding expected loan losses 
and build a capital buffer against expected loan losses that are written off against banks. In 
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line with banking activity, high-FSR banks are willing to maintain their good reputations and 
depositors’ confidence levels by reducing their probability of failure by applying defensive or 
firm techniques to guide the issuance of corporate and retail loans. This argument is 
supported by the fact that the average rate of loan loss reserve to equity ratio (LLRE) for 
high-FSR banks (22.9%) is somewhat lower than the average rate of LLRE for low-FSR 
banks (62.3%).  
In addition, low-FSR banks employ poor credit management techniques, which forces banks 
to increase balances of annual provision to alleviate expected future losses that may arise 
from poor quality loan portfolios. On the contrary, high- and near-high-FSR banks implement 
firm credit management techniques that result in lower annual provisions than for low-FSR 
banks. This argument is supported by the fact that average rate of LLPTL for low- and near-
low-FSR banks (1.47%) is higher than that for high-and near-high-FSR banks (0.73%). This 
finding confirms results reported for the LLRGL ratio. 
Finally, results for the loan loss provision to equity ratio (LLPE) confirm that low-FSR banks 
do not accumulate an appropriate amount of capital cushion to lessen high credit risk 
exposure. However, high-FSR banks confirm an opposite scenario because of the 
implementation of firm credit management techniques, which ultimately result in better credit 
decisions and reduce credit risk exposure. This debate is confirmed by the fact that average 
rate of LLPE ratio for low-FSR banks (9.4%) is slightly higher than the average rate for high-
FSR banks (8.35%). In conclusion, the two models of the credit risk category are significant 
at the 99% confidence level, which indicates that the null hypothesis (H04) is rejected in 
favour of the alternative hypothesis (HA4). 
Concerning the liquidity position of banks in the Middle East, the following elucidates the 
main characteristics of bank liquidity positions associated with various FSRs. It seems that 
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low-FSR banks sell larger amounts of poor quality loans, which results in a higher degree of 
liquidity risk exposure and inversely affects FSR assignment. On the other hand, it appears 
that high- and near-high-FSR banks do not depend entirely on selling loans as their main 
source of revenue. However, they invest in other financial activities and instruments to 
maintain safe liquidity positions and thus obtain high- or near-high-FSRs. 
In line with this, it appears that high- and near-high-FSR banks invest more in liquid assets to 
maintain good liquidity positions to withstand sudden withdrawal of customers and short-
term funding. It should be noted that high-FSR banks prefer excess liquidity to fund the 
growth in the retail market and to finance the booming small-medium size corporate sector in 
the Middle East region. In general, these two areas are considered huge opportunities for the 
potential growth of the banking industry in the Middle East region. On the other hand, it 
appears that low- and near-low-FSR banks do not maintain an appropriate amount of liquid 
assets and thus obtain low FSRs. This is supported by the fact that the average rate of liquid 
asset to deposit and short-term funding ratio (LADSTF) for high- and near-high-FSR banks 
(41.6%) is greater than average rate for low- and near-low-FSR banks (33.1%). As a final 
point, the two models of the liquidity category are significant at the 1% level, which shows 
that the alternative hypothesis (HA5) is not rejected. 
The empirical results provide clear evidence that bank profitability in the Middle East region 
is a strong determinant of bank FSR assignment. This is supported by the fact that the 
profitability category has the highest explanatory power of all of the categories. Also, the 
researcher concludes that bank management capabilities and characteristics have a great 
impact on FSR assignment. Banks’ managers that are unable to use security gains or losses 
and other tax-management tools (such as the purchase of tax-exempt bonds) to minimise 
banks’ tax exposure usually acquire low- and near-low-FSR. However, high- and near-high-
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FSR banks’ managers are proficient and experienced in terms of using new financial 
instruments or techniques to reduce bank tax exposure. This argument is supported by the fact 
that average rate of tax management efficiency (TME) for low- and near-low-FSR banks 
(80.5%) is somewhat lower than the average rate for high- and near-high-FSR banks (97.1%). 
Furthermore, low- and near-low-FSR banks manage cost-side activities inefficiently relative 
to the generated income side; whereas near-high-FSR banks operate at low cost. This finding 
is consistent with the new era of the banking industry, which focuses on movement toward 
automation and installation of sophisticated electronic systems instead of older, labour-based 
production and delivery systems. This reduces bank overhead costs relative to generated 
income. It is worth mentioning that the average rate of cost-to-income ratio (CIR) for low- 
and near-low-FSR banks (46.5%) is higher than the average rate for high- and near-high-FSR 
banks (34.6%). 
Moreover, low- and near-low-FSR banks do not efficiently utilise their available assets (i.e., 
loans, investment securities and fees earned from fiduciary activities) to generate an 
appropriate amount of total operating revenue (interest and noninterest). On the contrary, 
high- and near-high-FSR banks implement effective asset portfolio management policies. It 
should be noted that the average rate of asset utilisation (AU) for low- and near-low-FSR 
banks (6.2%) is slightly lower than the average rate for high- and near-high-FSR banks 
(7.3%). 
In addition, low- and near-low-FSR banks in the Middle East make unprofitable operating 
decisions and thus these banks reduce the spread between interest revenue generated by 
earning assets and interest expense paid to interest-bearing liabilities. On the other hand, 
high- and near-high-FSR banks are proficient and qualified in generating the maximum 
amount of revenue by using the cheapest sources of funding. Additionally, this argument is 
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supported by the fact that the average rate of net interest margins (NIM) for high- and near-
high-FSR banks (3.2%) is slightly higher than average rate for low- and near-low-FSR banks 
(3.0%). 
Further, low-FSR banks either suffer from expense-control problems or decreasing revenues. 
This erodes net income, which negatively affects the rate of return on funds invested by 
stockholders of low-FSR banks. Along with this, it seems that low-FSR banks ineptly use 
their assets to generate an appropriate amount of income even after adding the provision for 
loan losses. On the other hand, high- and near-high-FSR banks employ efficient banking 
operation techniques and strategies that result in superior shareholder returns. This debate is 
confirmed by the fact that average rate of return on average equity (ROAE) for low- and near-
low-FSR banks (15.4%) is somewhat lower than the average rate for high- and near-high-FSR 
banks (17.8%).  
Additionally, low- and near-low-FSR banks are unable to control bank operating expenses 
efficiently. On the contrary, high- and near-high-FSR banks maintain better control over their 
operating expenses as these banks are more enthusiastic about advances in automation and 
mergers. Accordingly, this eliminates many overlapping facilities and thus reduces overhead 
and operating expenses. It is also worth mentioning that the average rate of the expense 
control efficiency ratio (ECE) for high- and near-high-FSR banks (34.5%) is higher than the 
average rate for low- and near-low-FSR banks (27%). In conclusion, the two models of the 
profitability category are significant at the 99% confidence level, which indicates that the null 
hypothesis (H06) is rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis (HA6).   
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6.2.1.2 All financial categories 
The researcher ran ML regressions for all financial categories to validate the results reported 
earlier under the five bank performance categories and to examine the overall explanatory 
power for bank FSR.  
6.2.1.2.1 Financial variables 
The researcher concludes that the asset quality measure (i.e., LLRIL) is an essential financial 
measure for CI for assignment of high- and near-high- FSRs. For capital adequacy, it seems 
that banks’ that wish to attain high- or near-high FSRs must pay more attention to capital 
adequacy measures (i.e., CS, TCR and EM). Note that CS is significant across all 12 models 
in this thesis, which prompts not rejecting the alternative hypothesis (HA1).  
Further, this thesis confirms the significance of banks’ credit risk measures (i.e., LLRGL and 
LLPTL ratios) for CI to assign banks in the Middle East a high- or near-high FSR. Another 
piece of information that is derived from this thesis is that the management of liquidity 
measures (i.e., LR) is an essential financial measure for banks that seek high- or near-high-
FSRs. Finally, profitability measures (TME, ECE, AU, CIR and NIEAA) are the most 
important measures employed by CI to assign banks in the Middle East high- or near-high 
FSRs.  
6.2.1.2.2 Nonfinancial variables 
The researcher concludes that banks operating in countries in the Middle East that have low 
sovereign ratings are assigned low- and near-low FSRs. On the other hand, banks operating in 
countries with high sovereign ratings are assigned high- and near-high FSRs. This confirms 
that CI identifies the impact of macroeconomic variables and the surrounding environment on 
the overall performance of banks, which eventually affects their FSRs. This finding is 
intuitive and consistent with results reported by Poon and Firth (2005), Van-Roy (2006), 
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Poon et al. (2009) and Belloti et al. (2011a). It should be noted that SR is significant across 
all six models, which prompts not rejecting the alternative hypothesis (HA7). Size was 
significant across five of the six models, and so it is likely to have a significant effect on CI 
decisions in the bank-rating process. The time variable was only significant in three of the 
models, and so it had some influence but was not as important as the size effect. Regarding 
the country variable, it had been dropped because of high correlation with SR and its possible 
inclusion under alternative models had been associated with quite good, yet inferior, models 
in terms of pseudo R-square. This suggests that, although the country effect has relevance, SR 
is a better guide for CI decisions in the bank-rating process than the country effect per se.  
6.2.2 Summary of bank FSR group membership results 
This thesis concludes from DA results that financial variables are associated with higher 
discriminatory power than nonfinancial variables, which prompts not rejecting the alternative 
hypothesis (HA11). Thus, bank managers must give relatively higher weight to financial rather 
than nonfinancial variables when formulating bank policies and strategies to promote high 
FSRs for banks. This is validated by the DA findings, which state that all financial variables 
(LLPNIR, ILGL, TCR, CS, ENL, REP, AU and LLPTL) contribute to the model’s 
discriminatory power by 65.5%, and nonfinancial variables (size, SR and T) contribute to the 
model’s discriminatory power by 34.5%.  
The empirical results reveal that CI depends heavily on the following three aspects to assign 
bank FSRs in the Middle East: (1) the extent to which the banks utilise their available assets 
efficiently; (2) the extent to which banks use leverage to finance their lending activities and 
(3) the quality of banks’ loan portfolios. Additionally, the results imply that CI assigns 
relatively more weight to bank size and country SR than other non-financial determinants in 
the process of FSR assignment in the Middle East.  
 216 
 
In terms of financial variables, the DA results prompt the conclusion that high-FSR banks are 
differentiated from low-FSR banks in terms of their being well capitalised. The positive sign 
associated with the coefficients of the capital adequacy proxies (i.e., CS, TCR and ENL) 
confirm this. The empirical results also reveal that high-FSR banks more efficiently utilise 
their assets and generate an appropriate amount of income even after adding back provisions 
for loan losses from their available assets than do low-FSR banks. This is emphasised by the 
positive sign associated the coefficients of the profitability proxies (AU and REP). 
Additionally, high-FSR banks are characterised by the use of robust credit-management 
techniques, thus attain better loan portfolio quality; in addition, they compensate highly risky 
loans with greater interest margins. The negative sign associated with the coefficients of 
LLPTL, LLPNIR and ILGL assert this.  
Regarding nonfinancial variables, the findings indicate that countries’ economic and financial 
conditions play a vital role in the process of FSR assignment by CI. The positive sign 
associated with the SR coefficient confirms that high-FSR banks operate in countries with 
stable economic and financial conditions. Furthermore, the results indicate that high-FSR 
banks are usually large in size, as the size factor is associated with a positive coefficient sign. 
Finally, the negative sign associated with the coefficient of the time dummy variable implies 
that FSRs of Middle East banks deteriorated slightly during the period from 2001 to 2009.  
In terms of banks’ FSR group memberships’ prediction, sophisticated machine-learning 
techniques outperform conventional techniques, which suggest the rejection of the null 
hypothesis (H012) in favour of the alternative hypothesis (HA12). The ranking of the models 
varies according to the sample included in the sub-runs. When the entire data set, training 
subsample1 and training subsample2 are considered, CHAID is preferred in terms of having 
the highest ACC rate and the lowest EMC across all proposed models in this thesis. For 
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testing subsample1, the highest ACC rate and the lowest EMC rate are associated with CART. 
The results also show that the DA is the best model using testing subsample2 with the highest 
ACC rate and the lowest EMC rate because of minimal Type II error rates. In general, it can 
be concluded that machine-learning techniques (i.e., CHAID, CART and MLP neural nets) 
are superior to the conventional techniques (i.e., DA and LR) in terms of accurate predictions 
of bank FSR group memberships in the specific environment chosen (i.e., the Middle East 
region). 
6.3 Policy implications 
Bank rating is one of the public economic issues that drive the development of capital market 
regulations in any country. In this thesis, the researcher has reached many significant results 
that help economic policy makers in many aspects as follows: 
(1) An accurate bank's rating would help determine the bank's creditworthiness, and 
therefore enable policy makers, especially in the capital markets, to allocate the 
public funds efficiently. Accordingly, the highly rated banks are worth an 
allocation of a relatively higher proportion of the public funds that would 
eventually result in high investment returns to the economy. 
(2) Bank ratings play a significant role when it comes to the assessment of bank's 
efficiency by investors and capital market regulators. Hence, a correct rating 
indicates how efficiently the bank is being run, which directly reflects the 
investment worthiness of the bank. In other words, a bank's high rating signals the 
soundness of its investment strategies that eventually lead to an improvement in 
the public wealth. 
(3) As for financial disclosure, precise bank ratings help capital market regulators 
disclose the authentic financial information to the public. This is of great 
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importance as it helps support the universal claims of enhanced financial 
transparency.  
6.4 Research limitations 
The analysis in this thesis is subject to number of limitations; however, it should be stressed 
that these limitations and constraints do not devalue the research outcomes, but rather, 
indicate the need for additional research to be conducted in this area. 
Firstly, the research time frame is 2001-2009 due to bank scope data limitation. Secondly, the 
sample used includes rated rather than non-rated commercial banks in the Middle East region. 
Thirdly, banks' FSRs data are based on the CI rating agency. Finally, the prediction analysis 
outcomes reflect banks' FSR group memberships rather than the prediction of banks' FSRs. 
6.5 Recommendations for future research 
The above mentioned limitations call for further research as follows: 
(1) It has become a necessity to compare the determinants of commercial and Islamic 
bank FSRs due to the technical and operational characteristics in both types. This 
research can be enriched taking into account the developed and developing 
economies.  
(2) There must be updates to the findings of the determinants of bank FSRs after 
2009. It is worth noting that the global waves of the introduction of Islamic 
finance must have had significant effects on bank financial performance since 
2009 onward.  
(3) There are also practical and viable research venues using the conventional and 
machine learning statistical techniques for predicting bank FSRs. The necessity of 
this research stems from the fact that the quality of bank FSR predictions serves as 
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early warning signals of bank performance. The latter is a crucial prerequisite in 
order to prepare for a protection of bank capital. Furthermore, these prediction 
techniques provide practical knowledge to bank managers in terms of developing 
FSRs to the non-rated banks. 
(4) The reality of the operations of RAs shows that they differ among each other in 
terms of the published data. This anomaly calls for a consideration of bank FSRs 
developed by different RAs. In addition, there is also another type of data, namely 
bank governance- related data, which show the effects of the quality of 
governance on bank FSRs.    
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Appendix A: Summary of the Relevant Studies in the Literature 
Author Objectives Methods Main Results 
Poon et al. 
(1999)  
To predict Moody’s bank 
financial strength ratings 
(BFSR) using bank specific 
financial data and to include 
an aggregate measure 
(between 0 and 100) to 
measure the economic, 
political and financial risk in 
the country in which the bank 
operates (country effect). In 
addition, the authors examine 
the relative importance of 
information provided by 
BFSR compared to that 
contained in traditional debt 
ratings.   
Dependent variable: Moody’s BFSRs 
range from A to E+, coded as 10 ordinal 
values. 
Independent variables: The study starts 
with 100 financial variables and ratios that 
cover the major measures of profitability, 
efficiency, asset composition, interest 
composition, interest coverage, leverage 
and interest. Using varimax rotation factor 
analysis, three financial factors account for 
more than 50% of the variability in the data 
set are selected: risk measures, asset 
management and profitability. Thus, 
independent variables include bank risk, 
loan provision ratio, profitability, long-term 
debt rating, short-term debt rating and 
country risk. 
Sample: 130 banks from more than 30 
countries as of June 1997; financial 
variables are from 1996. 
Methodology: Ordered logistic regression 
model 
 BFSR provides similar but not identical 
information to that contained in traditional 
debt ratings (both long- and short-debt 
ratings). Thus, BFSR does not have a high 
supplementary contribution when 
compared to Moody’s traditional ratings. 
 The effect of country risk on BFSRs is 
insignificant. This is mainly because of the 
homogeneity in bank financial disclosures 
across countries and the maintenance of 
minimum capital adequacy ratios required 
by the BIS. 
 Three financial variables help to classify 
BFSRs. The loan provision information is 
the most important financial variable as it 
is statistically significant across all 
models. The second most important 
financial variable is the bank risk variable, 
whilst profitability is the third most 
important variable. The inclusion of these 
three financial variables improves the 
predictive power of models that include 
only long-term and short-term debt 
ratings.    
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Author Objectives Methods Main Results 
Laruccia and 
Revoltella 
(2000)  
To identify the main 
determinants of overall 
banking system soundness 
and stability and to construct 
a microeconomic model to 
predict Moody’s BFSRs 
using different econometric 
techniques.   
 
Dependent variable: Moody’s BFSR 
coded on a 1 (A) to 9 (E) scale 
Independent variables: Long-term bank 
deposit country ceiling (LTBDCC) as a 
proxy for country risk, the ratio of loan loss 
reserve to gross loans and loan loss 
provision to net interest revenue as proxies 
for asset quality; the ratio of equity to total 
assets, log of the total equity, the ratio of 
equity to net loans, the ratio of equity to 
customer and short-term funding and the 
ratio of equity to total liabilities as proxies 
for bank capitalisation; cost-to-income 
ratio, net interest margin, the ratio of net 
interest revenue to average assets, the ratio 
of other operating income to average assets, 
the ratio of non-interest expense to average 
assets, the ratio of non-operating items and 
taxes to average assets, return on average 
assets and return on average equity as a 
proxies for bank profitability; the ratio of 
net loans to total assets and the ratio of net 
loans to customer and short-term funding  
as a proxies for bank liquidity and country 
dummy variables to highlight structure 
differences between regions and countries. 
Sample: 212 banks operating in developing 
and transition economies (38 in East 
 The empirical results revealed that neural 
network model explains 76.7% of the 
variance of the BFSRs, the linear 
regression model explains 73.5% and the 
logistic model explains only 71%.  
 The findings show that the effect of 
country risk on BFSRs is highly 
significant in the models. 
 All of the financial ratios have the 
expected sign for sensitivity. Banks with 
high BFSRs are associated with high 
equity-to-total asset ratios (well 
capitalised) and low cost-to-income ratios 
(high profitability), low net loans–to-total 
assets ratio (high liquidity) and low loan 
loss reserve to gross loans ratio (better 
quality loan portfolio).  
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Europe, 106 in Asia and 68 in South 
America) as of December 1998. 
Methodology: Linear regression model, 
logistic regression model and neural 
network model. 
Poon and 
Firth (2005) 
To identify the main 
differences in the distribution 
between Fitch’s shadow 
(unsolicited) ratings and non-
shadow (solicited) ratings. 
The paper examined the main 
financial characteristics 
associated with Fitch’s 
shadow bank ratings and 
whether they differ from 
those associated with Fitch’s 
nonshadow ratings. Finally, 
the paper buildt a statistical 
model to recognise 
differences in bank ratings.  
Dependent variable: Fitch’s Bank 
Individual Ratings (FBRs) coded on a nine-
point ordinal scale [9 (A) to 1(E)]. 
Independent variables: Profitability 
proxies including net interest margin, the 
ratio of net interest revenue to average total 
assets, the ratio of pre-tax operating income 
to average total assets, return on average 
assets, return on average equity, dividends 
payout ratio and cost-to-income ratio. Asset 
quality proxies including the ratio of loan 
loss reserve to gross loans, the ratio of loan 
loss provision to net interest revenue, the 
ratio of loan loss reserves to nonperforming 
loans, the ratio of nonperforming loans to 
gross loans and the ratio of net charge off to 
net income before loan loss provisions. 
Liquidity proxies including interbank ratio, 
the ratio of loans to total assets, the ratio of 
loans to customer and short-term funding, 
the ratio of loans to total deposits, the ratio 
of liquid assets to total deposits and 
borrowings and the ratio of liquid assets to 
customer and short-term funding. Capital 
adequacy proxies including Tier 1 capital 
 The empirical results revealed that Fitch’s 
shadow ratings are lower than non-shadow 
rating.  
 The results indicate that larger and more 
profitable banks located in countries with 
high sovereign credit ratings tend to obtain 
high FBRs. Banks with high loan loss 
reserve-to-gross loan ratio (poor asset 
quality) and high loan-to-total asset ratios 
(poor liquidity positions) are assigned low 
FBRs.  
 The findings indicate that the most 
significant factors in determining FBRs 
are bank size, profitability, asset quality, 
liquidity and sovereign credit risk.   
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ratio, capital adequacy ratio, the ratio of 
equity to total assets, the ratio of equity to 
total loans and the ratio of equity to 
customer and short-term funding. Ln total 
bank assets as a proxy for bank size. Fitch’s 
sovereign credit ratings were coded as 12 
ordinal values where AAA = 12 and D = 1.     
Sample: 1,060 banks in 82 countries rated 
by Fitch as of 2002. 
Method: Heckman’s two-step treatment 
estimation method. 
Pasiouras et 
al. (2006) 
To examine the determinants 
of FBRs by considering bank 
regulation and supervision 
framework, market structure 
and bank specific 
characteristics. 
Dependent variable: FBRs coded on five 
main categories: A and A/B coded as 4, B 
and B/C coded as 3, C and C/D coded as 2, 
D and D/E coded as 1 and E coded as 0. 
Independent variables: Divided into three 
main groups: Bank-specific variables 
include the ratio of equity to total assets as 
a proxy for capital strength, the ratio of loan 
loss provision to net interest revenue as a 
proxy for asset quality, return on assets as a 
proxy for profitability, the ratio of cost to 
income ratio as a proxy for management 
quality or efficiency, the ratio of liquid 
assets to customers and short-term funding 
as a proxy for liquidity, the logarithm of 
total assets as a proxy for size, the number 
of subsidiaries as a proxy for diversification 
of business and franchise power and the 
number of institutional shareholders as a 
 The empirical results revealed that banks 
with low FBRs are characterised by cost 
efficiency problems, higher levels of 
provisions for loan losses compared to 
their net interest revenue and weaker 
liquidity positions. On the contrary, banks 
with high FBRs seem to be more 
profitable and larger in size. In addition, 
banks with high equity-to-assets ratios 
tend to obtain high FBRs only when bank 
supervision and regulations variables are 
not included. 
 Regarding bank regulatory environment, 
the results indicate that the main 
determinants of FBRs under all model 
specifications are capital requirements, 
restrictions on bank activities, official 
disciplinary power, explicit deposit 
insurance scheme, higher deposit insurer 
 245 
 
proxy for bank corporate governance and 
ownership. Regulatory and supervisory 
variables include 12 variables representing 
capital requirements, an indication of 
existence of explicit deposit insurance, 
power of deposit insurance authority, 
restrictions on bank activities, accounting 
and disclosure requirements, auditing 
requirements, official disciplinary power of 
the supervisory agency, the ratio of 
liquidity to diversification index as a proxy 
for the degree of bank compliance with 
liquidity and diversification guidelines, 
entry into banking requirements, limitations 
on foreign bank entry/ownership, fraction 
of entry denied and economic freedom 
index using the Heritage Foundation 
economic index as a proxy. Market 
structure variables include three variables, 
the percentage of government-owned 
banks, the percentage of foreign-owned 
banks and the degree of asset concentration 
in the five largest commercial banks. 
Sample: 857banks in 71 countries rated by 
Fitch as of 2004. 
Method: An ordered logit model. 
 
 
 
 
 
power, liquidity and diversification 
guidelines, entry requirements, fraction of 
entries denied and economic freedom.   
 For market structure variables, the results 
showed a positive (negative) relationship 
between the share of assets in foreign 
owned banks (degree of asset 
concentration and share of assets in 
government owned banks) and FBRs.   
 Banks in developed countries tend to have 
high FBRs only when bank supervision 
and regulations variables are not included 
in the model.     
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Author Objectives Methods Main Results 
Van-Roy 
(2006)  
To examine the whether or 
not Fitch’s treatment of 
solicited and unsolicited bank 
ratings are different. 
Dependent variable: FBRs coded on a 
scale of 9 (A) to 1 (E). 
Independent variables: A matrix of 
financial and nonfinancial characteristics 
that explain the individual rating of banks. 
Financial characteristics include: loan loss 
provision/net interest revenue as a proxy for 
risk management, net loans/total assets as a 
proxy for liquidity, equity/total assets as a 
proxy for capitalisation, return on assets as 
a proxy for profitability. Nonfinancial 
characteristics include: banking and 
finance score estimated by the Heritage 
Foundation as a for proxy market 
environment, log (total assets) as a proxy 
for diversification/franchise, bank 
ownership and state ownership as proxies 
for corporate governance and disclosure 
index as a proxy for public disclosure. The 
dummy variable equals 1 if the bank has 
requested an individual rating and 0 
otherwise as a proxy to measure the so-
called treatment effect. 
Sample: 169 banks located in 11 Asian 
countries with both Fitch’s solicited and 
unsolicited ratings as of January 31, 2004. 
Methodology: OLS regression model and 
endogenous switching regression model. 
 The ratios of loan loss provision to net 
interest revenue and the ratio of net loans 
to total assets (disclosure index and return 
on assets) have a statistically significantly 
negative (positive) impact on individual 
ratings. 
 Financial and nonfinancial characteristics 
are not the main reason for the difference 
in treatment between solicited and 
unsolicited rating. However, unsolicited 
ratings tend to be lower as they are based 
mainly on public information. 
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Author Objectives Methods Main Results 
Godlewski 
(2007) 
To examine coherence 
between bank default 
probabilities and Moody’s 
and Fitch’s bank ratings  
using a scoring and mapping 
technique applied to banks 
located in emerging market 
economies and identifying 
the main determinants of 
bank ratings.    
Dependent variable: Bank default 
probability, Moody’s BFSRs and FBRs 
Independent variables: the Ratio of equity 
to total loans as proxy for capital adequacy, 
the ratio of personal expenses to total 
operating expenses as proxy for bank 
management, net interest margin as proxy 
for profitability, the ratio of loan loss 
reserve to nonperforming loans as proxy for 
portfolio quality, the ratio of liquid assets to 
total assets and the ratio of total deposits to 
total assets as proxies for liquidity. 
Sample: Two samples of 483 and 257 
banks for Moody’s and Fitch respectively, 
located in emerging market economies 
(e.g., South-East Asia, South America and 
Central and Eastern Europe) during the 
period from 1998 to 2002. In both samples, 
The numbers of defaulted banks are were 
68 and 48 banks for Moody’s and Fitch, 
respectively.  
Methodology: Logistic regression model. 
 
 For the bank default logit model for the 
Moody’s BFSR sample, the results 
revealed that profitable, highly liquid and 
well-capitalised banks with high reserves 
to cover nonperforming loans tend to have 
a low bank default probability and thus 
obtain high Moody’s BFSR. 
 Using the FBR sample, the empirical 
results revealed that banks with better 
capital adequacy, more total deposits to 
total assets and a better cover of 
nonperforming loan with reserves results 
in lower bank default probability and thus 
higher FBRs.    
 Using a simple scoring model, the results 
showed coherence between these ratings 
and actual bank default rates and the 
mapping results indicated that ratings tend 
to aggregate bank default probability 
information into an intermediate low 
category grade.   
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Author Objectives Methods Main Results 
Pasiouras et 
al. (2007) 
To examine the possibility of 
predicting FBRs for Asian 
banks using publicly 
available data. 
Dependent variable: FBRs coded on five 
main categories from A to E. 
Independent variable: Financial 
variables: Total capital ratio, ratio of equity 
to total assets, ratio of equity to total loans, 
ratio of equity to customer and short-term 
funding and the ratio of capital funds to 
customer and short-term funding as proxies 
for capital strength. Net interest margin, 
ratio of net interest revenue to average 
assets, ratio of other operating income to 
average assets, return on average assets, 
return on average equity and recurring 
earning power as proxies for profit 
efficiency. The ratio of net interest expense 
to average assets and the cost-to-income 
ratio as proxies for cost efficiency. Ratios 
of net loans to total assets, net loans to 
customer and short-term funding, net loans 
to total deposit and borrowings, liquid 
assets to customer and short-term funding 
and liquid assets to total deposits and 
borrowings as proxies for liquidity. Log of 
total asset as proxy for bank size. Using 
factor analysis, only five financial variables 
were selected: ratio of equity to customer 
and short-term funding as a proxy for 
capital strength, net interest margin and 
return on average equity as proxies for 
 For financial variables, ratio of equity to 
customer and short-term funding, net 
interest margin and return on average 
equity are the most important financial 
variables for FBRs. The empirical results 
revealed that banks with high ratios of 
equity to customer and short-term funding, 
return on equity and net interest margin 
tend to obtain higher FBRs. Thus, 
profitable and well-capitalised banks are 
assigned high FBRs.  
  For nonfinancial variables, the number of 
institutional shareholders, the number of 
subsidiaries and the Heritage banking and 
finance score are the most important for 
FBRs. A piece of information derived 
from this study is that regulatory 
restrictions on bank activity have a 
negative and significant effect on FBRs, 
which is consistent with Pasiouras et al. 
(2006). In line with this, the analysis also 
revealed that FBRs are significantly 
positively affected by the number of 
institutional shareholders and subsidiaries. 
 The empirical results revealed that 
MHDIS predicts FBRs with satisfactory 
classification accuracy (66.03%) 
compared to discriminant analysis 
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profit efficiency, liquid assets to total 
deposit and borrowings and net loans to 
total deposit and borrowings as a proxies 
for liquidity. Nonfinancial variables: The 
auditor’s opinion of the bank’s financial 
statements, number of subsidiaries as a 
proxy for the diversification of business and 
franchise, number of institutional 
shareholders, the Heritage bank and finance 
score to measure the relative openness of a 
country’s banking and financial system and 
whether or not the bank is listed in the stock 
exchange.  
Sample: 153 commercial banks located 
mainly in South and South-East Asian 
countries as of October 2004. 
Method: Multigroup hierarchical 
discrimination (MHDIS), discriminant 
analysis and ordered logistic regression. 
(53.73%) and ordered logistic regression 
(47.55%).  
  
   
Poon et al. 
(2009) 
To examine whether 
solicitation matters in bank 
credit ratings and to identify 
how and why solicited and 
unsolicited bank ratings may 
differ in terms of (1) the main 
financial characteristics that 
differentiate between these 
two rating groups, (2) the 
potential self-selection bias in 
which only banks with strong 
Dependent variable: S&P’s long-term 
credit rating in local currency ranging from 
AAA to SD/D coded as nine ordinal values 
(from 9 to 1, respectively). 
Independent variables: Financial 
variables included net interest margin, ratio 
of net interest revenue to average total 
assets, pretax operating income to average 
total assets, return on assets, return on 
average equity, dividend payout, the ratio 
of cost to income as proxies for 
 Unsolicited bank ratings appear to be 
usually lower than solicited bank ratings. 
 Larger banks seek international markets 
and thus ask S&P’s for bank ratings.  
 Country sovereign risk rating, bank 
profitability and bank size are important 
factors in determining bank ratings.  
 Return on assets (ratio of loan loss 
reserves to gross loans) is statistically and 
positively (negatively) significant to 
S&P’s long-term rating.  
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financial positions seek 
ratings and those with poor 
performance measures do not 
ask for ratings and (3) the 
relative importance of each 
factor in determining bank 
ratings.  
profitability; the ratio of loan loss reserve to 
gross loans, loan loss provisions to net 
interest revenue, loan loss reserves to 
nonperforming loans, nonperforming loans 
to gross loans, net charge offs to average 
gross loans and the ratio of net charge off to 
net income before loan loss provisions as 
proxies for asset quality; interbank ratio, 
ratios of loan to total assets, loans to 
customer and short-term funding, loans to 
total deposit and borrowings, liquid assets 
to customer and short-term funding and 
liquid assets to total deposits and 
borrowings as proxies for liquidity; Tier 1 
capital ratio, capital adequacy ratio, the 
ratio of equity to total assets, the ratio of 
equity to loans and equity to customer and 
short-term funding as proxies for capital 
adequacy. Nonfinancial variables included 
proportion of solicited ratings of the bank’s 
home country, logarithm of book value of 
total assets as a proxy for bank size, the 
book value of trading securities as a proxy 
for the uniqueness of bank assets, S&P’s 
sovereign credit ratings as a proxy for some 
important macroeconomic and institutional 
characteristics of the countries in which the 
bank operates, a dummy for the number of 
overseas exchanges on which the bank was 
listed and a dummy for the number of 
overseas subsidiaries held by the bank as 
 Thus, large and profitable banks with 
relatively low nonperforming loans to 
gross loans ratios located in countries with 
high SRs tend to obtain higher S&P long-
term ratings. 
 Solicitations matter in bank ratings. The 
impact of solicitation on bank rating is 
much more significant than that caused by 
differences in financial profiles. 
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proxies for measuring the size and volume 
of bank international operation. 
Sample: Time-series cross-sectional data 
for 460 commercial banks in 72 countries, 
excluding United States, that have solicited 
and unsolicited credit ratings issued by 
S&P’s from 1998 to 2003. 
Method: Endogenous switching regression 
model. 
Belloti et al. 
(2011a) 
To identify the impact of 
financial variables and 
country risk on predictions of 
individual bank ratings issued 
by Fitch.   
Dependent variable: Fitch’s FBRs coded 
on eight rating categories (A/B, B, B/C, C, 
C/D, D, D/E and E) where A/B = 8 and E = 
1; there were no data on banks with A 
ratings in this sample.  
Independent variables: Ratio of equity to 
total assets, liquid assets to total assets, the 
natural logarithm of total assets, the net 
interest margin, the ratio of net operating 
income to total assets, operating expense to 
total operating income and the return on 
equity. A time dummy variable and country 
indicator variables were included to capture 
country-specific variations in ratings. 
Sample: 681 international banks’ ratings 
between 2000 and 2007 from 90 countries 
(360 observations).  
Method: Ordered choice estimation 
techniques and support vector machine. 
 Large size (in assets), well capitalised (the 
ratio of equity to total assets) and 
profitable (return on equity) banks 
operating in more stable, developed and 
rich countries tend to obtain higher ratings.  
 Banks with high liquidity levels over the 
previous two periods prior to the rating 
tend to have a higher bank rating.  
 On the contrary, lower bank ratings are 
assigned to banks with a high ratio of 
operating expense to total operating 
income. Empirical results revealed 
recently rated banks tended to obtain 
lower bank ratings. 
 Inclusion of country effect enhances the 
predictive performance of both the ordered 
choice model and support vector machine. 
 Results revealed the in-sample predictive 
accuracy of the support vector machine is 
substantially better than ordered choice 
models.        
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Author Objectives Methods Main Results 
Chen (2012)  To classify credit ratings in 
the Asian banking industry 
using hybrid procedures and 
to identify the main 
determinants of bank credit 
ratings using an integrated 
feature-selection approach. 
This approach formulates a 
set of rules and regulations 
that guide the performance of 
Asian bank mangers, 
investors and other 
stakeholders.  
Dependent variable: Fitch international 
long-term credit rating for banks for five 
categories (AA, A, BBB, BB, and B).  
Independent variables: Net interest 
margin, ratio of net interest revenue to 
average total assets, other operating income 
to average total assets, non-interest expense 
to average assets, recurring earning power, 
return on average equity, return on average 
assets and ratio of cost to income as proxies 
for operation; the ratio of loan loss reserve 
to gross loans as a proxy for asset quality; 
the ratios of net loan to total assets, net 
loans to customer and short-term funding, 
net loans to total deposit and borrowings, 
liquid assets to customer and short-term 
funding and liquid assets to total deposits 
and borrowings as proxies for liquidity; the 
ratios of equity to total assets, equity to 
liabilities and equity to customer and short-
term funding as proxies for capital strength, 
the logarithm of total assets as a proxy for 
bank size. Using the feature-selection 
technique, the ratio of liquid assets to 
customer and short-term funding and the 
cost to income ratio were eliminated.  
Sample: 1327 Asian banks from 17 Asian 
countries that have long-term credit ratings 
issued by Fitch covering the period from 
 The proposed procedure in this study 
outperforms other methods (decision tree-
C4.5, Bayes net, OneR, artificial neural 
networks-multilayer perceptron, logistic 
and support vector machines using 
sequential minimal optimisation) with 
overall classification accuracy rate of 
83.84%. 
 Banks with AA ratings are superior in 
bank operations (profitability), liquidity 
and capital strength. 
 Banks with high levels of liquid assets are 
assigned high bank ratings. 
 Banks with BBB ratings are relatively 
worse in terms of operating, liquidity and 
capital strength than banks with AA or A 
ratings. 
 High rated banks are characterised by high 
other operating income-to-average asset 
ratio (profitability), equity to customer-
and-short-term funding ratio (capital 
strength) and equity-to-total asset ratio 
(capital strength); and low net loans-to-
total assets ratios (liquidity) and low net 
loans-to-customer and short-term funding 
ratio (liquidity). 
 Banks with high loan loss reserves-to-
gross loans ratios (poor asset quality) tend 
to obtain poor bank ratings.  
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1993-2007. 
Method: Feature selection, cumulative 
probability distribution approach, rough set 
theory. 
 Diversification of bank operations is an 
important factor for receiving a high bank 
rating.  
Laere et al. 
(2012)  
To examine whether the 
differences in ratings 
between Moody’s and S&P 
are to the result of (1) the use 
of different standards, (2) 
systematic differences in 
ratings procedures and/or (3) 
random variations in 
judgement. This paper also 
investigated whether RAs 
have employed different 
rating models after the 
criticism of their activity 
during the global financial 
crises.        
Dependent variable: S&P’s (AAA to D) 
and Moody’s (Aaa to C) long-term bank 
rating (bank ability to satisfy financial 
obligations as they come due) coded as 17 
ordinal values (assigned 1 to AAA/Aaa and 
17 to CCC+/Caa1 and below). 
Independent variables: Ratio of common 
equity to total assets as a proxy for capital 
adequacy, the ratio of loan loss provisions 
to loans as a proxy for asset quality, the 
ratio of cost to income ratio as a proxy for 
management quality, return on equity as a 
proxy for earning performance, the ratio of 
loans to deposits and the ratio of liquid 
assets to total assets as proxies for liquidity, 
ln assets as proxy for bank size, the ratio of 
non-interest expense to net income as a 
proxy for revenue diversification, ln 
[(ROA+EA)/ σ (ROA)] as a proxy for bank 
risk where ROA is the rate of return on 
assets, EA is the ratio of equity to total 
assets and σ (ROA) is an estimate of 
standard deviation of the ROA, SR as a 
proxy for country risk, the 3-month treasury 
rate as a proxy for business cycle and loan 
growth variable. 
 SR is the most important determinant of 
bank ratings for both RAs. Thus, banks 
located in countries with high SRs have a 
better chance of obtaining a better rating. 
 The empirical results revealed that bank 
size, profitability, liquidity and asset 
quality contribute positively to bank 
rating. In addition, banks with lower 
default risk have a higher probability of 
acquiring a better bank rating.  
 The results also indicate that in response to 
the latest financial crises, Moody’s and 
S&P have two different bank 
creditworthiness standards for a particular 
rating grade. However, both RAs 
employed similar standards of bank 
creditworthiness for the various rating 
classes prior to the global financial crisis. 
In general, S&P has implemented stricter 
bank rating standards than Moody’s. 
 Both RAs use less prudence to assign 
ratings to large, profitable banks and/or 
banks with more loans in their portfolios. 
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Sample: This paper used two samples: (1) 
288 commercial banks from 40 countries 
that received a rating from both Moody’s 
and S&P for the period from 2000 to 2011 
for split-rating examination; (2) 505 and 
552 commercial banks from 40 countries 
that received a rating from Moody’s or 
S&P, respectively, for the period from 2000 
to 2011   
Methodology: heteroscedastic ordered 
probit model. 
 
 
 
Öğüt et al. 
(2012)  
To predict Moody’s BFSRs 
using the most important 
publicly available financial 
and operational variables and 
to examine whether or not the 
financial strength ratings 
developed by the prediction 
models in this study were 
consistent with those issued 
by RAs.   
Dependent variable: Moody’s BFSR 
coded on six rating categories: E = 1, E+ = 
2, D- = 3, D = 4, D+ = 5 and C = 6.  
Independent variables: Ratio of total 
equity to total assets, total loans to total 
assets, nonperforming loans to total loans, 
non-current assets to total assets, liquid 
assets to total assets, liquid assets in foreign 
currency to total liabilities in foreign 
currency, net period income to total assets, 
net income to equity, interest revenues to 
interest expenses, total deposits to total 
assets, net interest revenues (loss) to 
number of branches, net interest revenue 
(loss) to total assets, net interest revenue 
(loss) to number of employees, total loans 
to total deposits, net interest revenue to 
total revenue from operations, non-interest 
revenue to total assets, assets to total assets 
 Ordered logistic regression achieved the 
highest accuracy rate when using factor 
scores as input variables compared to 
other classifiers. Accuracy rates were 
highest for multiple discriminant analysis 
and support vector machine when financial 
and operational variables were used as 
input variables.  
 The prediction accuracy rate of classifiers 
using financial and operational variables 
as input variables was higher than using 
factor scores.  
 The empirical results revealed that banks 
with high loan portfolio (loan to asset ratio 
and loan to deposit ratio), profitability 
(return on equity), efficiency ratios (the 
ratio of net interest revenues [loss] to 
number of branches, the ratio of net 
interest revenue [loss] to total assets and 
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of the sector, loans to total loans of the 
sector, deposits to total deposits of the 
sector, number of branches to total branches 
of the sector, number of employees to total 
number of employees of the sector, 
personal deposits to total deposits, foreign 
branches to total branches, specialised loans 
to total loans and assets in foreign currency 
to liabilities in foreign currency.   
Sample: 17 Turkish banks for the period 
from 2003 to 2009. 
Methodology: Multiple discriminant 
analyses, ordered logistic regression, 
support vector machine and artificial neural 
network. 
 
the ratio of net interest revenue (loss) to 
number of employees) tend to obtain high 
ratings. 
 A piece of information derived from this 
study is that RAs assign low ratings to 
banks that invest more of their funds 
(especially deposits) in government debt 
securities rather than selling loans. This is 
mainly because investment in government 
debt securities results in low profitability 
and high market risk (mainly the interest 
rate risk).  
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Author Objectives Methods Main Results 
Hammer et al. 
(2012)  
To construct a reverse-
engineering Fitch bank rating 
model to evaluate the 
creditworthiness of banks.   
Dependent variable: Fitch’s FBRs coded 
on nine rating categories.  
Independent variables: 14 financial 
variables: loans, other earning assets, total 
earning assets, non-earning assets, total 
assets, net interest revenue, customer and 
short-term funding, overheads, equity, net 
income, operating income, total liabilities 
and equity, profit before tax and other 
operating income. 9 financial ratios: ratio 
of equity to total assets as proxy for asset 
quality; return on average assets, return on 
average equity, net interest margin, the ratio 
of interest revenue to average assets, 
operating income to average assets as 
proxies for profit efficiency; the ratio of 
non-interest expenses to average assets and 
cost-to-income ratio as proxies for cost 
efficiency; the ratio of net loans to total 
assets as a proxy for liquidity. S&P’s 
country risk rating as a proxy for country 
risk. 
Sample: 800 banks rated by Fitch and 
operating in 70 countries as of December 
2001.  
Methodology: Multiple linear regression, 
ordered logistic regression, support vector 
machine and logical analysis of data. 
 This study reveals that logical analysis 
of data and ordered logistic regression 
are better than multiple linear 
regression and support vector machine 
in providing the most accurate results 
for a reverse-engineered Fitch bank 
rating system. 
 Comparison of the logical analysis of 
data and ordered logistic regression 
ratings with the Fitch ratings revealed 
that the classification accuracy 
associated with logistic analysis of data 
outperforms that of ordered logistic 
regression.  
 A piece of information derived from 
this study is that the logical analysis of 
data approach is suitable for reverse-
engineering bank ratings as it is a 
objective, transparent and generalisable 
approach. These features can help bank 
mangers to construct internal rating 
systems that act in accordance with the 
IRB requirements and are consistent 
with Basel II requirements.      
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Author Objectives Methods Main Results 
Shen et al. 
(2012)  
To investigate why banks  
with similar financial ratios 
located in different countries  
receive different credit 
ratings by proposing an 
information asymmetry 
hypothesis. 
  
Dependent variable: S&P’s long-term 
credit rating. 
Independent variables: Average ratio of 
net income to total assets as proxy for 
profitability; average ratio of liquid assets 
to deposits and short-term funding as proxy 
for liquidity; capital adequacy ratio as 
proxy for capital; the average cost-to-
income ratio as a proxy for efficiency; 
average ratio of loan loss provisions to net 
interest revenues as a proxy for quality; 
natural logarithm of total assets as proxy for 
bank size; S&P’s sovereign credit rating as 
proxy for country-specific effect; 
information disclosure quality as a proxy 
for asymmetric information and law and 
order tradition of a country, the quality of 
bureaucracy of a country and a country’s 
corruption level as proxies for the 
institutional environment quality of a 
country.  
Sample: Rated banks in 86 countries from 
various regions during the period from 
2002 to 2008. 
Methodology: Ordered probit model.  
 RAs assign greater weight to banks’ 
financial ratios in high-income and 
industialised countries because of low 
information asymmetry, better 
institutional environment quality and 
high quality financial statements. On 
the contrary, the weight of banks’ 
financial ratios is minimal in middle-
income countries because of a lack of 
transparency, high information 
asymmetry and low quality financial 
statements.  
 Improvements in banks’ credit ratings 
are associated with countries having 
low information asymmetry.  
 The empirical results revealed that well-
capitalised, highly liquid and profitable 
banks tend to obtain high ratings. Banks 
also tend to receive high ratings when 
the cost-to-income ratio (efficiency) and 
the ratio of loan loss provision to net 
interest revenues (quality) reach 
minimal levels. 
 The results showed that large banks 
located in countries with high sovereign 
credit ratings tend to receive high bank 
credit ratings.  
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Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Explanatory Variables for Low- and Near-Low FSRs 
Asset Quality Category 
Mean Standard 
Error 
Median Mode Standard 
Deviation 
Sample 
Variance 
Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum 
FSR 10.621 0.091 11.000 11.000 1.554 2.416 1.063 -1.248 6.000 6.000 12.000 
LLPNIR 0.267 0.037 0.132 0.000 0.623 0.388 121.131 9.457 9.123 -0.438 8.685 
LLRIL 0.904 0.025 0.850 0.891 0.388 0.151 5.810 1.786 2.899 0.095 2.994 
ILGL 0.140 0.009 0.096 0.065 0.147 0.022 9.446 2.625 1.041 0.006 1.046 
NCONIBLLP 0.184 0.049 0.054 0.000 0.683 0.467 70.663 7.712 7.907 -0.514 7.393 
ILE 0.601 0.059 0.318 #N/A 0.920 0.847 17.927 3.830 6.967 0.028 6.995 
UILE 0.295 0.050 0.101 #N/A 0.655 0.429 44.764 5.840 6.328 0.000 6.328 
 
Credit Risk Category 
Mean Standard Error Median Mode Standard 
Deviation 
Sample 
Variance 
Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum 
NCOAGL 0.007 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.020 0.000 40.845 5.116 0.235 -0.044 0.191 
LLPTL 0.015 0.001 0.008 0.000 0.023 0.001 8.871 2.711 0.164 -0.017 0.147 
LLPE 0.071 0.008 0.027 0.000 0.139 0.019 15.557 3.508 1.292 -0.238 1.055 
LLRGL 0.111 0.005 0.083 #N/A 0.088 0.008 2.219 1.519 0.462 0.013 0.475 
LLRE 0.494 0.037 0.276 #N/A 0.634 0.402 5.932 1.949 5.030 -1.698 3.333 
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Control Variables 
Mean Standard 
Error 
Median Mode Standard 
Deviation 
Sample 
Variance 
Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum 
T 4.769 0.148 5.000 5.000 2.523 6.365 -1.144 0.121 8.000 1.000 9.000 
SR 10.776 0.238 11.000 11.000 4.045 16.361 -1.226 -0.051 9.000 3.000 12.000 
Size 1.417 0.038 1.000 1.000 0.640 0.410 0.432 1.268 2.000 1.000 3.000 
Country 5.545 0.174 6.000 1.000 2.967 8.802 -1.174 -0.279 9.000 1.000 10.000 
 
           
Capital Adequacy 
Category 
Mean Standard 
Error 
Median Mode Standard 
Deviation 
Sample 
Variance 
Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum 
TR 0.160 0.003 0.153 0.160 0.051 0.003 3.907 1.350 0.399 0.003 0.402 
TCR 0.100 0.003 0.101 0.108 0.053 0.003 4.127 1.515 0.408 0.007 0.415 
CS  0.109 0.004 0.113 0.109 0.069 0.005 5.644 -0.278 0.681 -0.383 0.298 
ENL 0.238 0.005 0.227 0.279 0.079 0.006 4.633 1.415 0.667 0.011 0.678 
EL 0.144 0.005 0.127 0.087 0.093 0.009 2.967 0.947 0.820 -0.239 0.582 
EDSTF 0.155 0.006 0.135 0.166 0.105 0.011 4.583 0.681 1.045 -0.384 0.661 
CFTA 0.114 0.006 0.110 0.110 0.072 0.005 8.424 -1.095 0.648 -0.314 0.334 
CFNL 0.249 0.006 0.232 0.359 0.078 0.006 2.052 1.106 0.541 0.035 0.576 
CFDSTF 0.144 0.008 0.128 #N/A 0.103 0.011 5.659 -0.139 0.900 -0.384 0.516 
CFL 0.136 0.007 0.123 0.124 0.091 0.008 3.257 0.472 0.741 -0.239 0.502 
SDCF 0.059 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.091 0.008 1.960 1.614 0.373 0.000 0.373 
EM 10.572 0.355 8.738 #N/A 6.044 36.535 1.351 1.082 40.480 -7.117 33.363 
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Liquidity Category 
Mean Standard 
Error 
Median Mode Standard 
Deviation 
Sample 
Variance 
Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum 
IBR 1.683 0.104 1.188 #N/A 1.650 2.721 7.121 2.475 9.631 0.024 9.655 
LR 0.547 0.007 0.551 0.642 0.116 0.013 -0.140 -0.190 0.615 0.201 0.816 
NLDSTF 0.692 0.010 0.688 0.677 0.171 0.029 0.258 0.351 0.975 0.241 1.215 
NLTDB 0.650 0.009 0.654 0.645 0.147 0.022 -0.094 -0.087 0.757 0.227 0.984 
LADSTF 0.331 0.009 0.308 #N/A 0.157 0.025 -0.412 0.494 0.721 0.050 0.771 
LATDB 0.313 0.010 0.288 0.178 0.156 0.024 -0.187 0.635 0.728 0.044 0.771 
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Profitability Category 
Mean Standard 
Error 
Median Mode Standard 
Deviation 
Sample 
Variance 
Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum 
NIM 0.030 0.001 0.030 0.037 0.009 0.000 8.781 1.550 0.079 0.010 0.089 
NIRAA 0.029 0.001 0.028 0.031 0.012 0.000 -0.406 0.081 0.060 -0.001 0.059 
OOIAA 0.016 0.001 0.013 0.015 0.014 0.000 25.762 4.315 0.125 -0.008 0.117 
NIEAA 0.025 0.001 0.022 0.016 0.013 0.000 14.360 2.743 0.118 0.006 0.124 
PTOIAA 0.017 0.001 0.014 0.025 0.017 0.000 12.822 1.754 0.191 -0.060 0.132 
NOITAA -0.003 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.005 0.000 10.024 1.314 0.045 -0.018 0.028 
ROAA 0.018 0.001 0.016 0.000 0.016 0.000 11.029 1.186 0.192 -0.061 0.132 
ROAE 0.154 0.009 0.143 0.000 0.148 0.022 39.553 4.356 2.099 -0.536 1.563 
DPO 0.452 0.048 0.434 0.000 0.645 0.416 61.933 -4.144 10.385 -6.000 4.385 
INODAE 0.075 0.006 0.070 0.044 0.083 0.007 16.480 -1.579 0.875 -0.536 0.339 
NOINI 0.080 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.598 0.357 21.445 3.886 5.646 -1.574 4.072 
CIR 0.465 0.016 0.434 #N/A 0.280 0.078 134.987 9.769 4.296 0.098 4.393 
REP 0.026 0.001 0.024 0.031 0.016 0.000 8.281 1.900 0.144 -0.010 0.134 
NPM 0.241 0.012 0.210 #N/A 0.192 0.037 5.782 -0.817 1.716 -0.840 0.877 
AU 0.062 0.001 0.061 #N/A 0.017 0.000 12.503 2.225 0.153 0.030 0.184 
TME 0.805 0.042 0.881 1.000 0.705 0.497 124.084 -10.476 10.083 -8.500 1.583 
ECE 0.270 0.012 0.263 0.333 0.193 0.037 7.086 -1.119 1.842 -0.961 0.881 
OER 0.767 0.012 0.793 #N/A 0.190 0.036 4.172 0.852 1.483 0.228 1.711 
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Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Explanatory Variables for High- and Near-High FSRs 
Asset Quality Category 
Mean Standard 
Error 
Median Mode Standard 
Deviation 
Sample 
Variance 
Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum 
FSR 14.824 0.067 15.000 15.000 1.118 1.250 -0.485 0.212 4.000 13.000 17.000 
LLPNIR 0.174 0.016 0.102 0.000 0.269 0.072 38.415 5.078 3.008 -0.232 2.776 
LLRIL 1.392 0.042 1.238 2.000 0.687 0.472 9.277 2.428 5.482 0.341 5.823 
ILGL 0.040 0.003 0.025 0.012 0.043 0.002 9.663 2.744 0.303 0.000 0.303 
NCONIBLLP 0.114 0.029 0.026 0.000 0.447 0.200 108.270 9.315 6.693 -1.000 5.693 
ILE 0.191 0.016 0.114 0.075 0.259 0.067 41.176 5.116 2.813 0.003 2.817 
UILE 0.134 0.050 0.026 #N/A 0.426 0.181 43.503 6.289 3.266 0.000 3.266 
 
Credit Risk Category 
Mean Standard 
Error 
Median Mode Standard 
Deviation 
Sample 
Variance 
Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum 
NCOAGL 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.015 0.000 56.068 6.823 0.161 -0.011 0.151 
LLPTL 0.007 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.009 0.000 24.199 3.589 0.093 -0.005 0.088 
LLPE 0.067 0.032 0.022 0.000 0.526 0.277 273.868 16.490 8.814 -0.032 8.782 
LLRGL 0.044 0.002 0.035 #N/A 0.038 0.001 10.844 2.825 0.284 0.004 0.288 
LLRE 0.240 0.035 0.150 #N/A 0.587 0.344 219.255 14.069 9.417 0.015 9.432 
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Control Variables 
Mean Standard 
Error 
Median Mode Standard 
Deviation 
Sample 
Variance 
Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum 
T 5.266 0.157 5.000 9.000 2.615 6.839 -1.249 -0.147 8.000 1.000 9.000 
SR 14.932 0.129 15.000 17.000 2.146 4.605 1.378 -1.359 9.000 8.000 17.000 
Size 2.381 0.041 2.000 3.000 0.679 0.461 -0.681 -0.644 2.000 1.000 3.000 
Country 3.140 0.134 2.000 2.000 2.230 4.973 -0.043 1.034 8.000 1.000 9.000 
 
Capital Adequacy Category 
Mean Standard 
Error 
Median Mode Standard 
Deviation 
Sample 
Variance 
Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum 
TR 0.176 0.006 0.159 0.117 0.079 0.006 8.471 2.220 0.559 0.061 0.620 
TCR 0.208 0.006 0.187 0.129 0.091 0.008 4.192 1.743 0.590 0.080 0.670 
CS 0.125 0.002 0.120 0.124 0.036 0.001 3.452 1.207 0.360 0.008 0.368 
ENL 0.351 0.017 0.281 #N/A 0.292 0.085 8.828 2.575 2.409 -0.533 1.877 
EL 0.146 0.003 0.137 0.122 0.050 0.002 5.850 1.742 0.417 0.008 0.425 
EDSTF 0.160 0.003 0.148 #N/A 0.055 0.003 4.976 1.698 0.440 0.008 0.448 
CFTA 0.130 0.003 0.127 0.109 0.035 0.001 4.555 1.314 0.274 0.024 0.298 
CFNL 0.351 0.027 0.275 #N/A 0.327 0.107 8.466 2.519 2.409 -0.533 1.877 
CFDSTF 0.168 0.004 0.157 0.144 0.058 0.003 5.933 1.855 0.422 0.026 0.448 
CFL 0.151 0.004 0.145 0.122 0.049 0.002 7.469 1.942 0.400 0.025 0.425 
SDCF 0.095 0.010 0.104 0.000 0.107 0.011 6.010 1.613 0.685 0.000 0.685 
EM 8.947 0.456 8.350 #N/A 7.609 57.893 234.876 14.712 126.842 3.353 130.195 
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Liquidity Category 
Mean Standard 
Error 
Median Mode Standard 
Deviation 
Sample 
Variance 
Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum 
IBR 3.468 0.165 2.711 #N/A 2.350 5.521 -0.146 0.844 9.874 0.032 9.907 
LR 0.435 0.012 0.439 #N/A 0.210 0.044 -1.234 -0.035 0.779 0.041 0.820 
NLDSTF 0.552 0.017 0.551 #N/A 0.292 0.085 -0.846 0.145 1.516 0.046 1.562 
NLTDB 0.526 0.018 0.510 #N/A 0.268 0.072 -1.067 0.176 1.157 0.046 1.202 
LADSTF 0.416 0.010 0.389 #N/A 0.170 0.029 0.121 0.607 0.935 0.009 0.943 
LATDB 0.395 0.010 0.379 #N/A 0.158 0.025 0.487 0.678 0.888 0.056 0.943 
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Profitability Category 
Mean Standard 
Error 
Median Mode Standard 
Deviation 
Sample 
Variance 
Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum 
NIM 0.032 0.001 0.033 0.044 0.013 0.000 -0.280 -0.183 0.063 -0.001 0.062 
NIRAA 0.028 0.000 0.027 0.024 0.008 0.000 9.488 1.625 0.071 0.010 0.081 
OOIAA 0.016 0.001 0.014 0.016 0.011 0.000 56.272 5.829 0.149 -0.007 0.142 
NIEAA 0.019 0.001 0.018 0.018 0.009 0.000 8.753 2.227 0.070 0.005 0.075 
PTOIAA 0.024 0.001 0.023 0.035 0.015 0.000 20.846 1.506 0.197 -0.059 0.139 
NOITAA -0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.000 19.727 -3.293 0.046 -0.035 0.011 
ROAA 0.023 0.001 0.022 0.017 0.014 0.000 18.320 0.385 0.204 -0.072 0.132 
ROAE 0.178 0.008 0.185 0.209 0.135 0.018 63.076 -5.918 1.906 -1.360 0.546 
DPO 0.440 0.016 0.426 0.000 0.249 0.062 -0.640 0.132 1.137 0.000 1.137 
INODAE 0.104 0.006 0.097 0.067 0.088 0.008 8.414 -0.750 0.864 -0.394 0.470 
NOINI -0.063 0.026 -0.008 0.000 0.355 0.126 12.380 -1.274 3.582 -2.052 1.530 
CIR 0.346 0.006 0.342 0.291 0.097 0.009 0.378 0.478 0.532 0.164 0.696 
REP 0.029 0.001 0.028 0.020 0.012 0.000 25.831 3.206 0.133 0.007 0.140 
NPM 0.335 0.012 0.368 #N/A 0.187 0.035 21.388 -3.410 1.891 -1.208 0.683 
AU 0.073 0.001 0.071 #N/A 0.019 0.000 9.685 1.609 0.175 0.022 0.197 
TME 0.971 0.004 1.000 1.000 0.061 0.004 5.568 -2.415 0.362 0.713 1.075 
ECE 0.345 0.012 0.374 #N/A 0.185 0.034 22.810 -3.587 1.890 -1.207 0.683 
OER 0.651 0.011 0.619 #N/A 0.164 0.027 19.271 2.969 1.705 0.283 1.988 
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Appendix D: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Explanatory Variables for All FSRs 
Asset Quality Category 
Mean Standard 
Error 
Median Mode Standard 
Deviation 
Sample 
Variance 
Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum 
FSR 12.678 0.105 12.000 12.000 2.503 6.265 -0.381 -0.352 11.000 6.000 17.000 
LLPNIR 0.221 0.020 0.113 0.000 0.482 0.232 174.260 10.811 9.123 -0.438 8.685 
LLRIL 1.162 0.027 1.023 2.000 0.616 0.379 10.675 2.476 5.728 0.095 5.823 
ILGL 0.087 0.005 0.044 0.012 0.117 0.014 16.982 3.455 1.046 0.000 1.046 
NCONIBLLP 0.146 0.027 0.033 0.000 0.568 0.322 90.338 8.625 8.393 -1.000 7.393 
ILE 0.384 0.031 0.180 0.075 0.689 0.475 34.112 5.139 6.991 0.003 6.995 
UILE 0.248 0.038 0.076 #N/A 0.601 0.361 48.693 6.078 6.328 0.000 6.328 
 
 
Capital Adequacy Category 
Mean Standard 
Error 
Median Mode Standard 
Deviation 
Sample 
Variance 
Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum 
TR 0.167 0.003 0.154 0.160 0.065 0.004 9.930 2.216 0.617 0.003 0.620 
TCR 0.193 0.003 0.176 0.178 0.074 0.006 6.611 2.047 0.663 0.007 0.670 
CS 0.123 0.002 0.119 0.109 0.055 0.003 8.295 -0.198 0.751 -0.383 0.368 
ENL 0.296 0.009 0.248 0.279 0.223 0.050 17.942 3.578 2.409 -0.533 1.877 
EL 0.145 0.003 0.135 0.122 0.075 0.006 4.981 1.147 0.820 -0.239 0.582 
EDSTF 0.157 0.004 0.145 0.167 0.084 0.007 6.859 0.854 1.045 -0.384 0.661 
CFTA 0.123 0.003 0.122 0.109 0.056 0.003 13.082 -1.192 0.648 -0.314 0.334 
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Capital Adequacy Category 
Mean Standard 
Error 
Median Mode Standard 
Deviation 
Sample 
Variance 
Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum 
CFNL 0.296 0.013 0.242 0.359 0.234 0.055 19.960 3.742 2.409 -0.533 1.877 
CFDSTF 0.157 0.005 0.151 0.144 0.082 0.007 8.018 -0.014 0.900 -0.384 0.516 
CFL 0.144 0.004 0.139 0.122 0.072 0.005 5.536 0.590 0.741 -0.239 0.502 
SDCF 0.077 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.101 0.010 4.620 1.623 0.685 0.000 0.685 
EM 9.777 0.289 8.426 #N/A 6.897 47.566 164.159 9.905 137.312 -7.117 130.195 
 
Credit Risk Category 
Mean Standard 
Error 
Median Mode Standard 
Deviation 
Sample 
Variance 
Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum 
NCOAGL 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.017 0.000 47.866 5.845 0.235 -0.044 0.191 
LLPTL 0.011 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.018 0.000 16.490 3.550 0.164 -0.017 0.147 
LLPE 0.069 0.016 0.024 0.000 0.384 0.147 477.785 21.119 9.019 -0.238 8.782 
LLRGL 0.078 0.003 0.050 #N/A 0.076 0.006 4.915 2.092 0.471 0.004 0.475 
LLRE 0.369 0.026 0.204 #N/A 0.624 0.389 82.595 6.808 11.129 -1.698 9.432 
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Liquidity Category 
Mean Standard 
Error 
Median Mode Standard 
Deviation 
Sample 
Variance 
Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum 
IBR 2.481 0.102 1.700 #N/A 2.180 4.753 1.431 1.430 9.883 0.024 9.907 
LR 0.490 0.008 0.517 0.642 0.180 0.032 -0.536 -0.499 0.779 0.041 0.820 
NLDSTF 0.620 0.011 0.647 0.937 0.250 0.063 -0.261 -0.202 1.516 0.046 1.562 
NLTDB 0.592 0.010 0.609 0.645 0.222 0.049 -0.473 -0.301 1.157 0.046 1.202 
LADSTF 0.375 0.007 0.347 0.458 0.169 0.029 0.032 0.565 0.935 0.009 0.943 
LATDB 0.352 0.007 0.332 0.178 0.162 0.026 0.142 0.606 0.900 0.044 0.943 
 
Control Variables 
Mean Standard 
Error 
Median Mode Standard 
Deviation 
Sample 
Variance 
Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum 
T 5.012 0.108 5.000 7.000 2.578 6.647 -1.226 -0.007 8.000 1.000 9.000 
SR 12.810 0.162 14.000 16.000 3.862 14.913 -0.602 -0.774 14.000 3.000 17.000 
Size 1.889 0.034 2.000 1.000 0.817 0.667 -1.471 0.207 2.000 1.000 3.000 
Country 4.368 0.121 4.000 1.000 2.892 8.363 -1.226 0.361 9.000 1.000 10.000 
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Profitability Category 
Mean Standard 
Error 
Median Mode Standard 
Deviation 
Sample 
Variance 
Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum 
NIM 0.031 0.000 0.031 0.026 0.011 0.000 1.751 0.357 0.090 -0.001 0.089 
NIRAA 0.028 0.000 0.028 0.028 0.010 0.000 1.728 0.500 0.082 -0.001 0.081 
OOIAA 0.016 0.001 0.014 0.010 0.013 0.000 36.036 4.903 0.150 -0.008 0.142 
NIEAA 0.022 0.000 0.019 0.016 0.012 0.000 15.448 2.791 0.119 0.005 0.124 
PTOIAA 0.021 0.001 0.020 0.025 0.017 0.000 14.331 1.480 0.198 -0.060 0.139 
NOITAA -0.003 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 0.005 0.000 13.373 -0.747 0.063 -0.035 0.028 
ROAA 0.020 0.001 0.020 0.000 0.015 0.000 12.897 0.779 0.204 -0.072 0.132 
ROAE 0.166 0.006 0.165 0.000 0.142 0.020 46.531 0.041 2.923 -1.360 1.563 
DPO 0.445 0.022 0.429 0.000 0.463 0.214 100.412 -4.754 10.385 -6.000 4.385 
INODAE 0.091 0.004 0.085 0.067 0.087 0.008 10.877 -0.995 1.006 -0.536 0.470 
NOINI 0.008 0.026 -0.004 0.000 0.494 0.244 26.552 3.320 6.124 -2.052 4.072 
CIR 0.407 0.009 0.384 0.291 0.219 0.048 193.135 10.917 4.296 0.098 4.393 
REP 0.027 0.001 0.027 0.020 0.015 0.000 12.844 2.202 0.149 -0.010 0.140 
NPM 0.287 0.009 0.316 #N/A 0.195 0.038 10.369 -1.879 2.085 -1.208 0.877 
AU 0.067 0.001 0.067 #N/A 0.019 0.000 9.132 1.733 0.175 0.022 0.197 
TME 0.887 0.021 0.988 1.000 0.510 0.260 238.272 -14.407 10.083 -8.500 1.583 
ECE 0.307 0.009 0.335 0.333 0.192 0.037 12.249 -2.153 2.088 -1.207 0.881 
OER 0.710 0.008 0.683 #N/A 0.187 0.035 7.126 1.559 1.759 0.228 1.988 
 
  
  
Appendix E: Analysis of Model-Fitting Criteria and Likelihood Ratio Tests for Logistic 
Regression Model 
 
Model 
Model-Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square Df Sig. 
Intercept only 335.741    
Final 10.806 324.936 18 .000 
  
